ETERNALISM

By Orlando J. Smith

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ETERNALISM

A THEORY OF INFINITE JUSTICE

BY

ORLANDO J. SMITH

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PREFACE

It is usually assumed that the individual is created at his birth by a Divine Power, or by the processes of Nature. And we cannot deny that some individuals are born good and others bad, and it seems to be impossible to reconcile with Infinite Justice the theory that one individual is created — "compelled to be" — with a noble character, and another individual with a vicious character.

Other questions must be answered. If God or Nature has created a criminal, can we acquit the Creator of all accountability for the criminal? Has not the soul which is created vicious been deeply wronged? How can men be held to equal moral accountability if they have not been endowed in the beginning with equal goodness, equal strength, equal intelligence? Are those who are born vicious really the victims of the malice of Nature or of the wrath of God?

I shall attempt herein to answer these and kin-

dred questions, and to prove that the Eternal Order can be and must be just and right.

A small part of the matter in this volume is taken from a brochure published by me in 1899, entitled "A Short View of Great Questions."

O. J. S.

New York, 1902.

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PART I

CREATION AND ANNIHILATION ARE UNKNOWN TO SCIENCE

The world was never made.
It will change, but it will not fade.
So let the wind range,
For even and morn
Ever will be
Through eternity.
Nothing was born;
Nothing will die;
All things will change.

TENNYSON.

I

AGNOSTICISM, THE THEORY THAT NO ONE CAN KNOW

DESIRING to discuss the immortality of the soul, with kindred questions, I am met in the beginning by the Agnostic theory that knowledge bearing on the subject is unobtainable.

The position "I do not know" is a modest one. Every man must take it in relation to many things, for "our knowledge is as the rivulet, our ignorance as the sea." But the extension of the statement "I do not know" by the Agnostic to "I cannot know; no one knows; *no one can know*," does not bear the impress of humility. It has the appearance rather of an indirect form of denial, a method of changing the grounds of discussion, a challenge to human intelligence.

Man has always struggled to comprehend the meaning of his existence. He has been undiscouraged by countless failures. Beaten in one field of exploration, he turns with undiminished hope and courage to another. He refuses to accept a denial of the possibility of knowledge. He says to the Agnostic:

"How do you know that no one can know? You do not explain; you do not answer; you only deny.

"Upon what basis do you set a limit to human knowledge — not alone to your own knowledge, or to the knowledge of all who are now living, but to the knowledge of all who may yet live?

"When you say that 'no one can know,' you assert by implication that there is no evidence bearing on the subject; for knowledge cannot be denied where evidence exists.

"Here are two conflicting theories — one that the soul of man is immortal; the other that it is not. Is it likely that an inquiry would prove one theory to be exactly as reasonable, or as unreasonable, as the other?

"The true theory must have more evidence to support it than the false one, the truth being stronger than that which is untrue.

"You ask us to dismiss the subject. We cannot dismiss it. Primitive man could not; the half-civilized could not, and no more can enlightened man. And the Agnostics cannot dismiss it; for, having denied all possibility of knowledge and ended discussion, they continue to lecture and to write about it."

In a time within the memory of men now living, the theory of evolution had made little impression even upon scientific men, and not any upon mankind in general. The physical origin of the human race was still undemonstrated.

When Darwin wrote his immortal demonstration, Agnosticism was unknown. Darwin was impelled, however, in the introduction to his "Descent of Man," to dispose in these words of the "no one can know" theory, which is doubtless as old as the thought of man:

"It has often and confidently been asserted that man's origin can never be known; but ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge; it is those who know little, and not those who know much, who so positively assert that this or that problem will never be solved by science."

We now understand, through the labors of Darwin and others, the physical origin of the race of men.

If we would advance in our investigation of the still more important problem of the wherefore of the soul of man, we should deal promptly with essentials, rather than with non-essentials.

II

MATERIALISM, THE THEORY THAT DEATH ENDS ALL

TWO common views are held, in Europe and in America, regarding the past and future of the soul of man — the materialistic view and the theological view. Reduced to its simplest terms, this is the theory of Materialism:

The existence of the individual begins with the birth, and ends with the death, of his body.

The philosophy of Materialism may be expressed as follows:

"The individual is born without his own consent — the product of Heredity and of other causes of which he has no knowledge — and is equipped with physical, mental, and moral qualities for which he is not responsible.

"All that the individual knows is that he is here; that he is what he is. Why he is here, why he is what he is, he does not and cannot know."

But man must ask questions. He must, for example, inquire concerning the law of Heredity, upon which is based the claim that the dull and the depraved inherit the follies and suffer for the vices

of their forefathers. How can this theory be reconciled with moral accountability or with justice? Why should the individual be condemned for the sins of his fathers?

We do not tolerate a code that punishes one man for the wrong done by another. Can it be that man is just, and that the Eternal Order is unjust?

The Materialist would doubtless answer:

"Even if there were no law of Heredity, your questions would remain unanswered; for, since the individual does not create himself, he is not accountable for the qualities born in him.

"Nature, for reasons which we cannot comprehend, or perhaps for lack of reason, produces creatures that are unequal — some being men, some beasts, some reptiles. Of the men, some are wise and some are foolish, some good and some bad."

Then man must ask more questions. If Nature has created one brave and another cowardly, one wise and another foolish, one good and another vicious, why should the wise reproach the foolish, or the good the bad, or the hero scorn the coward? Is creation a lottery, in which some creatures draw prizes and others blanks?

We may assume that the Materialist would answer in these words:

"But why do you question *me?* I am not the Creative Force. I only face the facts, and decline to cherish illusions. If I have stated the facts in-

correctly, please correct me. If I have stated them correctly, then you, who question their justice, should account for them.

"If you cannot answer them, then accept them and make the best of them. If they overthrow some of your most sacred idols and theories, so much the worse for your idols and theories.

"The sheep does not complain because it is a sheep, nor the snake because it is a snake. Perhaps it would be wise for us to congratulate ourselves that we are no worse than we are, and make the best of what we are, rather than lament because some creatures have been treated unfairly in the distribution of Nature's favors."

III

MATERIALISTIC FATALISM: MAN IS THE BENEFICIARY OF NATURE'S BOUNTY, OR THE VICTIM OF HER MALICE

IT is now evident that the theory of Materialism is the doctrine of Fatalism, which can be interpreted as follows:

"We are men; we know not why. That we are men is due to no merit of our own.

"The good are only the beneficiaries of Nature's bounty, and the evil are the victims of her malice.

"That we are not monkeys or rats or snakes is due to our good luck alone.

"We had no part in our creation; we shall not be consulted about our extinction. A few years ago we were not; a few years hence we shall not be.

"If we are discontented, we can depart of our own will and without fear; for there can be no consequences of self-destruction. He who finds life undesirable is foolish to suffer here, when he can go hence to eternal sleep.

> "'If you would not this poor life fulfill,
> Lo, you are free to end it when you will,
> Without the fear of waking after death.'

"Courage, truthfulness, honor, and wisdom are the gifts of Nature, for which he who possesses them deserves no more credit than the apple for its flavor, or the rose for its fragrance.

"The noblest thought of Plato is not his thought; it is the result of the forces which Nature planted in the skull of Plato.

"Nature propagates intellectual and moral qualities as she grows potatoes, and vicious impulses as she produces thistles. The good and evil in us belong to Nature, who planted them.

"We are only the garden pots with which she indulges her fancy for the cultivation of man. In one pot she plants a seed which produces a hero, in another a poet, in another a thinker, in another a savior; and other seeds planted in other pots produce fools, traitors, liars, thieves.

"Our noblest, brightest, and best are as the prize roses in the flower show; our meanest are as the weeds by the wayside, or as the noxious growths in the swamps of the tropics.

"What merit we have is due to Nature's favor; our demerit to her neglect."

If the theory of Materialism be true, we must indeed part with the idols and ideals which we have most cherished. We must cease building monuments to the good and noble.

If it be true, we must pluck from our hearts all reverence for the great teachers, thinkers, discov-

erers, and heroes of the earth, for we owe them no respect; they were only the fortunate ones in the lottery of Fate.

If it be true, we can condemn no cowards, fools, or criminals, for they are the wretched victims of Nature's malevolence, and as such are entitled to our sympathy — if Nature has endowed us with such a quality as sympathy.

If it be true, we must admit that moral accountability is a fiction, and that equity has no place in the Eternal Order.

If it be true, our theories of eternal justice are dreams and illusions. Nature negatives them all. Man reaps what he has not sown, and sows what he shall not reap.

Materialism is a dismal and hopeless philosophy, which sends a chill to our heart-strings, turns the sweet things of life into bitterness, and destroys the charts and extinguishes the lights by which we have been guided.

And yet the Materialist is right in at least one position — his propositions should be answered, rather than merely questioned or denied.

IV

THE THEOLOGICAL THEORY, THAT MAN IS MADE BY A CREATOR

THE theory of Theology concerning the soul of man is expressed briefly as follows:

The individual is created at his birth, an immortal soul, who survives the death of his body.

This theory differs from the theory of Materialism in two particulars: First, in the assumption that the individual is created by God rather than by Nature; and, second, that man is endowed with immortality.

The theological theory — that the individual has been created by God — is also a doctrine of Fatalism. Man remains a creature that has been *made;* and the credit or responsibility for what he is rests with the Maker, and not with the thing made. Man is still but a pot in which the Great Gardener has planted a seed of good or of evil.

Indeed, the law of Heredity is distinctly asserted in the Second Commandment (Exodus xx. 5): "For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me."

A few of the many other texts touching the creation and final disposal of man, and the fatalistic relation of the Creator to man, are here reproduced:

Genesis ii. 7:

And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.

Ephesians i. 11:

In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.

Proverbs xvi. 4:

The Lord hath made all things for himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil.

Acts xv. 18:

Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world.

Proverbs xv. 3:

The eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good.

Isaiah xlv. 5, 7:

I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these things.

Romans ix. 11, 13, 15, 16, 18:

(For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that call-

eth.) As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.

Romans viii. 30 :

Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called : and whom he called, them he also justified : and whom he justified, them he also glorified.

Timothy i. 9 :

Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.

Ephesians ii. 8, 9 :

For by grace are ye saved through faith ; and that not of yourselves : it is the gift of God — not of works, lest any man should boast.

Romans ix. 21, 22 :

Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction ?

Daniel iv. 34, 35 :

I blessed the Most High, and I praised and honored him that liveth for ever, whose dominion is an everlasting dominion, and his kingdom is from generation to gener-

ation. And all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing: and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth: and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?

Psalm cxxxv. 6:

Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven, and in earth, in the seas, and all deep places.

Matthew x. 29–31:

Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered.

Psalm xciv. 8–11:

Understand, ye brutish among the people: and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that chastiseth the heathen, shall not he correct? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know?

Romans xi. 7:

What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded (according as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear) unto this day.

V

THEOLOGICAL FATALISM: ALL MEN ARE UNDER THE FAVOR OR CURSE OF THE CREATOR

ORTHODOX theologians agree in affirming the all-presence, all-wisdom, and all-power of a Creative God; that he sees all things, knows all things, wills all things; that the creature is powerless against the Creator; that man is an instrument of his Maker.

Upon this line of reasoning has been built the most absolute form of Fatalism that the wit of man can conceive — the doctrine of Predestination — which was until recent centuries accepted by all of the churches, though against the protest of an earnest minority. It yet remains in the creeds of the sects which hold the Westminster Confession of Faith, in which it is expressed in these words:

"By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life and others foreordained to everlasting death.

"These angels and men thus predestinated and foreordained are particularly and unchangeably designed, and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

. . . . . .

"The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy, as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sins, to the praise of his glorious justice."

The doctrine of Predestination is the logical and inevitable deduction from the theory of a Creative God, against whose will nothing can happen, who is all-powerful and is personally cognizant of all that is and will be.

But the sense of justice in the hearts of nearly all men revolts against every phase of Fatalism. The larger bodies of the church long ago abandoned the doctrine of Predestination. It is now a dying dogma.

And yet the denial that the final disposition of the souls of men has been predetermined by the Creator leaves equally serious questions unexplained; for it is evident, if the Creative theory be true, that the Creator *has already either blessed or damned all of his creatures in the very act of creating them.*

If the Creative theory be true, man is of necessity, from the first breath he draws, — for no merit or demerit of his own, — under the favor or the wrath of the Creator.

If it be true, then some men are created strong, brave, wise, honest, and righteous; some receive the gift of genius, of beauty, of fair-mindedness, of innocence, of honor; and these are under the favor and blessing of the Creator.

If it be true, then others are created ignorant, cruel, corrupt, selfish, cowardly, and base; some receive the gift of dullness, of selfishness, of meanness, of indolence, of ugliness, of savagery, of depravity; and these are under the curse of the Creator.

Justice requires that man shall earn what he gets, and shall not get what he does not earn; that he shall reap as he sows, and not reap what another has sown; that he shall suffer for his own sin, and not for the sin of another.

In one creature the Creator, if we accept the theory of Theology, has planted good. This good the creature has not earned. It is the gift of man's Maker.

In another creature the Creator, in accordance with the same theory, has planted evil. This evil the creature has not earned. It is the curse of man's Maker.

The doctrine that all men sinned in Adam is at war with justice. If we assume that a creature can sin against the will of his Creator and Ruler, then Adam's sin was his own, and he alone could justly pay its penalty. But if man did sin in Adam, then man should pay the penalty. Hence the atonement, by which man's responsibility is shifted, is also at war with justice.

The doctrine that salvation cannot be earned through a moral life alone, which has perplexed so

many minds, now becomes plain. The individual cannot, under the Creative hypothesis, be saved by his own merits, for he has none. His merits belong to his Maker, who gave them.

Man's demerits also, under the Creative theory, belong to his Maker; and the justice of this claim is crudely recognized in the granting of easy terms of salvation. Repentance and faith are the essential theological factors in salvation. Repentance is easy, and especially so to one in trouble. Faith is easy also to one who can accept the theory, often advanced, that reason need not enter into faith.

Theology has failed in its prolonged efforts to reconcile the doctrine of Fatalism, or of the creation of the individual, with justice and morality. Such a reconciliation is impossible. No system of justice or morality can be built upon the theory that we are, from our birth, and for no merit or demerit of our own, either the beneficiaries of God's bounty or the victims of his wrath.

VI

JUSTICE CANNOT BE BUILT UPON A FOUNDATION OF INJUSTICE

MATERIALISM and Theology are in agreement to this extent — that the individual is created. The Materialist believes that man's character is made for him by the processes of Nature; and the theologian holds that man's character is made for him by the act of a Creative God.

We have now reached the heart of the main difficulty in all theological and philosophical thought — the riddle which has puzzled, confused, and baffled every reasoning mind that has approached it from the standpoint of Creationism. Millions have discussed the question in books, pamphlets, sermons, lectures. The foremost thinkers in Christendom have sought for light on the subject, and have failed. The issue, when cleared of the complications and entanglements with which learning and authority have sought fruitlessly to explain, evade, or bury it, is as follows: *How can the responsibility for the good and evil in the individual who is created be transferred from the Creator to his creature?*

Can we even say that the thing that is manufac-

tured, compounded, is either moral or immoral? The lotion that changes agony into peace, the prescription that saves a life, are not moral; nor is a poisonous compound immoral. Morality and immorality exist in the maker and designer only, and not in the thing made or designed.

If the individual is created, then he can think only such thoughts as his Maker has given him the power to think, and do only the things which his Maker has given him the power to do. His thoughts and acts are therefore not his own; they are the thoughts and acts of his Maker.

It will be said in answer, by the theologian, that all men have been given freedom by their Maker to choose between good and evil. Does the Maker grant to the one created deaf, freedom to hear? Or to the one created blind, freedom to see? Or can the one created morally deaf be free to hear, or the one created morally blind be free to see? "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?" Must not each created soul act in harmony with the nature or character that has been given to it by its Maker?

Some men, it is true, have the inclination, will, or power to improve their moral condition. But if man is created, this inclination, will, or power is the endowment given to him by his Maker.

Other men have an inclination toward evil, and are mentally or morally weak. This tendency and

weakness are also, in accordance with the Creative theory, the gifts of man's Maker.

If man has been created, his will, his ambitions, his aspirations, are all the gifts of his Maker; and his weakness of will, his lack of aspiration or ambition, his mean-spiritedness, are also conferred upon him by his Maker. He can be nothing more or less than what he is made to be.

Moreover, the man who has been *created* vicious has been wronged beyond all our knowledge of wrong in its darkest aspect.

Our conception of the worst forms of wrong may be found in the basest manifestations of hate, cruelty, lust, ingratitude, treachery. But these iniquities and atrocities pale in comparison with the deeper and blacker wrong done by a Creative Power which could place the stain of crime, the stamp of debauchery, the brand of dishonor, upon a helpless human soul, which, if it could have had a choice, might have been innocent, noble, and good.

It is a significant fact, on the other hand, that mankind have coined the correct meaning of the word "creature," in the sense of one who has received unearned fortune, position, or honors at the hands of another, and is subject to the will, or is the instrument or tool, of this patron or creator. The word "creature," used with this meaning, as when Macaulay speaks of Charles I. "and his *creature*, Laud," is a term of scorn and contempt.

Nor can this word have in justice any other meaning, when applied to men who owe all that they have or are to power, patronage, or favor. And it must be so applied to our noblest, wisest, and best, if they have been created noble, wise, and good, without merit, or even choice, of their own.

He who honors any man for his wisdom or goodness, or scorns another for being dull or vile, repudiates both Materialism and Theology. For, if either the theory of Materialism or of Theology be true, no man deserves the least praise or blame for what he is. The man created good is as a good engine or machine, reflecting credit upon his Maker; and the man created bad is as an imperfect machine, a dangerous engine, or a poisonous compound, reflecting discredit upon his Maker.

Justice cannot be built upon a foundation of injustice, nor can morality be built upon a foundation of immorality. If God or Nature has created one soul good and another bad, then God or Nature has been unjust. If God or Nature has created a vicious, base, or depraved creature, then God or Nature has been immoral.

If a Creative Force has made all men as they are, then the truth that man speaks is the Creator's truth, and the lie that man utters is the Creator's lie; the honor in man is the Creator's honor, and the crime of man is the Creator's crime.

Man, at his worst or best, if his character is made

for him, is but the impotent and soulless expression of the Creator's varying moods, *and all moral distinctions vanish from the world.*

Fortunately, however, Creationism is not the only possible theory of the origin of the soul of the individual.

VII

SCIENCE KNOWS NOTHING OF CREATION OR OF ANNIHILATION

THE whole theory of Creation — the creation of the Universe, of the race of men, of the soul of the individual — is at variance with the trend, deductions, and demonstrations of modern science.

Fire, decay, and other forces can change, but do not annihilate, matter. Neither can matter be created; it is, so far as science knows, eternal. Force, also, so far as science knows, and the essential properties in all things by rational inference, are uncreatable, indestructible, eternal.

There is on record no evidence of a change in the laws of Nature. It is reasonable to assume that there has been and will be no change in them. Nature's ways are large ways. Her great forces, we are compelled to believe, could not have been set to work in some dim, far-off time, as an engine starts the wheels of a factory.

Huxley, in "Essays Upon Some Controverted Questions," says: "But science knows nothing of any stage in which the Universe could be said, in other than a metaphorical and popular sense, to be

formless or empty, or in any respect less the seat of law and order than it is now."

Herbert Spencer closes an epitome of the cardinal principles of his philosophy with these words: "That which persists unchanging in quantity, but ever changing in form, under these sensible appearances which the Universe presents to us, . . . we are obliged to recognize as without limit in space and without beginning or end in time."

We can conceive of no time when Nothing was, and Something was not. The word Nothing expresses only a negation. It has no place, no habitation, no real existence.

The theory of Creationism — so far as it applies to the Universe, to matter and force — has no standing now among scientific and philosophical thinkers. They believe that the Universe has not been created, and will not be destroyed — that matter and force are uncreatable and indestructible, and that the order of Nature is changeless.

Nothing is created, nothing destroyed — and yet the way of Nature is transformation, unceasing change. No thing stands still for an instant; not even the granite rock. There is nothing new in the constitution of any thing — nothing that did not exist before its incipience, and that will not survive its dissolution.

Creation, in its basic sense, — the making of something out of nothing, — is, so far as science knows,

impossible. Annihilation — the reduction of something to nothing — is also unknown to science.

The processes of evolution, of building and fashioning, are not creations. A house is not created — the essence and substance of all things used in building a house being uncreatable. Nor can a house be annihilated, its matter being indestructible.

What we loosely call Creation and Annihilation are really Transformations. That which to our eyes is made or born anew is old matter, old force, old thought, old spirit, old love, old hate, old honor, old degradation, in new forms.

The order of Nature, so far as we are able to comprehend it, has no contradictions. Its ways and facts are harmonious. The Universe, matter, force, and the essence of all things being immortal and eternal, then the soul of man, which is the essence of man, must also be immortal and eternal.

The flesh in which we see man must be only as a garment worn for a time. *There must be a process of growth, of evolution, for the mind, character, or soul, as well as for the physical body, of the individual.* The soul must have developed through evolution from antecedents that are eternal.

Man is the flower of this earth. It is unbelievable that God or Nature would give eternal life to a senseless speck of dust, and deny it to the soul of man.

VIII

THE THEORY OF ETERNALISM — MAN BUILDS HIS OWN CHARACTER

FROM the propositions in the preceding chapter I draw the following deductions, which are the foundation stones of the theory of Eternalism, which I shall herein defend: —

1. *The Universe has in space no boundary; in time no beginning and no end.*

2. *There is no creation and no annihilation — the essential properties of all things being uncreatable and indestructible. Birth and death, growth and decay, are transformations.*

3. *The soul of the individual, which is the essence of the individual, is uncreatable and indestructible, preëxistent and after-existent, immortal and eternal.*

The theory of Eternalism, in its relation to the individual, is the completion and the rounding out of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. That which has a beginning must have also an end. If man's soul came into existence with the birth of his body, it must die with the death of his body. "That which originates in time perishes in time," says Romany.

On the other hand, that which has no ending can

have had no beginning. The theory that immortality exists after death only is evidently but a half-truth. That which is immortal has forever existed.

Building upon the theory that the soul of man is beginningless and deathless, Eternalism teaches that the Eternal Order is just to the last degree — that man builds his own character — that we are sick because we have neglected the laws of health; ignorant because we have failed to improve our opportunities; fretful, despondent, lazy, or cowardly because we have cultivated mean-spiritedness; boasters, drunkards, ingrates, thieves, liars, or murderers because we have dishonored ourselves — that we reap as we have sown — that each one is what he has made himself in his previous existence — that man is forever working out his own damnation, or his own salvation — that he may rise to divine altitudes, or fall to the level of the reptile or the insect.

It is in harmony with the theory of Eternalism also to say that man is free, subject to the limitations of his own character, which the individual has made and can modify in freedom, and subject also to the order of Nature which, as I shall attempt to show, is just — that the form of each being shows what its life has been; its strength and goodness are medals of honor for its victories; its weakness and vileness are the badges of defeat — that man's life is an endless battle in which the good and brave are victorious, and the mean and cowardly are defeated.

IX

A WORLD WITHOUT EVIL WOULD BE AS TOIL WITHOUT EXERTION, AS A BATTLE WITH NO ANTAGONIST

EVIL, the problem which has baffled the Creationists, becomes explicable under the theory of Eternalism. Evil exists in the balance of natural forces. It is the penalty of wandering from right ways. It is also the background of good, the incentive to good, and the trial of good, without which good could not be.

As the virtue of courage could not exist without the evil of danger, and as the virtue of sympathy could not exist without the evil of suffering, so no other virtue could exist without its corresponding evil.

In a world without evil — if such a world be really conceivable — all men would have perfect health, perfect intelligence, and perfect morals. No one could gain or impart information, each one's cup of knowledge being full. The temperature would stand forever at seventy degrees, both heat and cold being evil. There could be no progress, since progress is the overcoming of evil.

A world without evil would be as toil without

exertion, as light without darkness, as a battle with no antagonist. It would be a world without meaning.

A man without eyes could see no evil, and without his other senses could hear, taste, smell, feel, and know none. But so emasculated, he would be a clod, not a man. Who would give up even one of his senses to escape the evil that it opens to him?

The law of averages indicates that what is called chance, or luck, is manifest in a superficial and temporary sense only, and that in the deeper and more permanent sense there is no such thing as hazard in the natural world.

So true is this, that the important business of insurance is built upon the sound assumption that fires, accidents, marine disasters, and even death itself, will always bear a definite ratio to time, numbers, and other factors.

Through the working of this law of averages, we can conceive that the individual in his eternal life — assuming the preëxistence and after-existence of the soul — passes through all forms of experience possible to human beings; and that he benefits and suffers, impartially with his fellows, from all kinds of good and evil fortune; and hence that he receives no injustice in the distribution of Nature's frowns and favors.

High souls do not get trouble enough. Nature's average allotment of difficulties does not satisfy

them. They seek, rather than avoid, risks, trials, and dangers. In fiction and history, and in the life about us, those characters are the most interesting who have gone successfully through the most trouble. No man commands our admiration if he be not a conqueror of difficulties.

Why should we not have happiness without effort? Because we should not have earned it. Nature is an inexorable creditor. We must pay for what we get, and pay in full.

A man loses his sight by a stroke of lightning; he is not responsible for the thunderbolt, and could not have escaped it by prudence or foresight. What consolation has he for this affliction which he could not have avoided? The consolation that his loss will be temporary, that his sight will be restored in his after-life. He should look upon his misfortune as merely an incident of his eternal life, in which adversity, as well as prosperity, has its uses and its compensations.

What is commonly called good fortune is not always really good; nor is bad fortune always really evil. Back of good fortune lurks sometimes an evil influence, and back of evil fortune a good influence.

Adverse fortune may strengthen a man's unselfishness, fortitude, and courage; while good fortune may weaken some of his nobler qualities, as great riches may develop idleness or vanity, and as inherited privileges may foster self-love, arrogance, and con-

tempt for one's kind. The heir to a throne, seen by the lights which illuminate the eternal life, may really be more unfortunate than he who is born to poverty and toil.

Many evils, such as pestilence and famine, which were formerly considered manifestations of the wrath of God, are now known to be the results of man's ignorance. Science can overcome pestilence, and provide the antidote for germs of disease. Prudence, foresight, and coöperation, combined with human thought, in the practical form of railroads and steamships, can relieve the horrors of famine.

Accidents, difficulties, burdens, and sorrows are tests of our manhood, trials of our worthiness, without which the soul would shrivel for lack of exercise.

All forces work to make strong men, high men, real men. The post of hardship and danger is a post of honor.

> "For as gold is tried by fire,
> So a heart must be tried by pain."

X

THE PROBLEM OF HEREDITY—GOD OR NATURE HAS NOT CREATED A VICIOUS MAN

HEREDITY, in the light of the theory of the preëxistence of the soul, becomes an illustration of the justice, and not of the injustice, of the natural order.

To vicious parents a vicious child is born. *The child is not created; its soul is as old as are the souls of its parents.* Its sins are its own. Its character has been formed in its previous existence.

It is as correct to say that the sins of the child are visited upon the parents, as that the sins of the parents are visited upon their offspring.

The child comes from space, to be for a short time a citizen of this earth. It is attracted by its own kind. Vicious itself, it naturally becomes the offspring of vice. So also the ignorant soul is born to dull lineage, the wise soul to wise ancestry, the good soul to good antecedents.

It is just that parents should beget children of the same nature as themselves, and that children should be begotten by their own kind. The children are as mirrors in which the parents can see

themselves, and in the parents the children are reflected. And thus both parents and children are rewarded for the good and punished for the evil in their own characters.

Building upon the theory of the eternal existence of the soul, we perceive that God or Nature has not created a vicious man — that the vicious man is self-developed — that he can place the responsibility nowhere but upon himself — that the strong have made themselves strong, and that the weak are responsible for their own weakness.

The dreams of perfect equality here or hereafter are apparently baseless. Some men will always be taller, stronger, or better than their fellows. No two men can be exactly equal in all things. The fit advance; the unfit decline. If the law were reversed, the Universe would be a hell in which health and wisdom would be exterminated by disease and folly.

We perceive also that the future of the individual is not predetermined; for it is of necessity undetermined, since man — under the theory of the complete immortality of the soul — makes his own future, as he has made his present and his past.

If it be true that our lives are predetermined, then we are as actors, speaking the lines and simulating the emotions in an unending drama which Fate writes for us — loving or hating, fighting or yielding, speaking wisdom or folly, acting nobly or ignobly, as the iron law of Necessity gives us our com-

pulsory parts — a theory which is in harmony with Creationism, and at war with Eternalism.

Nor can we admit, under the theory of eternal life for the individual, that salvation is free; nor that it can be secured on easy terms; nor secured on any terms in the sense of being held against all danger of being lost. Salvation can be *maintained* only — under this theory of justice — and only through eternal vigilance.

XI

MAN'S ACCOUNTABILITY — SUICIDE CANNOT KILL HIM; DEATH CANNOT DESTROY HIM

ETERNALISM confirms the doctrine of moral accountability in declaring that man is and will be what he makes himself. His follies and vices are his own; his strength and goodness are his own.

From the awful responsibility for himself he cannot escape. Suicide cannot kill him; death cannot destroy him. No ritual, ceremony, fasting, confession, or repentance; no imploration, prostration, or sacrifice to the Gods; no mediation, no form of faith, can save him. He has no friend at court; no attorney can appear for him.

The Law works silently, constantly; it is a stranger to pity, mercy, love, or hate; it knows only Justice — Justice to the finest degree, as exact as arithmetic, as the movements of the stars, as the order of the Universe.

Man's systems of justice are feeble compared with Nature's, as is shown in our temperance laws, which are often impotent; while Nature's statutes against drunkenness are enforced to the letter. Poverty, degradation, insanity, and death are penalties for the violation of Nature's prohibitory laws.

Our own system of government is a reflection apparently of eternal justice. The state gives to each man freedom, equal rights, and equal opportunities; but it can force no one to use his freedom, his rights, or his opportunities. The use or misuse of his civil rights rests with man.

So it is with his eternal rights. If the Eternal Order were to force man to use or to neglect his eternal rights, it would destroy his freedom, and consequently his morality, which is dependent upon his freedom to choose between good and evil.

The Law is accurate, steadfast, fair, and just. If anything so absolute as the Eternal Order can be said to have a purpose in relation to men, it is to make them happy. Unhappiness is usually the penalty of man's own errors.

XII

MAN IS HIS OWN SAVIOR AND CREATOR, AND MAKES HIS OWN HEAVEN AND HELL

UNDER the theory of the eternal existence of the individual, we perceive that the human form, however humble or even degraded, still confers a certain stamp of nobility. We are at least men; not "dumb, driven cattle." Opportunity is ours; knowledge is ours, if we would grasp it; and happiness is ours, if in ignorance we do not refuse it.

The greatest things in this world are not its rivers, lakes, and mountains; not its forests, plains, and palaces. None of these can see, feel, or love; none can think, aspire, or dare.

Man — who can conquer the forests and plains, who can build palaces, who can read the stars and suns, who can taste of both pain and joy — is the noblest object in this world. The raggedest child in London is greater than St. Paul's; the poorest peasant in France is nobler than the tallest peak of the Alps.

Man need not grovel or abase himself. He is older than Rome, older than the Pyramids, older than the Koran and the Bible, older than any book

ever written or printed; and he will survive them all.

Man is the eternal master of himself; a king of a royal line older than any throne or dynasty. The noble man has a noble kingdom; it extends as far and wide as his thought and love can reach.

The base man has a mean kingdom; but, if he so wills, he can broaden it, better it. He can lose it only through his own abdication; for in all the Universe he has no real enemy but himself.

Man is his own savior and creator, and makes his own heaven and hell.

Heaven and hell are real. They are always with us, and follow us through all experiences. Now, and every day of our lives, we must choose between them. We can accept either, scorn either.

Hell is in the neglecting of opportunities, and in descending among the vile and slothful; in descending so low that opportunity may cease, and hope die, and intelligence be lost. The deeper hell can be seen about us, in the lower animals; in beings dull, slimy, creeping, insignificant, loathsome.

Heaven is in the improving of opportunities, and in ascending to the level of the wise and good. It is visible to us in bodies sound, strong, and clean — in muscles that can stand a strain — in organs that can resist disease — in eyes that can drink beauty — in ears attuned to music — in minds that can reason and understand, appreciative of noble thoughts and

deeds, eager for wisdom, hospitable to truth, scornful of lies — in moral natures set to the Golden Rule, kindly, cheerful, generous, loving, and just; in courage, true; in honor, bright.

PART II

THE ACTUAL MEANING OF RELIGION

I

OUR LIFE HERE IS AS A BROKEN PART OF A MUCH BROADER LIFE

IN seeking for the rational explanation of Religion, and for the secret of its extraordinary hold upon mankind, this important fact should be considered: The life of the individual in this world alone — in that phase of existence which is bounded by birth as a beginning and by death as an end — *is usually incomplete, and apparently more or less unjust.*

Some enter the life here well endowed in body, mind, and morals, while others are poorly equipped in one or all.

A few live long and pleasant lives, into which enters no unusual trouble, pain, or misfortune. The lives of the many are short and broken, or rendered burdensome by slavish toil; "by griefs that gnaw deep, by woes that are hard to bear." Story pictures them, in his "Hymn of the Conquered," as —

. . . "the low and the humble, the weary and broken in heart,
Who strove and who failed, acting bravely a silent and desperate part;
Whose youth bore no flower on its branches, whose hopes burned in ashes away,

From whose hands slipped the prize they had grasped at, who stood at the dying of day,
With the work of their life all around them, unpitied, unheeded, alone,
With death swooping down o'er their failure, and all but their faith overthrown."

Nor are the good always happy, nor the vicious wretched, in proportion to their deserts in this life. To the contrary, the good are often wretched, and the vicious happy.

The life here is as one act in a play, or one chapter in a novel, in which the plot has neither opening nor conclusion, and in which the action, separated from the preceding and succeeding parts, is apparently without purpose, sense, or justice — in which wrong and villainy may be triumphant, and integrity and virtue trampled in the dust.

Perhaps our passion for fiction and the drama is due to the fact that in them we find that completeness and justice which we see rarely in real life. In them the good, after many difficulties and troubles, are triumphant, and the evil are finally undone.

Our fondness for biography and history — which abound also in rewards, retributions, and other equities — can be explained on similar grounds.

We discover that completeness and justice come to the individual slowly, but surely, in a historic sense — that those made great by accident are in time forgotten — that the tyrannical and the cruel are detested — that Columbus left a better legacy

than Cæsar — that Shakespeare is more honored than any English king — that Burns, the rustic poet, is better loved than Bonaparte, the conqueror.

We observe that Lincoln — whose youth was forlorn, whose life was full of care, who was assassinated in the hour of his triumph — still lives, and will continue to live, enshrined in the hearts of his countrymen.

And we learn to believe that the books of Nature must balance — that Time glorifies the just, humiliates the arrogant, levels all inequalities, revenges all outrages, rights all wrongs.

Thus we find in both fact and fiction, and in the hunger for justice in our own hearts, some warrant for our faith that the present life is only a broken part of a much broader life which will be complete, and in which all things will be made right and even.

If this life were broken into still shorter fragments, it would appear to be still more unjust. If, for illustration, each life consisted of one day only, then the lives of some would fall upon fair, mild, or brilliant days, and others upon wet, cold, or hot days; some upon the long days of June, and others upon the short days of December; and some upon days into which no sunlight would enter, and these would doubt even the existence of the sun.

But our life here consists of many days, and we know that the good days outnumber the bad ones; that the seasons return with precision, and that there

are but slight variations in the annual rainfall and temperature of any given district.

A week or even a month of bad days does not discourage us, for we know that in the round of a year we shall have about so much of rain and drought, sunshine and fog, heat and cold. So far as the weather is concerned, Nature's average restores approximate equilibrium in the cycle of one year, and complete balance in a term of years.

The broader the basis of reckoning, the more perfect is the result established by statistics and experience. While we have in our present life manifestations of perfect justice in the alternations of the weather, in the recurrence of the seasons, and in many other phenomena, and while a tendency toward justice is evident in all human affairs, it is clear that the life here is neither long enough nor broad enough to establish complete equity.

A full consideration of the subject leads to the conclusion that, if death ends all, then the mass of mankind must live, toil, suffer, and die under a condition of hopeless injustice — and hence that the only basis for the belief that justice will be completely established in human affairs is in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

This conclusion sheds much light upon the origin, universality, persistence, and rational meaning of Religion.

II

THE CONTRADICTORY DEFINITIONS OF THE WORD RELIGION

RELIGION is a word which has not been clearly defined. It has one meaning to Jews, another to Christians, another to Mohammedans, another to Buddhists.

Even the Christians — being divided into many sects — hold views more or less in conflict concerning religious truth.

The lexicographers have defined the word timidly and haltingly, drawing no clear distinction between Religion and Theology.

Benjamin Kidd, in his "Social Evolution," after assuming that an inhabitant of another planet who is visiting this earth desires to investigate our Religion, says:

"He would find everywhere discussions on the subject of Religion. Besides an immense theological literature, exclusively devoted to the matter, he would encounter the term at every turn in the philosophical and social writings of the time. He would find a vast number of treatises, and innumerable shorter works and articles in periodical publications, devoted to discussions connected with the subject and to almost every aspect of the great number

of questions more or less intimately associated with it. But for one thing he would search in vain. He would probably be unable anywhere to discover any satisfactory definition of this term 'Religion' which all the writers are so constantly using, or any general evidence that those who carried on the discussions had any definite view as to the function in our social development of the beliefs they disputed about, if, indeed, they considered it necessary to hold that they had any function at all.

"He would probably find, at a very early stage, that all the authorities could not possibly intend the word in the same sense."

The confusion in the varying conceptions of the meaning of the word Religion is apparent in the following descriptions, characterizations, and definitions:

Webster's Dictionary:

The outward act or form by which men indicate their recognition of the existence of a God or of Gods having power over their destiny, to whom obedience, service, and honor are due; the feeling or expression of human love, fear or awe of some superhuman and overruling power; . . . a system of faith and worship.

Century Dictionary:

The origin [of the word Religion is] uncertain, being disputed by ancient writers.

Recognition of and allegiance in manner of life to a superhuman power. Sense of obligation; conscientiousness; sense of duty.

Standard Dictionary:

A belief binding the spiritual nature of man to a supernatural being on whom he is conscious that he is dependent; also the practice that springs out of the recognition of such a relation, including the personal life and experience, the doctrines and duties and rites founded on it.

Religion is morality.

Worcester's Dictionary:

An acknowledgment of our obligation to God as our Creator, with a feeling of reverence and love, and consequent duty or obedience to him; duty to God and to his creatures; practical piety; godliness; devotion; devoutness; holiness.

James i. 27:

To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world.

Micah vi. 8:

To do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God.

Swedenborg:

All Religion is of life: and the life of Religion is to do good.

Herbert Spencer:

An absolute mystery.

Something which passes comprehension.

The consciousness of an Inscrutable Power.

Belief in the Unknowable.

Fichte:

Religion is conscious morality, a morality which, in

virtue of that consciousness, is mindful of its origin in God.

Spinoza:

The love of God, founded on a knowledge of His divine perfections.

Darwin:

The feeling of religious devotion is a highly complex one, consisting of love, complete submission to an exalted and mysterious superior, a strong sense of dependence, fear, reverence, gratitude, hope for the future, and perhaps other elements.

Thomas Paine:

To do good is my Religion.

Max Müller:

Religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man.

Kant:

Religion consists in our recognizing all our duties as Divine commands.

Matthew Arnold:

Religion is morality touched by emotion.

Comte:

The Worship of Humanity.

Alexander Bain:

The religious sentiment is constituted by the Tender Emotion, together with Fear, and the Sentiment of the Sublime.

Edward Caird:

A man's Religion is the expression of his ultimate attitude to the Universe, the summed-up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things.

Hegel:

The knowledge acquired by the Finite Spirit of its essence as an Absolute Spirit.

Huxley:

Reverence and love for the Ethical ideal, and the desire to realize that ideal in life.

Mill:

The essence of Religion is the strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires towards an ideal object, recognized as of the highest excellence, and as rightly paramount over all selfish objects of desire.

Gruppe:

A belief in a State or in a Being which, properly speaking, lies outside the sphere of human striving and attainment, but which can be brought into this sphere in a particular way, namely, by sacrifices, ceremonies, prayers, penances, and self-denial.

Carlyle:

The thing a man does practically believe; the thing a man does practically lay to heart, and know for certain, concerning his vital relations to this mysterious Universe and his duty and destiny therein.

J. R. Seeley:

Religion in its elementary state is what may be described as habitual and permanent admiration.

Dr. Martineau:

Religion is a belief in an everlasting God; that is, a Divine mind and will, ruling the Universe, and holding moral relations with mankind.

Froude:

There are at bottom but two possible Religions — that which rises in the moral nature of man, and which takes shape in moral commandments, and that which grows out of the observation of the material energies which operate in the external universe.

George MacDonald:

Life and Religion are one, or neither is anything: I will not say neither is growing to be anything. Religion is no way of life, no show of life, no observance of any sort. It is neither the food nor medicine of being. It is life essential.

Benjamin Kidd:

A form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for social conduct.

D'Alviella:

The conception man forms of his relation to the superhuman and mysterious powers on which he believes himself to depend.

III

THE TRUE DEFINITION WILL BE FOUND IN INSTINCTIVE AND PERMANENT BELIEF

THE mass of intelligent religious believers are growing rapidly in toleration and breadth of view. They hold with tenacity to what they believe to be the essentials, and are indifferent to the non-essentials, in Religion. To these liberal minds the moralities are the essentials, and the formalities are the non-essentials.

And many who are classed as unbelievers have recognized that there must be some truth in a sentiment so deeply intrenched in the foundations of human nature as is the religious sentiment. Chief among these is Herbert Spencer, who has expressed this thought at length in his "First Principles," from which I quote:

"Of Religion, then, we must always remember that amid its many errors and corruptions it has asserted and diffused *a supreme verity*. From the first, the recognition of this supreme verity, in however imperfect a manner, has been its vital element; and its various defects, once extreme but gradually diminishing, have been so many failures to recognize in full that which it recognized in part. The truly religious element of Religion has al-

ways been good; that which has proved untenable in doctrine and vicious in practice has been its irreligious element; and from this it has ever been undergoing purification."

Of the universality of Religion, Tito Vignoli says:

"There is no society, however rude and primitive, in which all the relations, both of the individual and of the society itself, are not visibly based on [religious] superstitions and mythical beliefs." — Myth and Science, 41.

Tiele says:

"The statement that there are nations or tribes which possess no Religion rests either on inaccurate observations or on a confusion of ideas." — Outlines, 6.

Max Müller says:

"Wherever there is human life, there is Religion."

Tylor ranks perhaps as the foremost investigator of primitive beliefs. In considering the theory that there must be tribes so low as to be destitute of religious faith, he says:

"Though the theoretical niche is ready and convenient, the actual statue to fill it is not forthcoming. The case is in some degree similar to that of the tribes asserted to exist without language or without the use of fire; nothing in the nature of things seems to forbid the possibility of such existence, but as a matter of fact the tribes are not found. Thus the assertion that rude non-religious tribes have been known in actual existence, though in theory possible, and perhaps in fact true, does not at present rest on that sufficient proof which, for an exceptional state of

things, we are entitled to demand." — Primitive Culture, i. 418.

Concerning the harmonies in religious beliefs, Tylor also says:

"No Religion of mankind lies in utter isolation from the rest, and the thoughts and principles of modern Christianity are attached to intellectual clues which run back through far pre-Christian ages to the very origin of human civilization, perhaps even of human existence." — Primitive Culture, i. 421.

Religion is older than feudalism, autocracy, and democracy; it is older than implements of metal, older than all language save only the rudiments of speech. Dynasties, nations, civilizations, and races have perished, but Religion survives.

Older than all learning, taking root in the hearts of the lowest forms of men, it has lived to build and sustain the greatest institutions of learning and of charity in the world.

It has been vital to and inseparable from man in all stages of his existence. It has inspired men to unselfishness and sacrifice; it has made life endurable to the forlorn and wretched, and it has comforted nearly all of mankind in affliction and agony and bereavement, and in the face of death.

In the name of Religion, on the other hand, superstition has been developed, learning persecuted, cruel wars have been waged, and monstrous crimes committed — including torture and many forms of mur-

der, from the slaughter of children on the sacrificial altar to the butchery of sects and communities.

In view of these contradictory facts, and of the supreme importance of the whole subject of Religion, it is imperative that we shall make no error concerning its actual meaning.

The essential truth or error in a philosophy is always found in its fundamental principle. Therefore we must search the foundations of Religion for the "supreme verity" to which Mr. Spencer refers, and the harmony of which Mr. Tylor speaks; we must seek for the vital part of Religion, not alone in its origin, but in all important stages of its development, whether among savage, semi-civilized, or enlightened men.

It would be useless to attempt to discover a ground of agreement in all of the thought of the world concerning Religion, for the thinking on the subject has been voluminous and endless, good and bad, sane and insane.

Nor should we expect to find an essential harmony in all religious organizations, great and small, temporary and permanent, powerful and insignificant. It is conceivable that a sect claiming to be religious is really irreligious.

We should seek for the actual meaning of Religion in the broad principle or principles which have been accepted by great masses of men in places and times wide apart; in the permanent manifestations of reli-

gious sentiment, and in the instinctive, spontaneous, and untaught beliefs common to primitive men which survive in more highly developed form among the enlightened.

And we must seek for it more particularly and finally in the harmony of belief in the great religious organizations now in existence; for they must contain, in the natural order of growth, that which is worthy of survival in the religious faith that has preceded them.

IV

THE SURVIVAL OF THE SOUL IS AN INSTINCTIVE AND A PERMANENT RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE

THE belief in a future life for the individual is accepted by all of the modern religious organizations of any importance. The belief that this future life will be endless is also held by all except the Buddhists, whose doctrine of Nirvana, it is usually assumed, means the final destruction or absorption of the individual life.

Since the Buddhists believe, however, that the soul of the individual, after death and preceding Nirvana, lives for a period so long as to be well-nigh interminable, we find that Buddhism is still in harmony with the other great religious organizations of the world — Christian, Mohammedan, and Oriental — in the belief that *the souls of all men survive the death of their bodies.*

It is now conceded by enlightened theologians, as well as by philosophers, that religious institutions and beliefs have developed through the universal principle of evolution. And it follows that, as the oak is something more complete than the acorn,

astronomy than astrology, man than the ape, so we shall find religious beliefs to be more perfectly developed in enlightenment than in savagery.

"For a principle of development," says Edward Caird (Evolution of Religion, 43, 44, 45), "necessarily manifests itself most clearly in the most mature form of that which develops. . . . It is the developed organism that explains the germ from which it grew. . . . We must find the key to the meaning of the first stage in the last."

We shall discover little, however, in the earlier cults out of harmony with the universal modern doctrine of the survival of the soul. There is no record of a religious organization of any consequence which denies wholly the life hereafter. Even the ancient Hebrews, whose faith was more materialistic doubtless than any other that is known to us, believed in spirits in and without men, that Elijah "went up by a whirlwind into heaven," that the dead Samuel appeared to Saul, that "the Lord killeth and maketh alive: he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up," and that all souls went at death to a vague and shadowy hereafter which could not be called life, and yet was not complete annihilation.

In a comparatively few cases the future life is denied to some portion of mankind. The Tonga Islanders believed that immortality was the privilege of caste; the Marquesas Islanders that women only would live hereafter; the Fijians that the souls of

the wifeless would be annihilated; the Nicaraguans and the Guinea negroes that the vicious would not survive death.

Some recognition of the doctrine of a life hereafter, of a soul separable from the body, is found in all forms of religious belief, ancient and modern, ignorant and enlightened, savage and civilized. As a rule this doctrine is asserted with clearness and completeness and with no form of reservation.

Tylor claims (Primitive Culture, i. 424) "as a minimum definition of Religion, *the belief in spiritual beings*," which appears (p. 425) "among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate relations." He defines "the belief in spiritual beings" (p. 427) as including in its full development "the belief in souls and *in a future state*."

This belief, he says (p. 426), is "*the groundwork of the philosophy of Religion*, from that of savages up to that of civilized man;" and constitutes (p. 427) "an ancient and world-wide philosophy."

Grant Allen says:

"Religion, however, has one element within it still older, more fundamental, and more persistent than any mere belief in a God or Gods — nay, even than the custom of supplicating and appeasing ghosts or Gods by gifts and observances. That element is the conception of *the Life of the Dead*. On the primitive belief in such a life *all Religion ultimately bases itself*. The belief is in fact the earliest thing to appear in Religion, for there are savage

tribes who have nothing worth calling Gods, but have still a Religion or cult of their dead relatives." — The Evolution of the Idea of God, 42.

Brinton says:

"I shall tell you of religions so crude as to have no temples or altars, no rites or prayers; but I can tell you of none that does not teach the belief of the intercommunion of the spiritual powers and man." — Religions of Primitive Peoples, 50.

D'Alviella says:

"The discoveries of the last five-and-twenty years, especially in the caves of France and Belgium, have established conclusively that as early as the mammoth age man practiced funeral rites, *believed in a future life*, and possessed fetishes and perhaps even idols." — Hibbert Lectures, 15.

John Fiske says:

"No race or tribe of men has ever been found destitute of the belief in a ghost-world." — Reality of Religion, 169.

Huxley says:

"There are savages without God in any proper sense of the word, but there are none without ghosts." — Lay Sermons and Addresses, 163.

Herbert Spencer says that the conception of the soul's survival of physical death,

"along with the multiplying and complicating ideas arising from it, we find everywhere — alike in the arctic regions and the tropics; in the forests of North America

and in the deserts of Arabia; in the valleys of the Himalayas and in African jungles; on the flanks of the Andes and in the Polynesian islands. It is exhibited with equal clearness by races so remote in type from one another that competent judges think they must have diverged before the existing distribution of land and sea was established — among straight haired, curly haired, woolly haired races; among white, tawny, copper colored, black. And we find it among peoples who have made no advances in civilization as well as among the semi-civilized and the civilized." — Sociology, ii. 689.

It is a significant fact that the modern Hebrews, the Christians, and the Mohammedans accept the doctrine of the survival of the soul, thereby repudiating to that extent the Old Revelation which they still accept formally as the word of God himself.

In the same way the Chinese have repudiated Confucius. While the thought of Confucius is materialistic, the Chinese Religions are profoundly spiritualistic. Not even Confucius, the adored and venerated philosopher of the Chinese, nor the writers of the Old Testament, could wean their followers permanently from the instinctive belief in a future life.

Instinctive Religion — that which is permanent and untaught as distinguished from that which is temporary, isolated, or based on speculation or authority — tolerates no limitation upon the after-life of man. Here and there some teacher or prophet has proclaimed that only women, or the married, or

the great, or the good, or even that no one, would survive death, but such theories have left no permanent impression upon the religious convictions of mankind.

Among these interpolations, contrary to the usual order, is the doctrine of Nirvana, which had its origin in the mind of "the Buddha." It is a comparatively unimportant part of a great philosophy. We do not know that it has been accepted otherwise than perfunctorily by the Buddhists, and we may doubt that it will enter into the universal religious belief of the future.

It should be observed that the soul doctrine of the lower culture has been amplified and extended by the higher culture. While a few of the lower tribes believed that some souls would not survive death, the modern religious organizations hold that all will survive. And while early Judaism discredited the immortality of the soul, the great religious organizations founded upon the Hebrew revelation proclaim that all men are deathless. For more than six hundred years the Jewish church has accepted the doctrine of "the resurrection of the dead" in the creed of Maimonides.

And while the Oriental theory of Nirvana apparently includes an actual though a remote end to the life of the individual, the spiritual philosophy of the Buddhists is in many other respects more comprehensive and complete than that of any other religious

organization concerning which we are fully informed — including as it does both the preëxistence and the after-existence of the soul, and a theory of divine justice for the individual which appeals with increasing force to the ethical thought of the world.

The tendency in the development of religious faith has been distinctly in the direction of a broad, rather than of a narrow, affirmation of the theory of immortality. And it is clear that the world has not yet reached a final stage in the evolution of the doctrine of the soul.

Without entering upon grounds of speculation, however, we may confidently claim, in the light of all the facts obtainable, that the belief in a future life, in *the survival of the soul*, is now an essential and universal religious doctrine, and that it has been continuously the instinctive belief of mankind.

The denial of the after-life is an irreligious doctrine. It is in opposition to all that is spontaneous and permanent in religious belief. "Without a belief in a future life," says Kant, "no Religion can be conceived to exist."

V

THE BELIEF IN THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE SOUL IS ALSO INSTINCTIVE AND PERMANENT

"I ENTERTAIN a good hope," says Socrates, "that something awaits those who die, and that, as was said long since, it will be far better for the good than the evil."

A very old belief — which grows with man's growth and strengthens with his enlightenment — is the faith that he is accountable for his actions.

Tylor, who doubts that the doctrine of retribution was universal among primitive races, admits that it existed among many, and that it extended and developed with the growth of mankind. He says:

"A comparison of doctrines held at various stages of culture may justify a tentative speculation as to their actual sequence in history, favoring the opinion that through an intermediate stage the doctrine of simple future existence was actually developed into the doctrine of future reward and punishment, a transition which, for deep import to human life, has scarcely its rival in the history of Religion." — Primitive Culture, ii. 84.

D'Alviella says:

"The idea of a judgment of the dead, to which the

theory of rewards and punishments naturally leads as its culmination, appears to have found its way into the minds even of very backward peoples." — Hibbert Lectures, 193.

Tangible evidence of the belief in accountability by primitive tribes now extinct being lacking, many scientific investigators deny that it existed.

Yet these investigators agree that propitiation was an universal rite among the lowest men, that it developed with man's culture, and survives even to the present time. Why did primitive men propitiate the spirits of their dead? And why did the later cults propitiate fetishes, idols, and gods?

Propitiation is offered through fear to powers to which one acknowledges accountability. The culprit propitiates his judge, the slave his master, the subject his ruler.

It is evident that the motive strong enough and general enough to impel all primitive tribes to propitiate the spirits of the dead must have been based on the belief that man was accountable to the spirits, whom he credited with extraordinary powers.

Peschel, Ratzel, and Schurtz, the modern German ethnographers, hold that the relation of cause and effect is ingrained in the minds of all men, including primitive men.

The knowledge of primitive man begins with cause and effect. He discovers that water quenches thirst, game is found under certain conditions, a cave gives shelter, friction brings fire, the sun yields heat and

light, some plants are poisonous, frost withers, lightning kills.

The first lesson learned by the infant is connected with cause and effect. The mother is the source of food, the cause of protection. Later the child learns that through effort it can walk; that some things are hurtful and others helpful; some bitter, some sweet; some heavy, some light. It discovers that some actions are beneficial, and may be safely repeated; that others are injurious, and should be avoided. The beneficial it recognizes as good, the harmful as evil. That which hurts, even if inanimate, the child would punish; that which is pleasant it rewards at least with a smile. The baby becomes a judge, and gives forth verdicts. Before it can speak its first word it knows much instinctively of cause and effect, of good and evil, recognizes the utility of rewards and punishments, and realizes dimly its own accountability.

And so animals, within their limitations, understand cause and effect, knowing that certain actions are beneficial and others harmful.

And the wisest man is distinguished from the dullest only by his superior knowledge of the results of causes, and of the distinction between good and evil. Knowledge consists only of the exploration of the great field of causation and accountability. Apparently nothing within reach of human observation is separated from cause and effect.

Man's belief in his accountability — that is, in cause and effect — is fundamental. It begins with his first rational consideration of his relations to the external world and to the order of Nature, which he will later deify.

Nature has two imperative commands which primitive man hears constantly—"Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not." As his mind grows the horizon of his accountability extends until it passes beyond the confines of this life.

Believing instinctively in his own survival of death, he anticipates naturally that in the after-life it will be "far better for the good than the evil." His ideas of good and evil may be crude, even wholly erroneous, but it is impossible for him, as it is for the child, to hold no theories of good and evil.

It appears to me that the sense of accountability was in the nature of things the first religious sentiment in the mind of man — that it is older than the belief in a future life and in superhuman powers — that it was based and still rests upon cause and effect, which are apparent to the infant and to the savage as well as to the enlightened — that the lower men perceived that the fruits of certain acts and things were good and of others bad, and that this perception led inevitably, in the infancy of thought, to what we may call *the doctrine of consequences*, which is the doctrine of accountability, of rewards and penalties.

Into the religious life of men has always been woven the theory of accountability. It is almost certain that all theories of a superhuman power or powers — of potent spirits, fetishes, idols, of many Gods, and finally of one God — grew out of man's feeling of accountability. His sense of accountability forced him to believe that he was responsible to some power or principle which sets things right.

Man has been so impressed usually by his accountability for his sins — by "the dread of something after death" — that he has sought means of escape from it as he would from wild beasts, from flood, or from fire.

D'Alviella (Hibbert Lectures, 179) says that Religion from the first "developed a spirit of subordination" and "favored the sacrifice of a direct and immediate satisfaction to a greater but more distant and indirect good."

The theory of "a standard of duty prescribed by something loftier than immediate advantage," as Brinton expresses it, which was recognized dimly and roughly by the lower tribes, has been accepted by all later forms of faith.

We find the doctrine of *the accountability of the soul* bedded in the foundations of Religion, entering completely into the life here, and into the life hereafter. It lies at the base of all religious theories of compensation and retribution, of a day of judgment, of salvation and damnation, of heaven and hell.

VI

THE BELIEF IN GOD — THE WAR BETWEEN NATURALISM AND SUPERNATURALISM

TO demonstrate the common principle in man's faith in superhuman influences and powers, which has developed into the belief in God, is a work of no little difficulty, if we limit ourselves to a mere comparison of the many objects to which man has attributed divine qualities.

For man, in the varying stages of the evolution of religious beliefs, has worshiped his own ancestors; trees, herbs, plants, and flowers; pebbles, small stones, and great rocks; hills and mountains; the dawn, sun, moon, and stars; the fire and sea; mummies and idols; ravens and other birds; lions, tigers, wolves, calves, goats, and coyotes; fishes, snakes, crocodiles, and lizards; and many Gods, some being good and others bad.

That an essential harmony does exist in man's varying beliefs in superhuman powers, we cannot doubt, since these beliefs have been universal and have developed on natural lines. The lowest conceptions gave way to something better, and these to something still better — fetishism to idolatry, idolatry to polytheism, polytheism to monotheism.

It would be easy to jump at this point to the conclusion that the highest theistic conception is found in the one God of the Christian Religion. Two hundred years ago such a claim could have been made with better grounds of reason than now. Then the tendency of religious thought, in the Western world at least, was distinctly in the direction of one God, personal and supernatural, the Creator and Ruler of the Universe.

Since that time, however, and particularly within the last thirty years, there has been a significant revolt against the theory of Supernaturalism. Great leaders in religious thought now declare that evolution is God's law and God's way, and that the natural order is identical with the divine order.

The doctrine of Supernaturalism is now attacked with vigor from the inside and from the outside of the churches. The highest scientific thought accepts the invariableness of law, the impossibility of the supernatural. Religious thought adjusts itself slowly but invariably to scientific thought. More changes in religious and scientific conceptions are registered now in one year than in some of the earlier centuries. A battle royal is now on between the hosts of Naturalism and Supernaturalism, and there are many reasons for believing that the latter has passed the maximum of its strength, and will appeal hereafter with decreasing force to human belief.

VII

THE MEANING OF THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

FOR the present I shall postpone the inquiry into the God-belief, the meaning of which will become clearer after an examination into the deeper significance of the two religious beliefs which, as we have discovered, are fundamental and permanent — one being the doctrine of *the survival of the soul*, and the other the doctrine of *the accountability of the soul*. In the harmony in these two doctrines we shall find the actual significance of the belief in God.

To begin with the first doctrine, Why has the belief in the survival of the soul been fundamental in all forms of faith?

The Materialist assumes that the belief in a life hereafter can be explained in man's fear or vanity — in his fear of annihilation, or in his assumption that his life is too important to be extinguished by death.

If man, through fear of annihilation, had adopted the theory of another life, he would have invented heaven only, or at least a condition not more wretched than his present life; and not hell, which is worse.

Men, through fear, do not jump deliberately from bad to worse. Nor if moved by vanity would man have invented hell. Vanity could have inspired heaven only.

The reasoning powers of primitive man were feeble and undeveloped. His religious beliefs were the results of feeling rather than of reasoning. In the main, or perhaps wholly, they were instinctive and spontaneous beliefs.

And yet there must be something veritable in the faith of primitive man, since it has been a vital part of all later religious belief, and has been held with as much tenacity by enlightened men as by savages.

Moreover, the truest of all thoughts and beliefs are those which are inborn and instinctive in the human race.

If primitive man had comprehended the rational meaning of his belief in the survival of the soul, he would doubtless have interpreted it as follows:

"We have adopted the theory of another life because of the injustice in this one.

"We perceive that there are wrongs here which are not righted here, and good which is not rewarded here; and, having faith in the justice of the Universe, we demand another world to right the wrongs of this one."

The origin of the belief in the survival of the soul, and the cause of its persistence and vitality, is found in the fact that *justice can be established in human affairs only upon the theory of immortality.*

And why also has the belief been universal that man is accountable here and hereafter for his actions? And why is man impelled to believe that his conduct here will influence his fate hereafter?

The voice which we have just quoted would answer as follows:

"We have always been busy with the questions of right and wrong. They crowd upon us imperatively. We cannot be indifferent to them; for wrong oppresses and tortures us.

"Our natures are such that we are forced to believe that wrongs should be righted, that justice should prevail, that the evil should be punished and the good rewarded.

"No sane man can entertain the contrary belief — that wrongs should *not* be righted, that *in*justice should prevail, that the evil should be *rewarded* and the good *punished*.

"Believing that right should prevail, we are forced to believe also that right will prevail, that justice will be done.

"And since, in the life here, wrongs are not always righted, and justice is not always completed, we are compelled either to abandon our faith in right and justice, or to believe that they will be completed in another life, or in other lives."

It is now evident that the theory that man is accountable eternally for his actions is the doctrine that *justice should and will be enforced.*

VIII

ETERNAL JUSTICE IS THE ACTUAL MEANING OF RELIGION

ONE of the two fundamental religious beliefs is the doctrine of *the survival of the soul* — that time shall be given for the completion of justice. The other is the doctrine of *the accountability of the soul* — that man shall reap as he sows; that justice shall be done.

Both doctrines are vital to justice, and in the absence of either justice could not exist.

It is plain that these two noble moral beliefs are but servitors upon a yet nobler principle. And it is evident that this central principle is JUSTICE — and more particularly ETERNAL JUSTICE — *which is the actual meaning of objective Religion.*

Religion should be defined in a subjective sense, as *man's recognition of and belief in Eternal Justice, in the moral order of the Universe, in a Supreme Power or Principle of Rightness.*

We can now understand why Religion — the faith in Justice, respect for Justice, love of Justice, desire for Justice — is older than the arts and sciences, than language and learning, than all of the other

institutions of men. For, without some comprehension of Justice, man could never have been man. It is his sense of Justice that makes him a man.

It is also obvious that Religion had no miraculous origin — that it was born with the awakening of man's moral senses, and that it will live so long as his moral senses survive.

Religion is as natural as the rocks, trees, and soil, as fruit, flowers, and fragrance, as the glory of dawn and sunrise, as brother-love and mother-love, as the hunger for Justice in the heart of man.

It is faith in Eternal Justice alone that has comforted the unfortunate, the afflicted, and the sorrowful, — that has made life endurable to the desolate, the wronged, and the dying, — that has been the source and inspiration of every religious thought, hope, and aspiration of man.

From this faith in Justice have grown inevitably our theories of right and wrong, our sense of duty and our code of morality — the belief in honor and honesty and rectitude — all of which would have no meaning if Justice be denied.

Morality is a question of duty, and duty is an obligation which Justice compels us to pay. Duty includes veracity, integrity, sincerity, benevolence, charity, good-will, self-respect, gratitude, fidelity, and all other virtues.

The Golden Rule is the perfect law by which Justice is determined. And Kant's famous "categorical

imperative" — "Act according to that maxim only which you can wish at the same time to become the universal law" — is also an exact law of Justice.

Justice is the foundation of every phase of retribution, vindication, reparation, indemnity, obligation, accountability. From whatever point we take up morals, we trace them back to their root in Justice.

"The real first truth of morality," says Victor Cousin, "is Justice. It is Justice, therefore, and not duty, that strictly deserves the name of a principle."

"Universal Justice," says Aristotle, "includes all virtue."

"Justice is the greatest good," says Plato.

Religion is a complete and perfect system of morality. Eternal Justice, the accountability of the soul, the immortality of the soul, and all other moral principles, are joined and linked together, and are inseparable. If one be true, all are true. If one be false, all are false. *The heart of all morality is Justice. And the heart of all Religion is Justice.*

The perversions of Religion are immoral, or unmoral, but real Religion has no meaning which is not moral.

Is Religion, then, identical with morality? Can we say that a moral Materialist is a religious man?

Religion means more than personal morality — it means *the moral order of the Universe.* The Mate-

rialist is religious in so far as he leads a moral life; he is irreligious in his denial of the life hereafter, which is also a denial logically of the rightness of the Eternal Order.

And, inversely, one who recognizes the moral order of the Universe may be a religious man to that extent only, and irreligious in so far as he leads an immoral life.

IX

A HARMONY IN THE DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION — ITS PERVERSIONS — ITS ORIGIN

WITH the comprehension of the true meaning of the word Religion, we perceive a harmony not before apparent in many of the conflicting definitions of the word.

The "Overruling Power" in the definition in Webster's Dictionary — the "Superhuman Power" in the Century — the "Supernatural Being" in the Standard — the "Ethical Ideal" in Huxley — the "Absolute Mystery" in Herbert Spencer — the "Ideal Object" in Mill — the "Everlasting God" in Martineau — come into harmony when we accept them as idealizations, interpretations, or deifications of the divine order of Eternal Justice.

The terms quoted in the preceding paragraph — with the exception of Huxley's "Ethical Ideal" — carry no clear meaning to the mind.

It is impossible to determine, for illustration, whether a "Superhuman Power," a "Supernatural Being," or an "Absolute Mystery," is either bad or good, diabolical or divine, save as one may apply one's own arbitrary interpretation to the term.

Huxley's "Ethical Ideal," when defined, means Justice, the base and source of all morality.

The misconception and perversion of Religion have been prominent in the development of religious beliefs. Irreligion has masqueraded as Religion, as lies have masqueraded as truth.

The perversions of Religion bear the same relation to real Religion that error bears to accuracy, and counterfeit to genuine.

Real Religion has developed no pomp, pageantry, or ceremonies, has demanded no bloody sacrifices, has established no inquisitions, has persecuted, tortured, and murdered no unbelievers nor dissenters. These performances, rites, and acts are irreligious.

The superstitions of the church are inheritances from our savage ancestors. The wars and feuds in the name of Religion have their source in the perversions of Religion.

Religion is the moral order of the Universe which, like evolution, gravitation, and equilibrium, has existed, and will continue to exist, regardless of man's recognition, or of his ignorant misinterpretations.

From whence comes this religious belief which is common among men?

The origin of Religion presents no more difficulties than the source or cause of all other knowledge that is classed as instinctive or innate. That man

believes instinctively in Eternal Justice is not more marvelous than that animals swim, and infants suckle, without instruction.

It may be doubted that any form of instinctive knowledge can be named which is not also true and vital. Instinct saves the animal from drowning, and the infant from starvation. It impels and inspires in the ways of salvation.

Only one question has ever troubled man — in slavery and freedom, in savagery and enlightenment — and that is the many-sided and ever-present issue between Right and Wrong. It is not remarkable that he is born with a belief favorable to Justice and antagonistic to Injustice — and that this belief is the strongest conviction that has ever entered his mind. Man turns as instinctively to Justice as to shelter, food, warmth, light.

The belief in Eternal Justice is the true faith, and the denial of the moral order of the Universe is the only real infidelity.

Perceiving now that man's religious belief is natural, it is evident that Religion can be defended and its truth demonstrated more perfectly on natural than on supernatural grounds — that it has not only a rational but a scientific standing.

X

THE MEANING OF THE BELIEF IN GOD — INHERITED THEOLOGY — SUPERNATURALISM

WHAT, then, is the actual meaning of the belief, which has always charmed the mind of man, in a Divine Power? It is not devotion alone to Jehovah, Allah, or Brahma, to Woden, Zeus, or Osiris, to fetish or idol. Many of the Gods of the past have been abandoned, and others may yet pass into oblivion, but the faith in God survives, and will doubtless continue to survive, with undiminished force.

Man has always believed that there must be a Power that rights things. His conception of this Power has often been infantile, grotesque, or monstrous.

The theological ideas of savages are as crude as their language, garments, and habitations. Some have advanced theories, others have dreamed dreams, and others have either assumed to be, or believed themselves to be, inspired to utter divine truth.

These savage beliefs have been handed down from generation to generation, gaining in authority and sanctity with time, and influencing and coloring the views of later and more enlightened eras.

Each age has usually inherited the Theology of a darker age. Clodd says:

"There is not a rite or ceremony yet practiced and revered among us that is not the lineal descendant of barbaric thought and usage." — Myths and Dreams, 168.

The gross descriptions of Gods and Devils, heaven and hell, as presented in many mythologies, are the efforts of the earlier men, who lived in darkness, to picture the central religious principle of Eternal Justice — the Gods being personalizations of Justice, the Devils of evil; heaven being the reward of virtue, hell the penalty of sin.

Back of the most ignorant forms of faith there is always a spark of truth. Mankind have never departed absolutely from the moral truth, and have been incapable of holding a false belief that did not in some sense, even though vaguely, symbolize a truth.

In remote times man conceived that the Overruling Power could be bribed with food or other gifts, or appeased by flattery, charms, service, or sacrifice. Out of these childish ideas grew the faith in talismans and exorcisms; confessions, humiliations, supplications, and glorifications; macerations, mutilations, and mediations.

After the organization of social and political institutions, men gradually changed their theological ideals to harmonize with their own broader knowl-

edge. They now conceived of a Divine Ruler as having the form of an earthly Chief or King, who could not be propitiated by the offer of food and such other gifts as would impress a savage mind, but who could be swayed by homage, supplication, and praise, or by ceremonies, pomp, and pageantry.

This conception of God as of an earthly autocrat with unlimited supernatural powers — as one who "hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth" — survives among us to this day, although it is discredited, and cannot long exist under the lights which science and reason have turned upon it.

For man's thought concerning Religion is constantly broadening and improving. The thought of to-day is far better than the thought of a hundred, or even of ten, years ago, and the thought of the future will be still clearer and better.

Supernaturalism is the doctrine that God can and does interfere with the natural order of cause and effect — that he can and does alter, change, suspend, or disregard the laws of Nature — that the natural order is inadequate for the expression of the divine will.

The theory that man is accountable to a Supernatural Power is a survival of the Theology of primitive men, who assumed also that thunder and lightning, rain and snow, wind and drought, were visited

on men arbitrarily by the same Supernatural Power. We know now that all of these phenomena are produced and controlled in the natural order — that rain and snow, wind and drought, are the unvarying results of meteorological causes.

And we should know also that everything is the result of a cause — that moral causes are as effective, and moral results as sure, as physical causes and physical results — *that the religious doctrine of moral accountability is nothing more or less than the scientific law that definite effects must follow definite causes.*

We shall not comprehend the full meaning of Religion until we realize that it is wholly natural — that the supernatural has no existence — that life hereafter and out of the body is as natural as life here and in the body — that man's moral accountability is not to a Supernatural Power, but to the Law — that the Law of Moral Accountability administers itself, as all of the other laws of Nature administer themselves, in an unbroken series of causes and effects — that man, air, water, earth, stars, all things, are subject to Nature's laws, which are just and changeless — that God, the Supreme Power or Principle of Rightness, is manifest only through the order of Nature; is guiltless of partiality, pride, vanity, and jealousy, and is not swayed by pomp and pageantry, nor by homage, supplication, and praise.

And we shall make little progress in the investi-

gation of the fundamental meaning of Religion until we approach it in the scientific spirit, uninfluenced on the one hand by the dogma of Theology, which places authority above reason, asserting that the whole truth was revealed to one or to a few long ago; and uninfluenced on the other hand by the dogma of Agnosticism, which asserts that the question is beyond the reach of reason, being in the domain of the Unknown, the Supernatural, the Incomprehensible.

XI

IT IS NOT WELL TO SCORN THE MORAL RESULTS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE

THE religious questions are the problems of man's eternal life. The Materialist is forced to believe that there has been nothing rational in the perennial interest of mankind in these problems; for, from the standpoint of Materialism, there is for man no eternal life.

To assume that mankind, from the earliest days of the human race to the present time, have been perpetually and seriously absorbed in the contemplation of a phase of life which does not exist, and of moral relations and eternal obligations which have no foundation in truth, is to assume that practically all men in all times have been subject to one form of hallucination which would stamp them as a race of madmen.

This universal belief of mankind is, in its simplest terms, the faith that the Eternal Order is moral and just. If this faith be a delusion, it is a noble delusion.

On the other hand, the belief of the Materialist is based logically upon the presumption that the Eter-

nal Order is immoral and unjust — that the noblest being merits no praise for what it is, and the vilest creature no blame — that for suicide there can be no penalty — that for the tyrants, oppressors, robbers, and scourgers of the weak, for the brutes who trample on women and children, for ingrates and murderers, there can be no eternal reckoning — that man sows what he will not reap, and reaps what he has not sown. Materialism is a cold, deadly, soul-killing doctrine, in which there is no spark of light or hope or love or Justice.

Religion is the belief in Eternal Justice; Materialism is the belief in Eternal Injustice.

The faith of Religion is a moral faith; while it must be said in fairness that the philosophy of Materialism, which attributes injustice and immorality to the Eternal Order, must consequently be classed as the philosophy of injustice and immorality, or as an unjust and immoral belief.

The believers in morality and Justice have been the many; the believers in immorality and injustice the few.

It would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, to say that the moral belief of the mass of mankind is irrational, and that the immoral belief of a comparatively small number of men is rational. It would be fairer to say that the moral belief of men, whether held by the few or by the many, is always true; and that their immoral belief is always false.

It is not well to scorn the moral results of human experience. They represent all the thought, care, labor, sorrow, trial, persecution, martyrdom, travail, and agony of mankind. They are the sacred legacies which all the dead have left to the living.

If they are worthless, then indeed is life barren and bitter, its joys illusions, its hopes as the mirage of the desert which beckons one forward to disappointment and death.

Pure Religion, separated from all error and superstition, offers to mankind the hope and faith, based on all human experience, and in harmony with all truth, that there is no wrong which will not be righted; and, for those who live justly, no trouble which will not end, no night of sorrow or anguish which will not be succeeded by the dawn of peace and joy.

On the other hand, Materialism offers to the human race but one thing which, from the standpoint of Fatalism, is akin to justice — and that is suicide. He who is dissatisfied here can go hence, if the theory of Materialism be true, to the somber unconsciousness from which he but recently emerged.

Let mankind choose between the consolations which these two beliefs — Religion and Materialism — offer to the race of men!

PART III

FATALISM

I

THAT WHICH THEOLOGY CALLS PREDESTINATION, PHILOSOPHY NAMES NECESSITY — BOTH TERMS MEAN FATALISM

"PREDESTINATION and Fatalism," says Schopenhauer, "do not differ in the main. They differ only in this, that with Predestination the external determination of human action proceeds from a rational Being, and with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the result is the same — that happens which must happen."

"No less noticeable is it," says Froude, "that the materialistic and the metaphysical philosophers deny as completely as Calvinism what is popularly called Free-will."

Dugald Stewart says:

"This question about Predestination and Free-will has furnished, in all ages and countries, inexhaustible matter of contention, both to philosophers and divines. In the ancient schools of Greece it is well known how generally and how keenly it was agitated. Among the Mohammedans it constitutes one of the principal points of division between the followers of Omar and those of Ali; and among the ancient Jews it was the subject of endless dispute between the Pharisees and Sadducees. It is scarcely

necessary for me to add, what violent controversies it has produced, and still continues to produce, in the Christian world." — The Active and Moral Powers of Man, 268.

That which Theology calls Predestination, philosophy names Necessity. The meaning of both terms is Fatalism.

The ablest logicians — Jews, Christians, Mohammedans, Deists, Atheists, Materialists, Agnostics — reasoning from the theory that the soul of man is created, have been unable to disprove the doctrine of Fatalism, and much the greater number have accepted it.

It has been supported alike by Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards; by Hume, Voltaire, John Stuart Mill, and Buckle; by Buchner, Haeckel, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and Robert G. Ingersoll; by Spinoza, Hobbes, Leibnitz, Lord Kames, Diderot, Priestley, D'Holbach, Laplace, Schopenhauer, Moleschott, and Froude.

We may be sure that these thinkers have accepted most unwillingly a doctrine so cold, black, and forbidding as Fatalism, and that in doing so they were impelled by logic which seemed to them inexorable.

A few philosophers of rank have denied Fatalism, though none has been able to disprove it without abandoning the creative hypothesis.

"Sir," says Johnson to Boswell, "we *know* our will is free, and there 's an end on 't."

Locke — one of the clearest reasoners that the

world has produced, who was called by Voltaire "a thinking machine" — after having given much space in his published works to an attempt to refute the theory of Necessity, wrote these memorable words:

"I cannot have a clearer perception of anything than that I am free, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truth I most firmly assent to; and therefore *I have long since given off the consideration of that question*, resolving all into the short conclusion that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, *though I see not the way of it.*"

Berkeley, in his "Alciphron," struggles to answer "the minute philosophers," and, failing, he falls back upon the assertion that "it is evident to me, in the gross and concrete, that I am a free agent." At another point he says: "And thus, by an induction of particulars, I may conclude man to be a free agent, although I may be puzzled to define or conceive a notion of freedom in general and abstract."

Bain says that the question of Free-will is "that hampered lock of metaphysics," that "paradox of the first degree," "that inextricable knot."

Kant attempts to refute the doctrine of Necessity by assuming that reason is subject to transcendental laws, thus removing the whole question from the domain of human experience.

Descartes says: "However difficult it may be to

reconcile Predestination with liberty, we have an internal feeling that the voluntary and the free are the same." In contradiction to this feeble assertion of the possibility of freedom, he says: "The perfection of God requires that the least thought in us should have been predetermined from all eternity. The decrees of God are unchangeable, and prayer has an efficacy only because the prayer is decreed together with the answer."

Bishop Butler (Analogy, 177, 178), being unable to refute the doctrine of Necessity, assumes that, "wherever the fallacy lies," it must be "somehow or other" false, since it is in conflict with moral accountability, "a contradiction to the whole constitution of Nature, and so overturns everything."

"How moral liberty is possible in man," says Sir William Hamilton (Discussions on Philosophy, 621), "we are utterly unable speculatively to understand." Since, however, "we are free in act if we are accountable for our actions," he classes Free-will among those things "which *may*, nay *must*, be true, of which *the understanding is wholly unable to construe to itself the possibility*."

II

ALL FORMS OF FATALISM ARE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT MAN'S CHARACTER IS MADE FOR HIM

HUME expresses what he calls "the very essence" of the doctrine of Necessity in these words:

"It seems certain, that however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our *motives and character;* and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our *complexion and disposition.* Now this is the very essence of Necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine." — Essays, ii. 77.

That is, since man has been made as he is, he must act as he does. If he acts wisely, it is because he was created wise; if he acts foolishly, it is because he was created foolish. His acts are the results of the nature that was implanted in him by his Maker.

We shall find the same thought used as the main support — indeed as the only support, since all other arguments proceed from it — of every intelligent defense of the theory of Necessity.

Buckle says (History of Civilization, i. 14–20) that conduct follows inevitably from disposition and character. "In a given state of society a certain number of persons *must* put an end to their own life."

Spinoza says (Froude's Short Studies, 240) that man's destiny is fixed in the act of his creation, of which fact he can find no better illustration than in the words of Saint Paul: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?"

"That is not free," also says Spinoza, "*which is called into existence by something else*, and is determined in its operations according to a fixed and definite method."

Herbert Spencer, who speaks of Free-will as "the current illusion," says (Psychology, 504) that "*the nature of the ego is predetermined;* the infant had no more to do with the structure of its brain than with the color of its eyes."

Haeckel, who characterizes Free-will as "a pure dogma, based on an illusion," says (Riddle of the Universe, 131): "We now know that each act of the will is fatally determined by the *organization of the individual*."

John Stuart Mill defined a Necessitarian as one who believes that "our actions follow from our characters." He accepted the common belief that our characters are given to us by our Maker.

Voltaire says:

"You receive your ideas, and, therefore, receive your will. You will then necessarily; consequently, the word liberty belongs not to will in any sense. . . .

"Can we change our character? . . . If I have a wry nose and cat's eye, I can hide them behind a mask: and can I do more with the character that Nature has given me?

"A Free-will is a word absolutely void of sense; and that which scholars have called indifference, that is to say, will without cause, is a chimera, unworthy to be combated. . . .

"We exclaim, if it be thus, all things are machines merely; everything in the universe is subjected to eternal laws. . . . Either all is the consequence of the nature of things, or all is the effect of *the eternal order of an absolute master; in both cases we are only wheels to the machine of the world.*

"Where is the man who, when he looks into himself, perceives not that he is *a puppet of Providence?* I think — but can I give myself a thought? . . .

"I acquire a knowledge, but I could not give it to myself. My intelligence cannot be the cause of it; for the cause must contain the effect. Now, my first acquired knowledge was not in my understanding; being the first, *it was given to me by him who formed me, and who gives all, whatever it may be.* . . .

"All our sentiments, are they not involuntary? Hearing, taste, and sight are nothing by themselves. We feel, in spite of ourselves: we do nothing of ourselves: *we are nothing without a Supreme Power which enacts all things.*" — Philosophical Dictionary, i. 173, 353.

Dugald Stewart, who made a careful study of all the arguments advanced in favor of Necessity, says that its advocates

"have contended that the actions we perform are the necessary results of the *constitution of our minds*, operated on by the circumstances of our external situation; and that what we call moral delinquencies are *as much a part of our destiny as the corporeal or intellectual qualities we have received from nature.* . . .

"'Nothing is more usual for fervent devotion,' says Sir James Mackintosh, 'than to dwell so long and so warmly on the meanness and worthlessness of created things, and on the all-sufficiency of the Supreme Being, that it slides insensibly from comparative to absolute language, and, in the eagerness of its zeal to magnify the Deity, *seems to annihilate every thing else.*'

"This excellent observation may serve to account for the zeal displayed by many devout men in favor of the scheme of Necessity. 'We have nothing,' they frequently and justly remind us, '*but what we have received.*'" — Active and Moral Powers, 268, 276.

Belsham says that the doctrine of Necessity teaches us

"to look up to God *as the prime agent, and the proper cause of every thing that happens*, and to regard men as *nothing more than instruments* which he employs for accomplishing his good pleasure."

Huxley says that the supporters of Free-will

"rest upon the absurd presumption that the proposition, 'I can do as I like,' is contradictory to the doctrine of Necessity. The answer is: nobody doubts that, at any

rate within certain limits, you can do as you like. *But what determines your likings and dislikings? Did you make your own constitution?*"— Essay on Hume, 220.

Hyslop says:

"A man *must act according to his nature*, and he cannot act otherwise." — Elements of Ethics, 167.

Buchner, one of the most frank and positive of the Materialistic philosophers, says:

"He who brings with him *into the world* an innate tendency to benevolence, compassion, conscientiousness, love of justice, and so on, is in most instances cut out for a good moralist, supposing that bad training or adverse conditions of life do not forcibly subdue that tendency; whilst on the other hand *a congenital proclivity* to melancholy, or indolence, or frivolity, or vanity, or arrogance, or avarice, or sensuality, or intemperance, or gambling, or violence, can, as a rule, be neither controlled nor checked by any kind of will or imagination. In point of fact, daily experience proves conclusively that each person generally *acts in the manner most suited to his nature and individual character; these inborn or inherited tendencies and leanings of our nature* mostly exercise over our resolutions and actions an influence in comparison with which all other motives, especially those of reflection or religious belief, recede more or less into the background." — Force and Matter, 372.

Lord Bacon says:

"Man is no more responsible for his being than for the presence of color or sound, and he only knows that he *is*, by the perception of the senses given him that tell of the other things as well." — Principles of Human Knowledge.

Schopenhauer says:

"A man may be said, but he cannot be conceived, to be *the work of another, and at the same time be free in respect of his desires and acts.* He who called him into existence out of nothing, in the same process *created and determined his nature* — in other words, the whole of his qualities. For no one can create without creating a something; that is to say, a being determined throughout and in all its qualities. But all that a man says and does necessarily *proceeds from the qualities so determined;* for it is only the qualities themselves set in motion. It is only some external impulse that they require to make their appearance. As a man is, so must he act; and praise or blame attaches, not to his separate acts, but *to his nature and being.* . . .

"Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life, in all its incidents great and small, is as necessarily predetermined as the course of a clock. . . . Hence it is that every man achieves only that which is irrevocably *established in his nature, or is born with him.*" — Free-will and Fatalism, 71–82.

Robert Owen says that "a man's actions are the result of his character, and he is not the author of his character."

I could add to these quotations, which are mainly from free-thinking philosophers, a great number to the same purport from the most famous theologians, but forbear, since their views are well known.

The theologians have found the doctrine of Necessity intrenched, not alone in the Creative theory to

which they are committed, but also with much clearness and emphasis in the Bible. Some of these fatalistic texts will be found in the opening part of this volume.

III

THE LAW OF CAUSATION — THE ANSWER OF ETERNALISM TO FATALISM

"MAN'S acts and thoughts are the results of his own nature and character." This is the fundamental proposition of Fatalism. "He who denies Necessity," the Fatalist says, "denies the universality of cause and effect. Man's character was made for him. The individual had no part in his own making. Whether he was to be black or white, large or small, philosopher or fool, male or female, good or bad, man or monkey, insect or vegetable, was determined in the act of his creation. Hence the cause of his acts lies beyond him; it is apart from and external to him; it is to be found alone in the Power or forces that created him."

While the Creationists who support Free-will have not answered, and presumably cannot answer, the foregoing proposition, the Eternalist makes answer as follows:

"I agree with the Fatalist that the individual acts in accordance with his own nature and character. But I deny the assumption of Fatalism that man's character is made for him. I hold that the indi-

vidual, in his previous and continuous existence, has made his own character.

"The limitations in man's character are of his own making. In so far as he is oppressed, degraded, bound, or enslaved by his own nature, he is oppressed, degraded, bound, or enslaved by himself. The individual is his own oppressor, his own tyrant, his own master. He is also his own redeemer, liberator, emancipator.

"The individual has had beginningless time and opportunity for development in the past, and he will have endless time and opportunity in which to improve or to degrade his own character in the future. In all vital respects man is free. He rises as he wills, or descends as he wills.

"Man acts and is acted upon. He is constantly acquiring new experiences, and modifying his character for better or for worse. These modifications will be the causes of future actions, as his present actions are the results of previous modifications of his character.

"The law of causation is invariable; the chain of antecedents cannot be broken. The causes and antecedents of all of man's beliefs, aspirations, motives, and tendencies, and hence also of his thoughts and actions, are in himself. The individual is the architect, repairer, builder, and maker of his own nature. If his soul be mean, it is the hovel which he has made for himself; if it be noble, it is a palace of his own building."

IV

MAN AS A PEN THAT WRITES, AS A TRUMPET THAT TALKS

VOLTAIRE, in asserting that the character of man is fixed by Fate, that "he is a puppet of Providence," that "we are only wheels to the machine of the world," that we "receive our ideas," carried the doctrine of Necessity as far perhaps as any other philosopher. And yet he failed to express the full meaning of the dogma of Fatalism.

If Voltaire had carried his deductions a little further he would have expressed himself somewhat in this form:

"Man acts as he must. He loves as he must, hates as he must, thinks as he must, lies as he must, murders as he must. He is noble, vile, or unclean, as he must be.

"Man is as he has been made; all things happen as they must happen. No one is really better or worse than any other, and no act is either good or bad, all acts being under compulsion. No one is entitled to praise or blame; to honor or dishonor. The good are as evil as the vicious; the vicious as good as the best.

"The doctrine of Necessity does not deny man's freedom in part; it denies it wholly. It does not deny the freedom of one man, or of a few men. It denies the freedom of *all* men — of the philosopher as well as of the fool, of the learned as well as of the ignorant. It denies *my* freedom as completely as it denies the freedom of the dullest soul in the world.

"Without freedom man cannot reason. Man is a puppet, an automaton, a machine. He thinks the thoughts and produces the ideas which Necessity has forced upon him.

"The philosophy which I and the world call mine is not mine. It is the product of forces antecedent to me, and of a Necessity which I cannot elude.

"No thought that I utter is my thought; for I am not free. I who write these words am, intellectually and morally, a slave. You who read are a slave. Whether these words I am writing are true or false, sane or foolish, I have no real means of knowing, since I cannot escape the influences external to me which control all of my acts, words, and thoughts.

"If I were to express an opinion it would not be *my* opinion, since I am not free to entertain an opinion that is really my own.

"I am as a pen that writes, as a trumpet that talks. No more than they can I think or reason; for, like them, I am a thing without freedom."

In denying freedom to mankind the philosophers

and theologians are compelled to deny freedom to themselves.

To reason one must be free to comprehend, weigh, measure, and compare facts and thoughts, and to draw inferences and conclusions. If man is always under the compulsion of Necessity, he cannot reason; he can only recite.

If the Fatalists have demonstrated the truth of their cause, they have proved more than they would care to admit. For they have in that case proved that *the very arguments with which they support Fatalism are predetermined, uttered under the compulsion of Necessity*, and consequently that their own and all other reasoning is senseless and worthless — that man has no more real intelligence than the pen or trumpet, or the cliff that echoes the sound of voices.

Whoever undertakes to reason thereby asserts his own freedom, his own independence and kingship within the realm of his own soul, and thereby denies Theology, Materialism, and all other forms of Fatalism — and denies more particularly the theory of the creation of the soul of man, upon which alone the doctrine of Fatalism is based.

V

THE FAILURE OF THE EFFORTS TO RECONCILE FATALISM WITH MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

IF man must always act under compulsion, and never in freedom, how can he be held justly accountable for his acts? This issue has given much trouble to the theologians.

Can we say that the pen is morally responsible for what it writes, or the press for what it prints? A pen may be used by a scurrilous or truthless writer to give currency to his evil thoughts. But we cannot condemn the pen, since it has no freedom, and is used under compulsion. How, then, can man be responsible if he have no freedom, if his every act be under compulsion?

The greatest theologians in the world have striven to reconcile Necessity with moral accountability. The old have gone down to their graves, bequeathing the unfinished task to the young, who in turn have left it to their successors. And so it has come down to our own time incomplete, and it never will be finished; for the two are irreconcilable.

The philosophers have usually declined to make any effort to bring the two conflicting doctrines into

harmony, probably realizing the hopelessness of the task.

Indeed three — Diderot, Schopenhauer, and Priestley — have frankly admitted that, Necessity being granted, moral accountability cannot be.

Diderot, after demonstrating to his own satisfaction the doctrine of Necessity, says in a letter to Grimm:

"But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished. . . . *Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom.* Besides this, all is prejudice and false philosophy."

Schopenhauer says:

"Theism and the moral responsibility of man are incompatible; because responsibility always reverts to the creator of man and it is there that it has its center. Vain attempts have been made to make a bridge from one of these incompatibles to the other by means of the conception of moral freedom; but it always breaks down again. What is *free* must also be *original.*" — Free-will and Fatalism, 83.

Priestley, who now ranks, perhaps, as the main champion of Necessity, and who wrote a book on the subject, says:

"In all those crimes men reproach themselves with, God is the agent; *they are no more agents than a sword.* Actions may be referred to the persons themselves as sec-

ondary causes, but they must also be traced to the first cause. Mankind at first necessarily refer their actions to themselves, a conviction that becomes deeply rooted, before they begin to regard themselves as instruments in the hands of a superior agent. Self-applause and self-reproach have their origin in the narrower view, and cease when we refer our actions to the first great cause. The Necessitarian, believing that, strictly speaking, nothing goes wrong, cannot accuse himself of wrongdoing. *He has, therefore, nothing to do with repentance, confession, or pardon.*" — Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated.

Herbert Spencer says:

"To the effects of punishments inflicted by law and public opinion on conduct of certain kinds, Dr. Bain ascribes the feeling of moral obligation. And I agree with him to the extent of thinking that by them is generated the sense of compulsion which the consciousness of duty includes, and which the word obligation indicates." — Ethics, i. 126.

From which we may infer that Mr. Spencer is unable to discover any basis for moral accountability save in the laws and customs of men.

Spinoza justifies the punishment of the blameless:

"The wicked, though necessarily wicked, are none the less on that account to be feared and destroyed. A wicked man may be excused, but this does not affect the treatment he must receive; a man bitten by a mad dog is not blameworthy, but the people have a right to put him to death."

The same thought is expressed by Bain in answer to the Owenites, who claimed that, "since criminals are not the authors of their own natures, society should educate rather than punish them."

Bain admits the force of this, and adds: "But what if this education consists mainly in Punishment?" Here Bain, who has analyzed morals more thoroughly perhaps than any other philosopher, assumes that injustice may be justified, a contradiction which is found necessarily in all moralizing based on the immoral theory that the individual is created.

Four philosophers — Hobbes, Voltaire, Huxley, and John Fiske — have attempted to show that Necessity does not destroy moral accountability. Their reasoning should receive careful attention, for we may be sure that they have expressed the best that can be said for their cause.

Hobbes, in his discussion with Bramhall, regards the power of choice as in every way compatible with Necessity. He says:

"In this following of one's hopes and fears consisteth the nature of election. So that a man may both choose *this*, and *cannot but choose this;* and, consequently, choosing and Necessity are joined together."

To this St. John, the editor of Bohn's edition of Locke, responds as follows:

"Which is as much as to say, 'I have two legs because I choose to have two legs; and I choose to have two legs because I have two legs.' But this is like a kitten run-

ning after its own tail: there is a great deal of bustle, but no progress; for, if one should inquire, 'But suppose you should choose to have three legs? What then?' Why, then comes the Necessitarian's universal reply, 'You *can't* choose that:' which, in plain English, is, 'You are a mere machine, and have no liberty of choice at all.'"

Hobbes proceeds to say that "the Necessity of an action doth not make the laws that prohibit it unjust." To this St. John answers:

"Which I take to be as arrant a piece of absurdity as can be found in print: for if it be as necessary that a man should thieve as that he should breathe (and there can be no degree in Necessity), it were as just to prohibit breathing as thieving."

Again Hobbes puts the case as follows:

"Suppose the law, on pain of death, prohibited stealing; and that there be a man who by the strength of temptation is *necessitated to steal*, and is thereupon put to death; does not this punishment deter others from theft?"

St. John responds with this finishing stroke:

"What, deter men from doing what they are *necessitated* to do? Would the hanging of men for touching the ground in walking deliver other men from the Necessity of touching the ground?"

It should be borne in mind that Hobbes, who advances these lame propositions, ranks with the greatest of English philosophers.

Voltaire says:

"It is a foolish commonplace expression, that without this pretended freedom of will, rewards and punishments are useless. Reason, and you will conclude quite the contrary.

"If, when a robber is executed, his accomplice who sees him suffer has the liberty of not being frightened at the punishment; if his will determines of itself, he will go from the foot of the scaffold to assassinate on the high road; if struck with horror, he experiences an insurmountable terror, *he will no longer thieve.* The punishment of his companion will become useful to him, and moreover prove to society that his will is not free." — Philosophical Dictionary, i. 353.

To justify Necessity, Voltaire abandons Necessity, and assumes that the robber is free to thieve or not to thieve. St. John's answer to Hobbes is also a perfect answer to Voltaire: "Would the hanging of men for touching the ground in walking deliver other men from the Necessity of touching the ground?"

Huxley, in 1894, in the light of all the thought on the subject that had preceded him, made this attempt to prove that Necessity does not destroy accountability:

"It is said that Necessity destroys responsibility; that, as it is usually put, we have no right to praise or blame actions that cannot be helped. . . .

"If A does something which puts B in a violent passion, it is quite possible to admit that B's passion is the

necessary consequence of A's act, and yet to believe that B's fury is morally wrong, *or that he ought to control it.* In fact, a calm bystander would reason with both on the assumption of moral Necessity. He would say to A, 'You were wrong in doing a thing which you knew (that is, of the Necessity of which you were convinced) would irritate B.' And he would say to B, 'You are wrong to give way to passion, for you know its evil effects' — that is the necessary connection between yielding to passion and evil." — Essay on Hume, 222, 223.

The Calm Bystander says to A: "You were wrong in doing a thing which you knew (that is, of the Necessity of which you were convinced) would irritate B."

It is fair that A should be permitted to ask for further light on the subject.

A — Do you mean to say that I was free to act or not to act as I did?

Calm Bystander — I have said that you were wrong in doing it, and as the action was wrong you ought not to have done it.

A — Pardon me if I say that you have not answered my question, which is, "Was I free to act?" If you say that I was free to act, then you deny the doctrine of Necessity, and affirm the doctrine of Free-will. If I was not free to act, if I acted under compulsion and Necessity, then you can blame me for my acts no more than you can condemn me for the color of my eyes or hair.

Calm Bystander — I am authorized to speak

the words only which Mr. Huxley has put in my mouth.

John Fiske says:

"Or, as M. Littre has still more forcibly reminded us, the term 'liberty,' as applied to volition, *means* the power of obeying the strongest motive. When that power is interfered with, by paralysis or insanity, or the constraint exercised by other persons, then we may truly say that we are deprived of Free-will and of responsibility. But so long as circumstances allow volition to follow the strongest motive, then we truly say that we are free and responsible for our actions." — Cosmic Philosophy, ii. 180.

That is, if the strongest motive given to an individual by his Creator be murder, then he is free and responsible so long as he obeys that strongest motive, and is not interrupted in committing murder.

It will be observed that Hobbes, Voltaire, and Huxley, in order to justify moral accountability, have been compelled to assume, in contradiction with their own doctrine of Necessity, that man is free; and that Fiske adopts the theory that man is free in doing what he is compelled to do — that compulsion is freedom.

When the very clearest thinkers, such as Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Butler, Jonathan Edwards, Voltaire, Buckle, Huxley, and Fiske, attempt to discover any justification for moral accountability, or for praise and blame for human actions, either from the standpoint of Necessity or of Free-will — building on

the assumption that the individual is created — they seem to pass at once into a fog in which their words become vague, contradictory, and meaningless.

Only those who, like Diderot, Priestley, and Schopenhauer, frankly admit that Necessity negatives both morality and Justice, or, like Calvin and Saint Paul, throw the whole responsibility upon God, and refuse to question him, can be really understood.

Calvin says "that God, in predestinating from all eternity one part of mankind to everlasting happiness, and another to endless misery, was led to make this distinction by no other motive than his own good pleasure and Free-will."

Saint Paul says: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?"

The believer in Necessity has no ground left on which he can discuss moral accountability, or even morality. For morality is the question of what man *should* do, while Necessity is the doctrine that man does what he *must* do.

What a man *must* do, he cannot avoid doing, and the question whether he could have done something else cannot be considered.

VI

MORALITY IS SECONDARY IN THEOLOGY, WHILE PHILOSOPHY HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHAT MORALITY IS

BELIEF and conformity are vital, and morality is secondary, in nearly all systems of Theology. Man is to be saved through forms, rites, ceremonies, vicarious atonements, and faith — "not of works, lest any man should boast."

No important Jewish, Christian, or Mohammedan creed admits that man can be saved by morality alone. A long life of unselfishness, benevolence, helpfulness, charity, and righteousness, alone, will count for nothing in the eternal reckonings of Theology.

The doctrine, found in nearly all creeds, that man can win eternal happiness by faith and repentance, is neither just nor moral. It gives no encouragement to personal independence or to freedom of thought. It belittles moral sacrifice and moral heroism. It declares that the highest thinker, the greatest philanthropist, the purest life, may earn eternal torture; while the vile, the depraved, the selfish, and the cruel may earn eternal joy in one moment of repentance and belief.

The creeds make no allowance for character-building, which is in its nature slow — consuming days, years, and an eternity; while salvation through faith and repentance can be secured in a second.

As for our philosophers, they have not yet decided what morality is. They have been discussing the question for more than two thousand years, and have arrived at no agreement.

Protagoras denies natural morality. Hippias denies customary morality. Gorgias holds morality to be merely a useful convention. Thrasymachus makes morality the interest of the ruler. Aristippus holds that there is a single end of life — pleasure. Epicurus agrees with Aristippus in the main.

Hobbes holds right and wrong to be the creation of the state; Locke, that moral obligation arises from the law — divine, civil, and social; Hume, that reason is the "slave of the passions," that Justice is an "artificial" virtue, and that the motive to virtue is never moral obligation, but is the desire for pleasure.

Mandeville and Helvetius hold that virtue is supported only by self-interest; Bentham holds that utility is the foundation of morals; Hartley, that the moral sense is a product of association.

Haeckel says that the feeling of duty rests "on the solid ground of *social instinct*, as we find in the case of all social animals."

Herbert Spencer holds that morality consists in the pursuit of pleasure, and in conduct that will

preserve life; and that the feeling of moral obligation is a late product of the evolution of conduct.

Huxley says (Oxford Address, 1893) that "the cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends," and that, while the moral sentiments have undoubtedly been evolved, yet since "the immoral sentiments have no less been evolved, there is so far as much natural sanction for the one as for the other." This last thought is an answer to Spencer's theory of the evolution of morality.

If all that has been written on the principles of morality by our most famous philosophers could be transported to another inhabited planet, and there translated, it would be impossible for the distant reader to determine, through any agreement among our foremost thinkers, what the morality of this earth really is. If the verdict should be rendered in accordance with the views of a majority of our philosophers, it would consequently be determined that morality has no other basis than in social convenience, custom, and the pursuit of pleasure.

The school of philosophy which denies our common views of morality, and affirms that pleasure is the chief end of life, acquired a name long ago. It is called Hedonism. And some of the greatest men in philosophy, from Aristippus to Herbert Spencer, have been Hedonists in a modified or a complete sense.

If our later philosophers are agreed upon any one

theory concerning morals, it is this — that man has invented morals for the good of society. To say that man has invented morals for the good of society is as if one should say that man has invented heat and gravitation for the good of society. It is more likely that morals have made man than that man has made morals.

It is true, as the philosophers claim, that morals are good for society, that they are in harmony with social instinct, with real utility, and with ultimate self-interest. But in saying so much the philosophers have touched only the surface of the problem of morals. They have tried morals by all tests apparently save the real and final one — this final test being the results upon the character of the individual. That is moral, I conceive, which builds character, whether it be pleasurable or painful, easy or hard; whether it saves or kills the body. It is usually moral to live; it is moral also, in a good cause, to die.

VII

MATERIALISM AND MORALITY—"THE COSMIC PROCESS HAS NO SORT OF RELATION TO MORAL ENDS"

SCIENTIFIC thought, always more or less heterodox, has become within the last forty years somewhat materialistic. Many of the highly educated men and trained thinkers of the world now give their sanction to the theory that death ends all.

What is the attitude of these thinkers toward the great question of morality?

The materialistic thinker knows that morality and Justice cannot be harmonized with his theory that the present physical phase of being is all there is of life. He perceives that some men, in accordance with his philosophy, are created bad, and cannot, without doing violence to their own natures, be good; while others are born good, and cannot easily go wrong.

He sees also that some are born with great capacity for happiness, being beautiful or strong or good or wise, or so fortunately situated in regard to wealth or rank or position or health, that their lives are continuously pleasant, and even delightful;

while others, less fortunate, but not less meritorious, are condemned, without reason, according to his logic, to lives of penury, pain, humiliation, or wretchedness.

He is forced to admit also that the strong, the cunning, the greedy, and the grasping often secure more of the good things of this life than the just, the generous, and the honest. He sees goodness despondent in the gutters, and vice triumphant in its palaces.

The Materialist who reasons on these lines is forced to the conclusion — in harmony with the logic of Fatalism — that Justice has no existence, and that our conventional theories of morality are absurd. But he seldom expresses this thought, knowing that it is likely to be misunderstood, and to form the basis for an unjust accusation that he is an apologist of immorality. Some, however, are courageous enough to follow their logic to its conclusion.

Goldwin Smith discusses this issue with clearness and frankness:

"Yet it seems impossible to doubt that morality, personal and social, but especially social, has hitherto largely rested, in ordinary minds, on a foundation of religious belief, including the belief in another life and in future rewards and punishments. That foundation is now manifestly giving way. Literature teems with the proof of this. So does the conversation of the educated classes. So does even apologetic Theology, the attitude of which is generally one of concession and retreat. . . .

"The authors of systems of moral philosophy have

sought to discover some intellectual principle from which all moral rules could be logically deduced and the apprehension of which would constrain all men to be moral. But the question remains, why men who do not like to be moral, as many men do not, are to sacrifice their propensities to a logical deduction from an intellectual principle. . . .

"If we make of pleasure our ethical criterion, how are we to distinguish between one kind of pleasure and another; between the pleasure of eating the bread which is honestly earned and the pleasure of eating the bread which is stolen? . . .

"But the murderer who, by his cunning, escapes the gallows, and perhaps comes into the enjoyment of wealth out of which the life which he has taken would have kept him — why should he feel any more remorse than he would have felt if he had taken the life of a dog? Let us suppose, for instance, that the life of a child stands between a needy man and a great estate; that he puts an end to the child's life in such a way as to escape detection, enters into the estate, lives a life of ease and affluence instead of struggling for bread, spends his money well and enjoys the good-will of the people among whom he lives; why is he to feel remorse, or, if he has a twinge of it, why is he not to repress it as he would any other unpleasant emotion or bodily pain? . . .

"Myriads of human beings, through no fault of their own, have lived in misery, perhaps in cruel slavery, and died in pain, not a few in agony. Myriads have been born to primeval savagery, without hope of moral civilization. The lot of myriads has been cast in such periods as that of the fall of the Roman Empire or the Thirty Years'

War. If for these there is no compensation, how can we believe in a just and benevolent administration of the universe? Dogmatic and historical Christianity is far from relieving us of the difficulty, since it places all the generations before Christ, and the whole heathen world down to this day, out of the pale at least of covenanted salvation. . . .

"The Marquis of Steyne is an organism, and, like all other organisms, so long as he succeeds in maintaining himself against competing organisms, is able to make good his title to existence under the law of natural selection. He has his pleasures; they are not those of a Saint Paul, or a Shakespeare, or a Wilberforce, but they are his. They make him happy, according to the only measure of happiness which he can conceive; and if he is cautious, as a sagacious voluptuary will be, they need not diminish his vitality, they may even increase it both in duration and intensity, though they may play havoc with the welfare of a number of victims and dependents. He may successively seduce a score of women without bad consequences to himself. Why is he doing wrong? In the name of what do you peremptorily summon him to return to the path of virtue? In the name of altruistic pleasure? He happens to be one of those organisms which are not capable of it. In the name of a state of society which is to come into existence long after he has moldered to dust in the family mausoleum of the Gaunts? His reply will be that as a sensible man he lives for the present, not for a future in which he will have no share. . . .

"Mr. Cotter Morison, a man himself of moral sensibility, as well as the highest cultivation, said that the sooner the idea of moral responsibility was got rid of the better it

would be for society and moral education, and that while virtue might, and possibly would, bring happiness to the virtuous man, to the immoral and the selfish virtue would probably be the most distasteful or even painful thing in their experience, while vice would give them unmitigated pleasure. His method of moral reform is the elimination or suppression of the bad. But if the bad happen to be the stronger or the more cunning, what is to prevent their eliminating or suppressing the good? What is to prevent their doing this, not only with a clear conscience, but with a glow of self-approbation? . . .

"If no divine command for the practice of virtue can be shown, if no assurance of the virtuous man's reward, such as Paley assumes, can be given, moral philosophy must, it would appear, be content simply to take the observation of human nature as its basis, and to build its system on the natural desires of man, offering them such satisfaction as is consistent with the welfare of the community and the race." — Guesses at the Riddle of Existence, 191–244.

Leslie Stephen says:

"There is no absolute coincidence between virtue and happiness. I cannot prove that it is always prudent to act rightly, or that it is always happiest to be virtuous. . . .

"The path of duty does not coincide with the path of happiness. . . .

"The virtuous men may be the very salt of the earth, and yet the discharge of a function socially necessary may involve their own misery. . . .

"A great moral and religious teacher has often been a

martyr, and we are certainly not entitled to assume either that he was a fool for his pains or, on the other hand, that the highest conceivable degree of virtue can make martyrdom agreeable. . . .

"In a gross society, where the temperate man is an object of ridicule and necessarily cut off from participation in the ordinary pleasures of life, he may find his moral squeamishness conducive to misery; the just and honorable man is made miserable in a corrupt society where the social combinations are simply bands of thieves, and his high spirit only awakens hatred; and the benevolent is tortured in proportion to the strength of his sympathies in a society where they meet with no return, and where he has to witness cruelty triumphant, and mercy ridiculed as weakness. . . .

"Every reformer who breaks with the world, though for the world's good, must naturally expect much pain, and must be often tempted to think that peace and harmony are worth buying, even at the price of condoning evil. . . .

"'Be good if you would be happy' seems to be the verdict even of worldly prudence; but it adds, in an emphatic aside, 'Be not too good.'" — Conclusion Science of Ethics.

Herbert Spencer says:

"It is not for nothing that he [man] has in him these sympathies with some principles and repugnance to others. He, with all his capacities, and aspirations, and beliefs, is not an accident, but a product of the time. He must remember that while he is a descendant of the past, he is a parent of the future; and that his thoughts are as chil-

dren born to him, which he may not carelessly let die. He, like every other man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause; and *when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief.*" — First Principles, 125, 126.

Mr. Spencer, being a Necessitarian, holds that man must act in accordance with his own nature, and hence we may infer from the foregoing quotation that man should not be condemned if he "act out that belief" which is given to him, whether the belief be moral or immoral.

Quoting further from Mr. Spencer:

"And here let me repeat a truth which I have elsewhere insisted upon, that just as food is rightly taken only when taken to appease hunger, while the having to take it when there is no inclination implies deranged physical state; so, a good act or act of duty is rightly done only if done in satisfaction of immediate feeling, and if done with a view to ultimate results, in this world or another world, implies an imperfect moral state." — Ethics, ii. 450.

A good act, inspired by the motive of building character, would be "done with a view to ultimate results, in this world or another world," and would consequently imply, in literal accordance with the view of Mr. Spencer, "an imperfect moral state."

Mr. Spencer's general theory of morals, expressed as follows, is in complete accord with the Hedonists:

"Thus there is no escape from the admission that in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a blessing and not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad, according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful." — Ethics, i. 28.

Haeckel says:

"But in the new, as in the older, period the great struggle for existence went on in its eternal fluctuation, with *no trace of a moral order*." — Riddle of the Universe, 272.

It remains for an American Materialist, Van Buren Denslow, to carry the theory of Materialism to its logical conclusion in the denial of any real basis in Nature for morality. He says:

"It is generally believed to be moral to tell the truth, and immoral to lie. And yet it would be difficult to prove that Nature prefers the true to the false. Everywhere she makes the false impression first, and only after years, or thousands of years, do we become able to detect her in her lies. . . . Nature endows almost every animal with the faculty of deceit in order to aid it in escaping from the brute force of its superiors. Why, then, should not man be endowed with the faculty of lying when it is to his interest to appear wise concerning matters of which he is ignorant? Lying is often a refuge to the weak, a stepping-stone to power, a ground of reverence toward those who live by getting credit for knowing what they do not know. No one doubts that it is right for the maternal partridge to feign lameness, a broken wing or leg, in order to conceal her young in flight, by causing the pursuer to

suppose he can more easily catch her than her offspring. From whence, then, in Nature, do we derive the fact that a human being may not properly tell an untruth with the same motive? Our early histories, sciences, poetries, and theologies are all false, yet they comprehend by far the major part of human thought. Priesthoods have ruled the world by deceiving our tender souls, and yet they command our most enduring reverence. Where, then, do we discover that any law of universal Nature prefers truth to falsehood, any more than oxygen to nitrogen, or alkalies to salts? So habituated have we become to assume that truth-telling is a virtue, that nothing is more difficult than to tell how we came to assume it, nor is it easy of proof that it is a virtue in an unrestricted sense. What would be thought of the military strategist who made no feints, of the advertisement that contained no lie, of the business man whose polite suavity covered no falsehood?

"Inasmuch as all moral rules are in the first instance impressed by the strong, the dominant, the matured, and the successful upon the weak, the crouching, the infantile, and the servile, it would not be strange if a close analysis and a minute historical research should concur in proving that all moral rules are doctrines established by the strong for the government of the weak. It is invariably the strong who require the weak to tell the truth, and always to promote some interest of the strong. . . .

"'Thou shalt not steal' is a moral precept invented by the strong, the matured, the successful, and by them impressed upon the weak, the infantile, and the failures in life's struggle, as all criminals are. . . . Universal society might be pictured, for the illustration of this feature of the moral code, as consisting of two sets of swine, one of

which is in the clover and the other is out. The swine that are in the clover grunt, 'Thou shalt not steal; put up the bars.' The swine that are out of the clover grunt, 'Did you make the clover? let down the bars.' 'Thou shalt not steal' is a maxim impressed by property holders upon non-property holders. It is not only conceivable, but it is absolute verity, that a sufficient deprivation of property, and force, and delicacy of temptation, would compel every one who utters it to steal if he could get an opportunity. In a philosophic sense, therefore, it is not a universal, but a class, law; its prevalence and obedience indicate that the property holders rule society, which is itself an index of advance toward civilization. No one would say that if a lion lay gorged with his excessive feast amidst the scattered carcass of a deer, and a jaguar or a hyena stealthily bore away a haunch thereof, the act of the hyena was less virtuous than that of the lion. How does the case of two bushmen, between whom the same incident occurs, differ from that of the two quadrupeds? Each is doing that which tends in the highest degree to his own preservation, and it may be assumed that the party against whom the spoliation is committed is not injured at all by it. . . . Having control of the forces of society, the strong can always legislate, or order, or wheedle, or preach, or assume other people's money and land out of their possession into their own, by methods which are not known as stealing, since instead of violating the law they inspire and create the law. But if the under dog in the social fight runs away with a bone in violation of superior force, the top dog runs after him bellowing, 'Thou shalt not steal,' and all the other top dogs unite in bellowing, 'This is divine law and not dog law;' the

verdict of the top dog so far as law, religion, and other forms of brute force are concerned, settles the question. But philosophy will see in this contest of antagonistic forces a mere play of opposing elements, in which larceny is an incident of social weakness and unfitness to survive, just as debility and leprosy are; and would as soon assume a divine command, 'Thou shalt not break out in boils and sores,' to the weakling or leper, as one of 'Thou shalt not steal' to the failing struggler for subsistence. So far as the irresistible promptings of Nature may be said to constitute a divine law, there are really two laws. The law to him who will be injured by stealing is, 'Thou shalt not steal,' meaning thereby, 'Thou shalt not suffer another to steal from you.' The law to him who cannot survive without stealing is simply, 'Thou shalt, in stealing, avoid being detected.'

"So the laws forbidding unchastity were framed by those who, in the earlier periods of civilization, could afford to own women, for the protection of their property rights in them, against the poor who could not. . . . We do not mean by this course of reasoning to imply that the strong in society can or ought to be governed by the weak; that is neither possible, nor, if possible, would it be any improvement. We only assert that moral precepts are largely the selfish maxims expressive of the will of the ruling forces in society, those who have health, wealth, knowledge, and power, and are designed wholly for their own protection and the maintenance of their power. They represent the view of the winning side, in the struggle for subsistence, while the true interior law of Nature would represent a varying combat in which two laws would appear, viz.: that known as the moral or majority law, and

that known as the immoral or minority law, which commands a violation of the other." — Modern Thinkers, 240–246.

Mr. Denslow has taken the position openly which all Materialists will in time be forced to maintain, which is hinted at in the ethical philosophy of Herbert Spencer; in the quotation from Huxley, "The cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends;" and in Haeckel's statement that there "is no trace of a moral order."

VIII

SCIENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT SOME ARE BORN VICIOUS AND OTHERS GOOD — THE PLEA OF THE DEGENERATE

"AS there are men born physically cripples and intellectually idiots, so there are some who are moral cripples and idiots," says Huxley in his letter to Clayton, dated November 5, 1892.

"In general," says Lombroso, "born criminals have projecting ears, thick hair, a thin beard, projecting frontal eminences, enormous jaws, a square and projecting chin, large cheek bones, and frequent gesticulation. It is, in short, a type resembling the Mongolian, or sometimes the Negroid."

A. Draehms says:

"Mr. Dugdale has gathered, with remarkable patience and labor, the records of the celebrated Juke family, whose antecedents in New York were traced back through the genealogies of 540 persons in seven generations and 169 related by marriage or cohabitation, to one 'Margaret' and her drunken husband, of which 709 persons 280 were paupers; 140 were criminals and prostitutes, encompassing 115 different kinds of crime, including highway robbery and seven murders, incurring a direct cost estimated at $1,308,000, to say nothing of indirect damages to society which were incalculable. . . .

"The fact is incontrovertible that the moral susceptibilities are inborn in varying degrees in different individuals." — The Criminal.

Buchner says:

"These [medical] researches have proved in the case of many criminals, if not of all, that from the very first they have been, as it were, doomed or predestined to crime by a faulty or imperfect organization of mind or body. . . .

"Professor Benedikt of Vienna has arrived at a similar result; having had an opportunity of studying the formation of the brain of a number of persons convicted of very serious crimes, he pronounces it to have been defective in every one of them. More especially were the important convolutions of the surface of the brain developed to a strikingly diminutive degree, and the posterior cerebral lobes, the seat of emotion and of moral sensitiveness, were so deficient in development and so dwarfed as actually to leave part of the cerebellum bare.

"The same conclusion has been arrived at by Dr. Bordier of Paris. Having examined the brains of thirty-six executed criminals, he found that in almost all of them the parietal lobes were excessively developed at the cost of the frontal, a fact which points to a low grade of intelligence together with a stronger tendency to violence." — Force and Matter, 376.

Thus does science confirm that which common sense well knows — that some souls are born vicious and others good, some dull and others bright.

Let us assume that a man born vicious, accepting the theory of Creationism, were to defend himself

against the moralists. He would doubtless express himself somewhat in this way:

"As I am, I was made. I was created cruel, lustful, and revengeful. As for a conscience, I know nothing of it. Perhaps God or Nature gave you a conscience; I received none.

"You say that I ought to be kind and moderate and just. I answer first that I cannot; it is impossible for me to change my nature. Can I change the gray matter in my brain, or the shape of my skull?

"The best that I could do, and most of my kind do this, would be to turn hypocrite — to pretend to conform to your moral laws to gain better opportunities for violating them secretly and with impunity.

"And, second, I answer that I ought not to be kind, moderate, and just, for I was created for other purposes. A gun is made to shoot, a dagger to strike, poison to kill. Do you say to the gun, You should not shoot? to the dagger, You should not strike? to the poison, You should not kill?

"The gun, the dagger, and the poison, if they had been created with a little intelligence, as I have been, would laugh as I do at your childish moral philosophy.

"I would be rebellious and disrespectful toward my Maker if I were to attempt to be other than what I am; and you are rebellious and disrespectful in advising me that God or Nature blundered in creating me. How dare you raise your puny and im-

pious voices against the vast scheme of existence of which I am a product as legitimate as any philosopher, priest, or preacher?

"Why are you moralists? Because you were created moralists; because morality is in your brains and blood; because you can't help preaching and moralizing; because you take pleasure in dwelling upon the problem of sin, and more especially upon the sins of others.

"As for me, I was created immoral, and I take pleasure only in immorality. I enjoy a prize fight. It is rare sport for me to go gunning for helpless animals. Perhaps you know nothing of the keen delight of witnessing the agony of dying game.

"I enjoy dominion over the weak and helpless and dull. What a fool I would be to toil at mean labor when I have been endowed with the ability to relieve others, through various intelligent ways, of some of their surplus wealth.

"I pity you when I think that you know nothing of the pleasures of debauchery. Your cant about virtue as the source of happiness wearies me. In your dull lives, you never discover what real happiness is.

"I read with envy of the rare sport which, according to the newspaper reports, some of our allies had at Tientsin, where they tossed live Chinese babies back and forth on the points of bayonets. That was a sight worth seeing!

"You seem shocked. Well, who made the savages of Tientsin, and all of the other bloodthirsty monsters, as you would call them, that have lived and are yet living? The same Maker that made you.

"How do you know that you are really any better than they? What did you do before you were created to make yourself moral? You did nothing; for you did not exist before you were created. What did I do to earn what you call my immoral nature? I did nothing. It was given to me by my Maker. You are entitled to no praise for what you are, and I to no blame for what I am.

"You say that I am a moral degenerate. If so, who made me a moral degenerate? The same Power that made you so wise and good. Do you scorn me? Then you scorn the Power that made me and made you.

"If death ends all, then I would be a fool if I did not get all of the pleasure that I could out of this one life. It is my first, last, and only chance to enjoy myself.

"If, on the other hand, it should turn out that the preachers are right, and I am called after death to the bar of God, I shall not fear the consequences. I shall say, 'Here I am as you made me. I have lived in perfect harmony with the character and nature that you gave to me. I have not attempted to improve upon your handiwork, believing it to be good.'

"If God be just, he will say that I am right.

Having made me vicious, he will not punish me for being vicious. If he be unjust — well, vicious as I am, I do not dare to utter the blasphemy that the Ruler and Creator of this great Universe is unjust."

If the reader will attempt to frame an answer to the reasoning of this degenerate, he will then comprehend fully, if he has not already done so, the difficulties under which the theologians and philosophers have labored in attempting to reconcile morality with the theory that man's character is made for him.

IX

THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF MAN — "A CHALK-MARK ON THE BLACKBOARD OF TIME"

STILL another phase of Fatalism, which pictures man as something wholly ephemeral and insignificant, cannot be ignored.

John Burroughs says:

"We are like figures which some great demonstrator draws upon the blackboard of Time. A problem is to be solved, without doubt; what the problem is, we, the figures, cannot know and do not need to know; all we know is that sooner or later we shall be sponged off the board and other figures take our places, and the demonstration go on." — The Light of Day, Preface.

Voltaire says:

"Sarpedon was born at the moment when it was necessary that he should be born, and could not be born at any other; he could not die elsewhere than before Troy; he could not be buried elsewhere than in Lycia; his body must, in the appointed time, produce vegetables, which must change into the substance of some of the Lycians; his heirs must establish a new order of things in his states; that new order must influence neighboring kingdoms; thence must result a new arrangement in war and

in peace with the neighbors of Lycia. So that, from link to link, the destiny of the whole earth depended on the death of Sarpedon, which depended on the elopement of Helen, which had a necessary connection with the marriage of Hecuba, which, ascending to higher events, was connected with the origin of things.

"Had any one of these occurrences been ordered otherwise, the result would have been a different universe." — Philosophical Dictionary, i. 171.

In a tropical jungle, a million or more years ago, a flea-bite awakened a sleeping ape, which thereby saw and mated with a female. If either of these had failed to live to maturity, or had not been inclined to the other at a certain time and moment, then their descendant, Voltaire, according to his theory, could never have existed.

And the existence of Voltaire, in accordance with his logic, is due not alone to the contact of these progenitors, but it is also inextricably entangled with the flea which awakened one of them, with the minute details in the lives of a good part of all preceding fleadom, with the life antecedent to the flea and the apes, back to the origin of life on this earth, and to other happenings more or less insignificant, and in numbers beyond computation.

All of which would determine that the individual is of as little weight and import as a dewdrop, a dust-speck, the moonshine on a blade of grass, or Mr. Burroughs's chalk-mark.

That the physical body of Voltaire, and of all

other men, may be traced to trifling antecedents, is true. But I do not believe that the soul of Voltaire, "the intellectual emperor of Europe," owed its existence to a flea-bite, or to any other happening, great or insignificant.

A man is at sea alone in a boat. The man and the boat are intimately associated and mutually dependent for the time; yet we do not assume that they are one and inseparable. The man is older than the boat, and his connection with it is temporary. His antecedents run on lines far removed from the antecedents of the boat. The wood in the boat may have come from Oregon, its nails from Pittsburg, and the man from Norway.

And so the antecedents of the physical body of Voltaire may have come from one direction, and the antecedents of the soul of Voltaire — of the real Voltaire — from another direction.

X

THE DOGMA OF FATALISM BELITTLES AND ENSLAVES MANKIND

REASONING is a science. It has its laws which we must follow. Right premises bring right conclusions, and wrong premises bring wrong conclusions. One who builds on a wrong theory will fail to reach a right result, as one who travels on a wrong road will fail to reach the right place.

Theologians and philosophers, starting with the theory that man's character is made for him, reach the conclusion inevitably that he is a chalk-mark on the blackboard of eternity, an insignificant atom, a thing without freedom in thought, motive, or action.

It is a serious thing thus to belittle, emasculate, and enslave mankind. We have been taught to look with horror upon chattel slavery, but what shall we say of this blacker form of vassalage — the thraldom of the mind, the slavery of the soul of man?

For the chattel slave there is hope. We have seen him liberated; seen him rise to the dignity of free manhood. But the slave of Fate can never be set free. The captive of Necessity can never escape from bondage.

How shall we force ourselves to think of the acts of Lincoln as the acts of a slave; of the Declaration of Independence as coming from the hand of a slave; of the thoughts of Emerson and Goethe and Shakespeare as the thoughts of slaves?

Why should we indulge in the illusions of political freedom, if all men are incapable of one free act or free thought? Why do we say to the child, "Try, aspire, be good," if the child is, and forever must be, a slave?

Fatalism, if it could be believed, would kill every aspiration of man. He who cannot achieve, cannot aspire. Only the free can aspire.

If the doctrine of Fatalism be true, our language does not express the truth concerning anything; our poetry is foolish, our history senseless, our whole literature worthless and crazy — for it constantly commends good men and condemns bad ones, assuming that man is a free moral agent, that he is accountable, that he can act, think, and reason, in freedom.

Our systems of law and Justice are systems of injustice, if Fatalism be true — for they, too, are based on the assumption that man is free and accountable. The philosophy of Necessity can inspire no real poetry, no noble thought, no eloquence, no heroism — for these can be produced only in freedom.

If the doctrine of Fatalism be true, then we live in a world of illusions, compared with which the hallucinations of fever would be as sober reality.

The logic of theological Fatalism convicts God of being the author and instigator of every crime committed by man — of every meanness, deception, lie, theft, murder, cruelty, and torture, in the Universe. The logic of philosophical Fatalism also acquits man of all sin, and places the responsibility on Nature or on God.

These two phases of the one misbegotten dogma of Fatalism slander God and Nature, deny morality, moral accountability, and Justice, and degrade man by making him a puppet, an automaton, and a bubble, possessed of the insane delusion that he is free.

Fatalism reduces man to insignificance and nothingness. It annihilates him mentally and morally — not in death, but in life.

It is impossible for mankind to accept the philosophy of Fatalism. It does violence to all of our natural feelings. Before it can be accepted, human nature itself must be changed.

No man — not even the philosopher who has demonstrated the truth of Fatalism to his own satisfaction — has been able to really accept it in his natural thoughts, actions, and feelings; for it is of record that no philosopher of Fatalism ever failed to commend men for their good actions, and to condemn them for their evil actions, just as if they had been free.

It would be easy to prove from the writings of the fatalistic philosophers that they have labored con-

stantly under the belief — or, from their standpoint, the delusion — that they and all other men are free.

The doctrine of Necessity has made little impression upon mankind. It has convinced no one; not even its authors. But the reasoning by which the philosophers and theologians have sustained the doctrine of Necessity is absolutely correct, if the theory that man's character is made for him — upon which alone the dogma of Fatalism is based — be true.

If the doctrine of the creation of the soul of man is true, then the doctrine of Fatalism is true. All of the arts and resources of reasoning have failed to separate them. Fatalism can be denied and refuted only by denying and refuting the theory of Creationism, upon which Fatalism is grounded.

XI

THE DECAY OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY — OUR POETS ARE OUR CLEAREST THINKERS

THE Creative theory has been the blunder of the ages. It has set man wrong in all of his eternal reckonings. It is as though the whole of our arithmetical calculations were based on the presumption that one and one make three. All mathematical reckonings would consequently be wrong in all details, in all stages, and in all results.

Perhaps the most serious results of the acceptance of the Creative theory have been the consequent perversion and degradation of the reasoning powers of mankind.

Almost all learning and theological and philosophical speculations, in Europe and America, have been bent, twisted, and distorted, to sustain the theory of the creation of man, and to prove that to be just which is plainly unjust, and that to be moral which is plainly immoral.

The vast literature of the Theology of Creationism is an almost interminable record of sophistry in which learned men have attempted to reconcile the irreconcilable, and to bring truth into harmony with fiction.

These theological discussions have now practically ceased; not because they have arrived at a conclusion, which is impossible, but because mankind have grown weary of the fruitless and barren controversy; and because, science and reason having undermined the foundations of the Theology of Creationism, that monstrous delusion now sways and topples to its fall.

Nor is the failure of Theology more pronounced than the failure of philosophy, in so far as philosophy touches the higher problems of human life.

"Since the year 1840," says Dr. Vaihinger, "there has been hopeless philosophical anarchy in Germany."

"We live," says Max Müller, "in an age of physical discovery, and of complete philosophical prostration."

"Philosophy has hitherto been a failure," says Schopenhauer.

Windelband, in the conclusion to his "History of Philosophy," speaks of "the rapid decline of metaphysical interest and metaphysical production" in recent times.

Erdmann also, in the conclusion to his "History of Philosophy," says that "the philosophical interest has fallen into the background," which is "a symptom of philosophical decrepitude."

"A sense of universal illusion ordinarily follows the reading of metaphysics; and is strong in proportion as the argument has appeared conclusive," says Herbert Spencer.

It is now admitted almost universally among thinking men that philosophy, so far as it deals in first principles — with the whence and whither of man, and with the foundations of morality — has been a failure.

All of the philosophy which has been built upon the theory that the individual is created could be obliterated without loss to mankind. It is a vast system of logical quibbles, of dreary platitudes, of error hidden in mystification, of barren thoughts lost in a tropical jungle of unusual words. But it will not be expunged. It will stand as the record perhaps of the strangest misconception that has been entertained by intelligent men.

It has solved nothing. It has not even been able to establish on grounds of reason what all men know — that man is free! It has made no impression upon the common sense of the world.

No good lesson, no inspiration toward noble and lofty conduct, no light upon the meaning of existence, no help in sorrow and trouble, can be drawn from its dismal theories.

It would seem almost as if the philosophy of Fatalism were a comedy in which learned men have amused themselves by trifling with the most sacred things of life — using a language unintelligible in the main to plain people.

Our poets have been our clearest thinkers; for they have sung ceaselessly of Truth and Right and

Honor and Freedom. They have not belittled man.

The object of life is not to secure pleasure, as most of our philosophers have taught, but to develop manhood and womanhood — to build character.

Those who have sought to analyze morals and to regulate life in harmony with the soulless dogma of Fatalism should throw aside their cold and barren theories, and seek knowledge from the women who teach plain, every-day morals to their children, from the common run of men who are constantly weighing questions of Justice, and even from the poor and unlettered who know that right is right and wrong is wrong.

XII

THERE IS NO ERROR IN THE INSTINCTIVE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF MANKIND

HOW shall we explain this strange contradiction — that, while the thought of the learned concerning Fatalism is to a large degree unsound, the common thought of the world concerning the same problem appears to be sound?

This important question is usually answered by a reference to the proverbial superiority of common sense; and this answer is correct to an extent, though it fails to do full justice to the subject. Common sense is usually, though not invariably, correct.

Mankind have a deeper and more accurate sense even than common sense. This deeper sense is manifest in all stages of human development, so far as the record is open to us, and in the lower forms of life. I refer, of course, to instinct.

There are, I am informed, only two or three cases known to scientific observers in which instinct lures or misleads; and these are so exceptional, and out of harmony with all other cases, that they are recognized as survivals of instincts which were originally beneficial. Science recognizes that instinct is the

most infallible, as it is the most marvelous, of all guides of action.

"An instinct," says Sir William Hamilton, "is an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge."

Instinct produces effects "which transcend the general intelligence or experience of the creature," says the Century Dictionary.

"Instincts are as important as corporeal structures for the welfare of each species," says Darwin.

Wundt regards human life as "permeated through and through with instinctive action, determined in part, however, by intelligence and volition."

Instinct is vital truth inbred in plants, insects, beasts, man. It is not untrue, misleading, deceptive. It guards, protects, preserves, uplifts, saves. It is as important, and as true, in man as in the lower life.

Nearly all men hold two conflicting beliefs concerning religious questions — the religious questions being, as I have shown, the moral questions. One of these conflicting beliefs is the conventional or local belief — the belief that is taught, that is based on tradition, or revered authority — as Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Christianity.

The other belief is not conventional or local, nor is it based on tradition or authority. It is the universal belief of mankind; it is an instinctive and untaught belief. It is usually in conflict, to some extent at least, with the local or conventional belief.

Creationism is the conventional, formal, and local belief of our own people. It is that which has been taught to us. The almost universal bias of our people in favor of Creationism is unquestionably due to Bible authority, as the bias of the Hindoos in favor of preëxistence is due to their revered authorities. It is difficult for any one to abandon so completely the formal belief into which he is born that no vestige of its influence remains in his mind.

On the other hand, our people, and all other people of whom we have accurate knowledge, hold an instinctive and untaught belief which contradicts Creationism. This contradictory belief is the faith in man's freedom and accountability, which is shown in our universal commendation of good actions and condemnation of evil ones. The evidence of this instinctive and universal belief, which denies Creationism, is found also in the history and literature of the human race, in man's customs, usages, traditions, and laws, and in the details of man's own consciousness and of his relations to others. In the instinctive philosophy and Religion of mankind is found no trace of Creationism or Fatalism.

Our philosophers and theologians have based their fatalistic reasoning and speculations upon the conventional belief of our people in Creationism, ignoring the instinctive and universal belief which is adverse to Creationism. Applying the rules of logic to the theory of Creationism, our learned men have pursued

their reasoning to results so inconsistent and immoral that they have usually been appalled by their own conclusions. If they had built upon a broader basis — upon the instinctive belief of all men, including themselves — they would have reached rational conclusions wholly in harmony with morality and Justice.

The common man, on the other hand, is not usually a logician, though he is no stranger to logic. His logic, like his belief, is instinctive. He holds it in common with the rest of mankind. Instinctive logic, touching moral questions, builds upon instinctive belief. It denies all fatalistic premises, and reaches, consequently, no fatalistic conclusions. Instinctive logic reconciles all things with Justice, as is shown elsewhere in my inquiry concerning the actual meaning of Religion. I doubt that the instinctive logic of mankind contains an error, a false premise or a false conclusion — for instinct, we should remember, is true; it does not mislead or deceive.

When authority is at war with instinctive belief, it is authority that must succumb finally, as in the case of Confucius and the authors of the Hebrew Scriptures, who, without changing the resistless currents of instinctive belief, disputed the survival of the soul.

The poets have been our clearest thinkers on moral questions, because they have been the truest interpreters of instinctive belief. They are students of

human nature, rather than of authority, and are usually in warm sympathy with their kind, inspired by cosmopolitism and fraternalism, and uninfluenced by the theories and dogmas which run counter to the natural feelings of mankind.

Our people give only a formal, nominal, and superficial assent to Creationism. We must go deeper than formal assent to discover what men do really believe. No one believes anything unless his belief includes all that goes logically with it. Even learned men have sometimes accepted this and that without halting to consider what is included in this, and what follows from that.

I anticipate confidently that the day is coming, with the higher culture and enlightenment upon which we are now entering, when our philosophers will base their reasoning, concerning the great problems of morals and freedom, upon the book of human life, rather than upon the book of Genesis — upon the record written in the instinctive thought of mankind, rather than upon the Hebrew mythology — and when instinctive logic, belief, philosophy, and Religion will be accepted as the true logic, belief, philosophy, and Religion of the human race; and when all philosophies and authorities which are in conflict with man's moral instincts will no longer have any standing among enlightened men.

PART IV

NATURAL JUSTICE

I

EACH DAY IS A DAY OF JUDGMENT — JUSTICE IS COMPENSATION, RECIPROCITY, EQUILIBRIUM

WE have discovered that Justice is the basis of Religion and of morals. Let us extend our investigation further afield that we may know more of Justice, and inquire whether the Eternal Order be, upon the whole, just or unjust.

We shall find that the potency of Justice extends far beyond the realms of Religion and morals — that all of substance, energy, and life are involved in problems of Justice.

When I lift my hand I expend so much of force. There must be compensation in rest and food for this expenditure. Justice settles the score, as it adjusts similar matters within and near us in every moment of our lives.

All of our good institutions are examples of Justice. A public road is an illustration. So much of money and labor have been expended on it to secure certain benefits. We may say that it is lifeless and senseless, yet it compensates us for our outlay. It is strange that this dead thing can pay its debts!

The honesty of the trees which we plant is also

impressive. Some of them will pay their debts to us in bloom, some in fruit, some in nuts; others in fuel, lumber, sugar, turpentine, rubber, dye-stuffs, shade, and shelter.

And the good qualities we acquire — moderation, industry, courtesy, order, patience, candor — are also honest debtors, contributing incessantly to our revenues.

On the other hand, our evil institutions and habits are bad investments. They pay us nothing. We are debtors to them, and they are exacting creditors, forcing payment in full in money and labor, and sometimes in blood, agony, tears, humiliation, and shame.

We recently had in this country the institution of chattel slavery, which we had cultivated for two hundred years. Preparatory to going out of business this institution called on us for a final settlement. Our indebtedness, which proved to be large — amounting to more than five hundred thousand lives, and over six thousand million dollars — was paid in full.

Again, it seems strange that our institution of slavery, with no standing among the great powers of the earth, should have been able to collect such an indemnity in blood, treasure, and agony from an enlightened people, taking a drop of blood from the dominant race "for each drop drawn by the lash."

And so it seems that everything in Nature, con-

scious and unconscious, animate and inanimate, is busily engaged in paying its debts.

By what system is this perfect accounting made? We see no books, observe no management, and yet the numberless settlements are made with as much exactness as if each one were superintended by a group of experts, combining more of knowledge and of the spirit of equity than is possessed by all of the scientists, thinkers, philosophers, and judges in the world.

Even games, cards, and sports are based on exact Justice. Children instinctively demand fair play, and despise a cheat. One can get no pleasure out of *solitaire* if he play unfairly with himself.

The laws of grammar and rhetoric are only just rules applied to language. And language is a system of Justice, the right word fitting the right thought. And so rightness, or Justice, applies to diet, exercise, work, rest, recreation, manners, and to all things.

Justice is the basis of commerce, of exports, imports, and exchanges, of prices and wages, of supply and demand. Competition, when uninterrupted by man's greed or ignorance, is Justice.

Heredity is Justice. Like must in equity produce like, evil must breed evil, good must yield good.

We are administering Justice constantly in our praise and blame of our fellow men — in applause to a poet or discoverer, in condemnation to the greedy and rapacious, in aversion to tyranny, in love to our benefactors.

Each day is a day of judgment. We are judged continually, and usually correctly, by our friends and intimates. And we are constantly paying penalties to or receiving rewards from our judges — penalties in the indifference, dislike, suspicion, contempt, and detestation of our fellows; rewards in their appreciation, confidence, good-will, and love.

The vulgar receive no respect, the heartless no sympathy, the rapacious no affection. It is better to be a dog that has earned a little love than Cæsar riding in triumph, his enemies dying on his chariot wheels.

Justice is in the frost on the window-pane, and in the sunset of gold and crimson and purple, which reward the artistic sense in the minds even of the forlorn and poor — in the dune which the furious sea, beating upon the shore, builds unconsciously as a barrier against its own depredations — in the hope in the hearts of men which makes life endurable — in the first cry of the infant which rewards the mother's agony — in the transformation of the ugly worm into the brilliant butterfly, of manure into bloom, of a stench into fragrance — in the fact that the defensive position in warfare is stronger than the offensive position, that aggression is more difficult than self-preservation — in proportion, harmony, impartiality, compensation, reciprocity, equilibrium, equipoise — in the foot-rule and plumb-line of the carpenter; the inch, foot, and mile; the ounce, pound, and ton; the

shilling, franc, mark, and dollar; in all measures, weights, standards, and tests.

Justice is in all the manifestations of evolution, by which plants, animals, and men adapt themselves to their environment, and make the best use of their opportunities.

It is the foundation of every equation; of the axioms and principles of mathematics and of logic; of Kepler's laws; of the correlation of forces.

II

JUSTICE INVOLVES A CYCLE OF CAUSE, DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFECT

"BUT what of Injustice?" I am asked. "What of Torquemada and his nine thousand tortured victims? What of the noble Bruno, who was burned at the stake? What of all the other wrongs and atrocities which blacken the history of mankind? In them we behold Justice defeated and Injustice triumphant. How can you say, in view of these wrongs, that Justice rules invariably?"

My interlocutor might point also to the ascent of a balloon or the flight of an eagle, and exclaim, "Behold gravitation defeated! How can you say, in view of these facts, that gravitation is effective invariably?" The balloon and the eagle will return to the earth. They cannot escape from the law of gravitation.

To say that Justice is defeated because it requires time for completion is as unreasonable as if one would say that a journey is endless because its end is not reached in an instant.

We do not comprehend the Rocky Mountains through the first glimpse of one of their peaks; nor

is the whole thought of Emerson to be found in one of his lines. And Justice also is revealed only by the whole of it — in its completeness — and not by one glimpse or line.

Perhaps the actual meaning of Infinite Justice can be expressed in this paraphrase of Pope's famous line: "Whatever is" — taken with its antecedents and consequences — "is right."

Justice involves a cycle of cause, development, and effect — as seedtime, growth, and harvest — for its completion. A headache, separated from the indulgence that preceded it, is apparently wrong. Connected with its cause, it is right.

Injustice exists temporarily only. Every wrong must have its penalty, every outrage its retribution. As John Boyle O'Reilly says in "Peace and Pain:"

> "There is no ill without its compensation,
> And life and death are only light and shade;
> There never beat a heart so base and sordid
> But felt at times a sympathetic glow;
> There never lived a virtue unrewarded
> Nor died a vice without its meed of woe."

If we could follow the crime against Bruno to the end, we should doubtless know that the law of Justice has been vindicated. We have seen it vindicated in a historic sense. Among enlightened people on this earth, Bruno is glorified as a martyr, and the name Torquemada has become a synonym for monster and fiend.

We who have complete faith in Justice believe

that Bruno still lives, and that he is happy in proportion to his merits; and that Torquemada also lives, and that he has expiated, or will expiate, his crimes; and that the victims of his savagery are not dead. As Emerson says in "Brahma:"

> "If the red slayer think he slays,
> Or if the slain think he is slain,
> They know not well the subtle ways,
> I keep and pass and turn again."

The individual, when he comprehends the full meaning of his relations to the Eternal Order — as explained by the theory of eternal existence — can say:

"In my previous lives I have doubtless suffered all forms of wrong, and enjoyed all kinds of privilege and immunity. I have worn silks and rags, been prince and pauper, master and slave. I have lived in civilization and savagery; in luxury and in hardship. The servile have fawned upon me; the arrogant have scorned me. I have sinned, and others have sinned against me.

"I have suffered from treachery and ingratitude, persecution and outrage, tyranny and brutality. These have been hard lessons, yet they teach me that I shall be faithful and grateful, kindly and sympathetic, honest and just.

"My body can be whipped, enslaved, mutilated, but my soul cannot be whipped, enslaved, mutilated. My body can be killed, but my soul is deathless.

My body can be dishonored, but no power, no inquisition, no king, can dishonor my soul. I alone can dishonor my soul."

Perhaps the most important fact known to man is this — that the same cause, acting under the same conditions, produces exactly the same result. This fact demonstrates the steadfastness and equity of the natural order.

By assuming for a moment that effects bear no certain relation to causes, we may comprehend what life would be if Injustice were really dominant in the world.

If definite results should cease to follow definite causes, the compass would point east or west, north or south, at random; the plumb-line would deflect from the earth's center; ice would burn, fire freeze; potatoes would produce pebbles; human beings would be born from animals and reptiles; lower creatures and things would be born to women; the ear would not hear, the eye would not see, and the tongue would not talk; poison would be edible, food poisonous — and so on to the end of a chapter of horrors wholly beyond human imagination.

And if the law of gravitation, or attraction, were also reversed, this globe with the life upon it, and all other worlds and lives, would be promptly reduced to atoms, each atom becoming repellent to all other atoms, and seeking its own disintegration.

It is plain that this great Universe, of which our

own world forms an insignificant part, could not maintain its unceasing activities without order and harmony transcending any human conceptions of order and harmony; or without Justice, which is the basic principle of order and harmony.

III

NOTHING EXISTS WITHOUT COMPENSATION — THE KEY OF ALL TRUTH

A LAW of equivalents, compensation, reparation, and reciprocity, which is the Law of Justice, runs through the whole physical as well as the moral world. The engine can give back only the power that is put into it; the soil yields in proportion to its food and care.

The law of averages, to which reference has already been made, is a line of equilibrium, or equity, running through those events which are supposed to be subject to accident, hazard, or chance. In drawing impartially a long series of numbers, the odd and even figures cannot drift in the aggregate far apart, and will be repeatedly equalized. The males and females born are practically equal.

All of the perturbations of Nature — the tides, the lightning, the cyclone — are but her struggles to restore an equilibrium between forces. As Nature abhors a vacuum, so she loathes all other forms of inequality, unevenness, unfairness, injustice.

If the great Law of Justice were to cease to operate in human affairs, society and civilization would

be wrecked in a day; and if the Law of Equilibrium, or Equity, in the material world were to fail, the Universe would be turned into a vortex of fire and flame in an instant.

The Universe is under the reign of law, which is everywhere — in the smallest atom as well as in the solar system, in things mean and minute as well as in things noble and great. So far as we have come into an understanding of these laws, we have found none defective.

No philosophical mind can concede that a law of Nature could possibly be out of balance, or in any way less than true and perfect. When we advance a theory to the point where it would prove that a law of Nature is out of balance and unjust, we should know that the conclusion is wrong; that it is our reasoning, and not the law, that is out of balance and unjust.

He who plants the wrong seed will raise the wrong crop, and if he plants the right seed at the wrong time or in the wrong way, he will raise no crop. Only by right ways, right methods, right seed, right calculations, right machinery, can right results be obtained.

If right ways are necessary in our small human affairs, they must be vital in the greater and more intricate concerns of universal Nature.

Why do we assume that the invention of perpetual motion is an absurdity, an impossibility? Because power without compensation is impossible.

And is power the only thing dependent on compensation? Can anything exist without compensation? Science and common sense must agree in one answer: *Nothing exists without compensation.* And what is compensation? Compensation is Justice.

No one can maintain on grounds of reason the proposition that Justice applies to motion and not to man — that Nature is just to unconscious and unjust to conscious things.

The materialistic view that death ends all — and hence that wrong can exist without retribution, and good without recompense — is as irrational as the theory that perpetual motion can be invented.

He who comprehends this truth — that nothing can exist without compensation, that nothing is possible without Justice — has solved the riddle of existence, has grasped the key of all truth. It is the starting point for all sound reasoning and reckoning. It illuminates the great problem of final causes — the question whether things are as they are through design, or chance, or otherwise.

Since there has been no creation, design is impossible. And since everything is subject to law, chance is also impossible.

One and one make two. We must assume that the might of all the armies, navies, treasuries, courts, parliaments, cabinets, and thrones on earth — and all other power, mundane and supermundane, human and divine — could produce no other result than two from the addition of one and one.

What is this principle which is so marvelously inflexible in the addition of one and one? It is the principle of equivalency, of Justice. One and one equal two, and they can equal nothing else.

The invariable result of the addition of one and one, and the results of all other causes in Nature, are due apparently neither to design nor to chance, but to the principle which pervades and determines all things — the principle of Justice.

IV

JUSTICE IS THE BASIC VERITY, THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW, THE DIVINE PRINCIPLE

JUSTICE, I hold, is the ultimate fact, the key-principle of the Universe. It regulates all things, binds and holds all things.

A man out of balance falls. A globe out of balance is destroyed. What would happen if the Universe were out of balance and ruled by the principle of Wrongness? The result would be that nothing would be manifest in Nature but confusion, disorder, anarchy, chaos. Since the Universe is not thus given over to chaos, we know that Wrongness is not the ruling principle in the Universe.

On the other hand, those who have investigated Nature most closely and thoroughly have found order and harmony, equilibrium and compensation, and nothing contrary to these principles, in all of Nature's works and ways. We know a tree by its fruit. The fact that order and harmony, equilibrium and compensation, are always present in Nature, proves that the principle of Justice rules in the Universe.

Moreover, the existence of life proves also that Rightness regulates the Universe — for, *without Jus-*

tice, or Rightness, life could not exist. It would be as rational to say that the Brooklyn bridge could support itself without cables and piers, as that life could be without Justice. Even the reversal of the principle of gravitation alone, as I have shown, would destroy every living thing, and rend every combination of matter, in the Universe.

Justice is of necessity the regulating and saving force in Nature, since a force contrary to Justice — if such could exist — would be a destroyer.

And instinctive belief — a powerful ally — confirms my argument. Every form and manifestation of religious belief rests upon one foundation only — upon the faith that Justice is the ruling principle, the basic fact, in the world.

The principle of Justice is that which must be and could not be otherwise; that without which no organism could exist. Obviously also it is that Divine Principle which all men recognize, and which is the highest conception of Power and Rightness of which each soul is capable.

It is Herbert Spencer's "Unknowable" and the Agnostic's "Unknown." It is the Eternal Power of the philosophers, the Final Cause of Teleology, the One Principle of Monism.

It is the God of the devout, profaned no more by man's ignorance. It is that which comforts man in grief, humiliation, desolation, torment, and martyrdom — that which strikes terror to the hearts of the

malicious, the treacherous, the rapacious, the cruel. It is might and right, recompense and retribution, hope and doom, heaven and hell. It is Omnipotence and Omnipresence. It is immutable and unchangeable, and without shadow of turning.

Nature has one law which is the source of all her laws, one principle the base of all her principles, one truth the foundation of all her verities — and this fundamental law, principle, truth, is Justice.

Science and philosophy, Religion and morality, and all of the facts and forces of Nature, are built upon Justice. Upon what does Justice rest? We can comprehend nothing superior or antecedent to the great principle of Justice. It is complete and perfect in itself. While things as they exist are complex, the heart of things must be, as the Monists claim, and as enlightened Religion affirms, single and simple.

"Nature," says Du Prel, "is more simple than our conception thereof; we begin with very complicated theories, and end with the most simple."

"The plainest truths," says Ludwig Feuerbach, "are those precisely upon which man hits last of all."

"It nettles men," says Goethe, "to find that truth should be so simple."

PART V

ETERNALISM

I

AN ANSWER TO THE MATERIALIST — A DEMONSTRATION OF PRE-EXISTENCE

MYRIADS of plant forms, all of the two hundred thousand species of insects, and most other animal species to the extent of three hundred thousand more, go through some form of visible metamorphosis.

While these transformations vary greatly, the familiar case of the caterpillar and the butterfly is perhaps as good an illustration as any other. The caterpillar, upon reaching the end of its existence as a caterpillar, forms a cocoon out of its own body. A spark of life, which is called the pupa or chrysalis, survives in the cocoon. Sir John Lubbock says: "The quiescent and *death-like condition* of the pupa is one of the most remarkable phenomena of insect metamorphosis."

In time the chrysalis emerges from the cocoon in the form of a butterfly. The butterfly resembles the caterpillar as little as an eagle resembles a hog. One life only inhabits the two distinct and dissimilar bodies of the caterpillar and the butterfly.

The vital persistence of the caterpillar is a com-

plete answer to the contention of the Materialist — that life cannot survive the dissolution of the physical body. The physical body of the caterpillar has ceased to be; it has passed beyond the possibility of restoration or resurrection. Yet the real life of the caterpillar is not ended; its deathless principle survives in the cocoon; and it will live to inhabit the body of the butterfly.

Neither the caterpillar nor the butterfly can survive freezing, while the thread of life in the cocoon has lived, under the experiments of Réaumur, for three years in an ice house.

What is this deathless principle which can live so long in a death-like form, and which survives a temperature which would be fatal to the physical body of its predecessor, the worm, and of its successor, the butterfly? What is this vital spark, life principle, or individual essence, which survives the dissolution of one body and passes on, after three years in ice, to another and a dissimilar body?

The word *soul*, an old word in all languages, is apparently the only word which fitly describes that form of life which survives physical dissolution. With the caterpillar, death does not accompany physical dissolution. For it there is no annihilation. Having shuffled off this mortal coil, it yet lives.

The cocoon is the grave into which the mortal part of the caterpillar descends, and from which its immortal part ascends into the form of the butterfly.

The caterpillar has an after-existence in the butterfly, and the butterfly has had a preëxistence in the caterpillar.

This transformation demonstrates the fact of the preëxistence and after-existence of an individual life — that preëxistence and after-existence belong to the order of Nature. At the very least, it answers completely the assumption that there is anything unreasonable, unscientific, fanciful, or contrary to the natural order, in the theory that one life can inhabit more than one physical body.

It should be noted also that metamorphosis is the rule, rather than the exception, in animal life. The individuals of not less than half a million different species of animals undergo visible transformation, including usually the phenomena of one life inhabiting two or more dissimilar physical bodies.

Concerning the rationality of transmigration, Huxley says:

"None but very hasty thinkers will reject it [transmigration] on the ground of inherent absurdity. Like the doctrine of evolution itself, that of transmigration has its roots in the world of reality, and it may claim such support as the great argument from analogy is capable of supplying."

Not all of Nature's transformations are in the open. The eye cannot follow them completely. But her laws are harmonious. As Herbert Spencer says,

"The observed metamorphoses suggest that any metamorphosis may occur."

The theological theory that animals are soulless is plainly untenable. If man be immortal, all other forms of life must also be immortal.

On the other hand, if there be a deathless principle in the worm, there must also be a deathless principle in man.

II

THE THEORY OF CREATION IS AS THE DARKNESS OF NIGHT; THE THEORY OF ETERNALISM AS THE LIGHT OF DAY

MODERN science advances mainly through the use of intelligent speculations and assumptions, which are justified by their utility. N. S. Shaler says:

"Furthermore, all successful scientific inquiry shows us that the only way to interrogate the deeps is by sending into them well framed conjectures, hypotheses which state what the order of events should be in order to satisfy our minds. That this method of exploration is good is shown by its exceeding success; by it we have drawn from the darkness all that we have of light." — The Individual.

Of the now universally accepted theory of the indestructibility of matter, Herbert Spencer says:

"It must be added that no experimental verification of the truth that matter is indestructible is possible without a tacit assumption of it. For all such verification implies weighing, and weighing implies that the matter forming the weight remains the same." — First Principles, 182.

The atomic theory also is an assumption of science which cannot be proved in a strictly scientific sense. This is true also of the theory of the conservation of

force, and of nearly all of the general postulates of science. Speculations and assumptions can be dispensed with only in those comparatively small provinces of knowledge covered by the "exact sciences."

Science is compelled, lacking other proof, to accept that theory which is most rational — which explains things best. Geology consists almost wholly of the theories which fit and agree best with the facts, and evolution rests mainly upon the fact that it explains things. Building upon such rational assumptions, science builds truly, and can build truly in no other way.

The theory of the Creation of the soul of man is an assumption purely, which has grown out of Hebrew Theology. It has not the sanction of common belief, for the Orientals, composing one-half of the civilized world, dispute it. Schopenhauer says that the Chinese language and the Sanscrit have no word for "Creation" used in our theological sense.

And our own people who accept the theory of Creation nominally, deny it literally in their scorn of Fatalism, its monstrous product; while the instinctive belief of mankind, as I have shown, is also at war with Creationism.

Herbert Spencer says:

"To the mass of people nothing is so costly as thought. The fact that, taking the world over, ninety-nine people out of a hundred accept the creed to which they were born,

exemplifies their mental attitude toward things at large. Nearly all of them pursue mechanically the routine to which they have been accustomed, and are not only blind to its defects, but will not recognize them as defects when they are pointed out." — Ethics, ii. 343.

This reproof could be applied with equal force to the learned men who have accepted the Creative creed "to which they were born" and who also "pursue mechanically the routine to which they have been accustomed."

Do they know that the soul of man is created? If they do, they should demonstrate the fact. They can demonstrate the Creative hypothesis only by proving that it explains things better than any other theory. If they cannot do this, they must admit that it has no foundation upon which to rest.

The theory of the Creation of the soul of man is an assumption which explains nothing and confuses everything. It presents life as a riddle, an entanglement, a labyrinth, a maze of contradictions — dark, dismal, puzzling, insoluble. It belittles and degrades man, robs him of worth, of accountability, of freedom, and even of his reasoning powers. It is worse than an irrational theory; it is an immoral theory.

On the other hand, the theory of Eternalism explains all things in a simple and natural way, and in harmony with Right and Justice.

The theory of Creationism is as the darkness

of night; the theory of Eternalism as the light of day.

The eternal nature of matter is accepted by science as a necessary truth, without which the physical world would be inexplicable. The eternal nature of the individual soul is another truth without which the moral world is inexplicable.

Some one may say: "Nature preserves nothing as a whole. She dissolves into its original elements the body of man at his death. So we must assume that she dissolves the soul of man at his death. Science cannot admit that anything can avoid dissolution."

Quite to the contrary, we know that the soul, or vital spark, in the caterpillar is not dissolved with the dissolution of the physical body of the caterpillar, but passes on to the butterfly; and we know that the identical life principle in the butterfly had previously inhabited the body of the worm.

To the contrary also, science does admit *that Nature preserves the atom as a whole; that the atom is one and indivisible, invisible, uncreatable, indestructible, eternal.*

As the atom is the basic fact, the Ultimate Thing, in the world of matter, so the soul of man is the basic fact, the Ultimate Thing, in the world of mind and morals.

Science has accepted the whole doctrine of Eter-

nalism, save only the theory that man's soul is eternal. When science advances the soul of the individual to the dignity which it accords to the immortal atom, when it grants that the soul of man, like the atom, is indivisible and eternal, then its position will come into complete harmony with real Religion.

III

THEORIES CONCERNING THE REINCARNATION OF SOULS

MANY theories concerning the migration of souls come down to us — mainly from the sources of the Egyptian and Hindoo Religions and from the Greek philosophers — reinforced by voluminous modern speculations and investigations. It would be unwise to accept any of these theories as the last word to be uttered upon the question.

The ancient theory of transmigration through the souls of animals has had little standing in modern times. While science now recognizes that "life is an endless series of metamorphoses," there is nothing in Nature to justify a belief in a transformation so violent as that of a man into a brute.

The ways of physical evolution must give some indication of the ways of spiritual evolution. As physical evolution has been so slow as to be imperceptible save to the most expert observers, so the transformation of souls must also be gradual.

Yet the souls of some brutes are doubtless traveling manward, and the souls of some men bruteward. But these movements must be slow, taking long periods for completion.

Many of the theories concerning the migration of souls rest upon a mythological foundation, as does Theology. They purport to be the work of those who speak by divine insight, inspiration, or authority.

It is not well to discard one authority, and set up in its place another; for the last may be no better than the first. The world grows weary of authority. If a thing be reasonable, authority is useless; if it be unreasonable, authority cannot save it.

The old theories of transmigration, or metempsychosis, are sometimes complicated with a remote creation of man, with his ultimate annihilation, or with other theories which run counter to Justice.

The theory that man was created a very long time ago, and that he will be annihilated after another very long period, rights nothing. It has no fundamental moral advantage over the theory of Materialism. Indeed it differs from the theory of Materialism only in this — that it substitutes a long life for a short one. It is in agreement with the essential doctrine of Materialism — that man is a something that is created, and that will be annihilated.

A theory of preëxistence, transmigration, or reincarnation is not necessarily in harmony with Justice. If it include the theory of Creation, it is quite as distinctly at war with Justice as are both Theology and Materialism.

For this reason I have used herein the word Eternalism — thereby meaning the life which has neither

beginning nor end — which theory of life can alone be harmonized with Justice.

Justice demands an eternally existing soul. Our view of Nature's ways must negative the thought that the soul has existed in inaction. We see it here clothed with a gross envelope, a physical body. We may assume that it has had many others, similar yet widely different, upon this earth, and elsewhere. It struggles here; it has struggled there; it will struggle hereafter.

There is an Oriental doctrine that the movement of the soul is continually progressive; that it is ascending constantly through definite stages to higher planes, and will ultimately reach perfection. If the individual soul is carried forward by a vast progressive movement of all souls, then men reap what they do not sow, and Justice has no place in the Eternal Order.

There can be but one key to the secret of the migration of souls, and that key is Justice. Each soul must get what it earns; no more and no less. The theory that the soul can advance, otherwise than through its own effort and merit, is an immoral and an unjust theory, and must consequently be untrue.

Co-existent with all forms of religious faith has been a belief in a Land of Spirits, an Other-world, to which the souls of men repair, or return, after death. Indeed this faith is an essential part of the belief in the survival of the soul.

This faith in man's conscious existence in spirit form, after the death of his body, has the authenticity of innate conviction; it is a part of the instinctive moral and religious belief of the human race.

The theory of dualism is expressed as follows by Emerson in "Compensation:"

"An inevitable dualism bisects nature, so that each thing is a half, and suggests another thing to make it whole — as, spirit, matter; man, woman; odd, even; subjective, objective; in, out; upper, under; motion, rest; yea, nay. . . . The same dualism underlies the nature and condition of man."

This theory touching the double nature of all things sustains the belief that the present form of existence requires another and an opposite form — an Other-life — to make it complete.

Among all forms of faith there is a distinct tendency to picture the Other-life as the opposite of this life. We may observe in this fact another evidence of the harmony between instinctive belief and scientific truth; for science is aware that change involves alternation from one state to an opposite state — that the day turns from light to dark, from dark to light; the seasons from hot to cold, from cold to hot, and that movements are up and down, to the right and left, going and returning.

Of the many mythological beliefs and philosophical theories concerning the Other-life and the processes of reincarnation, those which appear to me to

be most in harmony with the order of Nature as we see it, with instinctive belief, and with Infinite Justice, are epitomized here:

"Man's life is dual. The soul migrates from the Present-world to the Other-world — a place in which souls are little changed save in being freed from earthliness.

"Death is the Unmasking of Souls. The Other-world is a land of Truth, in which there are no lies, and in which each soul stands revealed for what it is. Hell is there the exposure of evil souls, and heaven the revealing of the good.

"The Other-world is to the Present-world as summer to winter, as light to darkness, as rest to toil, as recreation to hardship, as order to confusion, as peace to war.

"The Present-world, in the economy of Nature, is as a state of war, a hard school, a place in which conditions are adverse, harsh, and rigorous; in which oppression may thrive, and greed fatten, and hypocrisy pass as holiness, and lies as truth; in which the noble may be obscured and the vulgar exalted — all for a little time.

"After the death of the physical body, each soul returns to its real part in the Land of Truth.

"In the Other-world, we may meet, recognize, and abide with the friends of this life who have preceded or may come after us, and also with the friends of our former lives, who are unrecognizable now, even by 'the lonely lamp of memory.'

"The more spiritual and noble are at peace and rest in the Other-world. They have returned home, as it were, after a weary pilgrimage in alien lands.

"On the other hand, the lower souls — the gross, dull, and vicious — do not find the Other-world a land to their liking. Stripped of the mask of the flesh, they can deceive no one, not even themselves. Deprived of all means of sensual gratification, they long to return to the more pleasant and congenial life in the flesh. In this yearning for the flesh they are finally gratified.

"Great and good souls also desire often to return to the life in the flesh, recognizing that the earth is the great field of conflict between good and evil, and that the opportunities for progress are really greater under the harsh conditions prevailing in this life than under the happier conditions existing in the Other-world. In this aspiration they also are gratified, and they return to the conflict as heroes who, from a sense of duty, return to the wars.

"Each soul gets, in the long run, what it wants, whether its desire be high or low. It goes its own way, and reaps its own retributions and rewards."

IV

WHY HAVE WE NO MEMORY OF OUR PAST LIVES?

WHY have we no memory of our past lives? If of our former existence there be no recollection, has not our identity been lost?

Doubtless the butterfly has no recollection of its previous life as a worm; but this defect in its memory does not change the facts, nor affect its identity.

We find it desirable often in one short life to turn over a new leaf, open a new set of books, break off from the past, abandon an old life. This life doubtless is as a miniature to that longer life to which our present existence is not even as a second to threescore years and ten.

As we grow old here, we become garrulous and tiresome with our recollections and reminiscences. Much more wearisome we should be if we had the experiences of all our lives, all of our humiliations and successes, to draw from. He who lives in the present is wholly alive; he who lives in the past is weakening, dying.

Each man as he stands is the epitome of his own past. His thought and moral substance show what

his life has been. In his character one can read his story. The volume is open for him and for all men. In it are concentrated the results of all his lives, as upon one plate the camera throws the details of a landscape.

His own memory could not change, but would doubtless be at variance with, the result; for our memory retains but a jumble of matters trivial as well as important; it is usually inaccurate and always fallible.

Memory is a treacherous vagrant who plays tricks with us, and eludes us often when we need him most. Of the present life we remember little. The years of our infancy, the hours passed in sleep, are all forgotten. Who remembers accurately all the details of yesterday, of this day last week, of this date last year?

He who has reached fifty years has breathed for 1,576,800,000 seconds. How many of these seconds can he remember? Certainly not one in one thousand. We retain, then, the memory of an insignificant part of the life we are now living.

It is true, however, that many persons, and more particularly the thoughtful and intelligent, do have glimpses, sometimes vague and often clear, of a previous existence. Edgar A. Poe, in "Eureka," says:

"We walk about, amid the destinies of our world existence, accompanied by dim but ever present memories of a Destiny more vast — very distant in the bygone time and

infinitely awful. . . . We live out a youth, peculiarly haunted by such dreams, yet never mistaking them for dreams. As *memories* we know them. During our youth the distinctness is too clear to deceive us even for a moment. But the doubt of manhood dispels these feelings as illusions."

We know little as yet of the intricacies and possibilities of the human mind. Some of our modern psychologists affirm that the memory of the subconscious mind is perfect. Memory may be, for all that we know to the contrary, a flower that opens, rather than closes, with the change which we call death; and the mind may contain a perfect register, yet to be unlocked, of its past experiences.

V

THE UNIVERSE IS MAN'S HERITAGE, MAN'S ARENA, MAN'S THRONE

THE theory that adverse fortune is the penalty for sin in this life, or in a previous life, may be questioned. The sun shines, and the rain falls, alike upon the just and the unjust.

The man morally good is as fair a target for the lightning, and as susceptible to the malaria, as the man morally bad. There is no evidence that, in a railroad accident, or a battle, the evil receive more injuries proportionately than the good. Difficulties, trials, hardships, bereavements, and sorrows are as likely to come to the good as to the bad.

It is not probable that an Eternal Judge dispenses any special judgments to fit special cases, or exercises a guardianship or supervision over all matters great and small in the Universe, or keeps a set of books which show the moral and eternal reckoning of all souls. It would be more in harmony with what we know of Nature to say that our acts are causes which produce their own unvarying results — as food refreshes, sleep rests, toil wearies, fire burns, poison kills.

A good act, in the nature of things, has a good result, which is a reward; and an evil act has a bad result, which is a penalty.

Man is free to choose between food and poison, between good and evil. He goes his own way in freedom, sails his own barque, and makes the port he aims for; or, if he have no force of character, drifts indolently with the wind and tide.

Our duty lies here. In one sense, and a very important sense, the Present is all there really is of life. The Past is gone. All the powers in the world cannot change one fact in the Past; it is a book that is closed. In the Present we make our Future. We do not live in the Future. When we reach the Future it will be the Present. We live only Now. Man builds his character only in the Now.

Man can make no progress save against adverse conditions, and all progress of consequence must be against hard and stern resistance. An easy victory is a poor victory. It is in the shock of real conflict that character is made or marred.

The chief result of man's sin must be in the degradation of his own soul, or character. The character is, in some sense, the soul of man. The character alone reveals the actual man. The character is made and modified slowly. It is the result of persistent effort. A few good actions cannot make it; nor can a few errors destroy it.

The man of high and noble character, though he

be poor and of humble station, is really rich and great; and he who is possessed of a frivolous, selfish, or vicious character, though he have great earthly possessions, though even he sit upon a throne, is actually a pauper.

He whose character is being strengthened and improved, is an ascending soul; and he whose character is weakening, is a descending soul, traveling the road of degeneracy and degradation which leads down to the meanest and vilest forms of life.

Evolution is no more a law of Nature, or a fact in the Universe, than devolution. Progress and retrogression, growth and decay, action and reaction, are the ways of Nature.

In the past million years new worlds have been born and others have ceased to be; great civilizations have been evolved and have perished; great races have been developed from savagery, have reached their prime, have descended, and have become extinct.

The unceasing motion throughout the Universe is both progressive and retrogressive. All souls are moving constantly up or down, heavenward or hellward. The individual can neither die nor stand still. He must advance or recede.

The question arises, If retrogression be as much the law of Nature as progress, may there not be a culminating point in the career of man from which he *must* descend?

That acme would, of necessity, be the place of perfection, which would seem to be unattainable. As the North Pole is that point on the earth's surface from which one can only move southward, so perfection would be that lonely pinnacle from which there could be no movement save backward — that inconceivable point where progress ceases.

The individual attaining perfection would of necessity reach a state in which he would be inferior to no other soul, human or divine, in the Universe. Even if the imagination could conceive of such a summit, it is so remote from our present plane of life that it can be safely omitted from all human calculations.

Our own world, in comparison with the Universe, is not even as one drop of water to all of the water in all of the oceans of this globe.

Some of the globes of the Universe must contain forms of life much lower, and others forms of life much higher, than the life on this earth. There are doubtless worlds possessing civilization, arts, and learning, compared with which our civilization is crude, our arts and powers feeble, our learning as the knowledge of little children.

There must be in other worlds heights which are undreamed of here, and intelligences beside which our most consummate creatures are as the worms of the earth to the men of the earth.

As Tennyson says:

> "This truth within the mind rehearse,
> That in a boundless Universe
> Is boundless better, boundless worse."

As there is doubtless on this earth no living thing so low that it may not, through Nature's unceasing changes and opportunities, reach the form of man, so there can be no higher forms of life in other worlds to which man may not ascend.

And as there is apparently no limit, in the meaner forms of life on this earth, to the possibilities of degradation for the descending soul, so there can be no boundary in the eternal life of man to the progress of the determined ascending soul.

Man can move forward if he so wills; he will drift backward if he does not work and fight against the adverse currents. All heights are accessible, and all depths are open, to him. He may advance in freedom, hampered only by the trials and obstacles which make and strengthen character.

The Universe exists for man. It is man's heritage, man's arena, man's throne. It has no secrets which he cannnot grasp, no barriers which he cannot surmount, no forces hostile to him which he cannot conquer.

VI

TO EACH SOUL ALL GOOD IS ACCESSIBLE, AND ALL EVIL POSSIBLE

EVOLUTION, as we have seen, is a half truth; the other half being devolution. Most of man's blunders in reasoning are built upon the incomplete half truth.

Even the acute mind of Schopenhauer did not always see beyond the half truth. Let us consider some of his pessimistic utterances concerning man:

"There is only one mendacious thing in the world, and that is man. Every other is true and sincere, and makes no attempt to conceal what it is, expressing its feelings just as they are.

"Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. . . . A hundred records, old and new, produce the conviction that in his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way inferior to the tiger and the hyena. . . . Man is the only animal which causes pain to others without any further purpose than just to cause it." — On Human Nature, 18–22.

This is true; and much more can be said to the discredit of man. He descends to depths unknown among other animals. None other is so envious, jealous, ungrateful, treacherous, and malicious as

man; none other cloaks his malice and treachery in the pretense of friendship and good-will, while waiting an opportunity to strike. Man is the only hypocrite; the only animal that robs, subjugates, scourges, and enslaves others of his own kind, pretending that he does it for their good, or for the advancement of civilization and Religion.

While this arraignment of man is true, it is only a half truth. It is true that man is vicious beyond any other animal; it is also true that man is noble beyond all other animals. Man ascends the heights of unselfishness, sacrifice, love, and devotion. He alone accepts martyrdom intelligently, giving his life for his cause, his country, or his kind.

Man is a devil; this is a half truth. He is also a saint; this is the other half of the same truth. Man is at once the vilest and noblest thing in our world; this is the whole truth.

The pessimistic view of things is true, and so also is the optimistic view. Those who devote themselves to the championship of one view against the other waste their time. Pessimism cannot exist without optimism, nor optimism without pessimism; good without evil, nor evil without good.

Good and evil are two sides of one thing. We can never get the whole truth until we look upon both sides, and see the whole. We can say in the night, "The world is dark;" this is a half truth. In the day, "The world is light;" this is the other half.

But to say, "The world is light and dark," is the whole truth.

Though pessimism and evil are half truths, they are the negative, black, ugly, and pestilential half truths; while optimism and good are the positive, luminous, beautiful, and wholesome half truths.

The meanest soul has within itself the possibilities of all wisdom and goodness; the noblest has the possibilities of all degradation. No man is so base that he has no spark of good; none so high that he has no taint of evil.

Each soul is a world in which all good is accessible, and all evil possible. Each soul is also a battlefield in which the vast hosts of good and evil, folly and wisdom, are forever at war.

The individual is an autocrat, an emperor, a czar, who can advance at will the standard of Right or Wrong within his own soul.

Eternalism is the gospel of hope, self-reliance, and courage. It preaches of the power of man, of the vast resources of man, of the dignity of man. It says to man: You are poor, but you can be rich; you are weak, but you can be strong; you are foolish, but you can be wise; you are vicious, but you can be noble; you are wretched, but you can be happy; you are defeated, but you can be a conqueror!

VII

ETERNALISM — A FAITH BASED ON REASON AND UNDERSTANDING

ALL shall have their chance. Those to whom opportunity is denied, those who are cut off in infancy or youth — even the defective and demented — shall have their chance. The dullest thing shall have its chance. Nature is as just to the meanest insect as to the noblest man.

He who grasps the truth that man's soul is eternal — that the life here is only one short act in an existence which has had no beginning, and will have no end — knows that no misfortune can seriously harm him.

Sorrows, poverty, blindness, deformity, paralysis, and all other afflictions and maladies, will come to an end. Sight will follow blindness; joy will come after grief and pain. Our dead have only gone home before us, to the Land of Truth and Peace, where we shall presently join them.

The frowns of fortune, the injustice of others, the insults of the strong, the stings of malice, are but petty things in the eternal life of man. There is little reason for hatred or for revenge. The evil

will go their own way downward. Nature's revenge is surer, and more exact in its justice, than our own.

The individual should attend carefully to his own soul; for nothing but his own self-degradation can really harm him.

He who, in his life here, has done most to improve himself — his real self, his nature, his character — has been the most successful man who has ever lived on this earth.

The conqueror of himself is greater than the conqueror of an empire; for the empire is of time, while man is of eternity.

He who has developed within himself a generous nature, an open mind, the philosophy of patience and courage, faith in himself, in his fellows, and in the Rightness of the Eternal Laws, is a greater victor than Bonaparte or Cæsar. For this true and lofty man — the victor over himself — Death has no terrors; for him the grave is but the open door from toil to rest, from war to peace.

Those who secure wealth and power, and hold them to be the main objects of life, should know that they can strut and swagger but for a little hour on this temporary stage; that they are only as other men, even as those in the meanest stations, or in the humblest life.

The noblest soul in a great city may not be its most honored citizen; but may indeed be a washerwoman, a drayman, or a newsboy.

" The honest man, though e'er sae poor,
Is king o' men for a' that."

The greatest hero is he who sacrifices, or has it in his nature to sacrifice, most for others. He who has acquired an heroic character is as much a real hero as any one whose name has become a household word, or who has been glorified in marble or in bronze.

It even may be that he whose statue crowns the Trafalgar shaft in London, and that other immortal, in whose honor the tallest column on earth has been reared in Washington, were not really the greatest heroes of our race. For the battlefield is not the only stage on which true heroism can be displayed.

The courageous ones in ordinary life — the men who carry cheerfully the burdens and sorrows of others — the women who fight patiently through long years for shelter, warmth, and food for their fatherless children — the lonely and forlorn souls who walk in the straight road of duty and honor — all the honest, brave, helpful, and true-hearted — are also real heroes, and the more heroic because there is little rest in their long, prosaic battle; because they seek no plaudits, and hope for no day when they will receive the homage of mankind.

But the day will come — must come — when they who have acted nobly, seeking no approbation or glory, shall be glorified; and when they who have played a coward's part shall be scorned. In the eternal life, every earnest and strong soul shall have

recognition, and every hypocrite and impostor shall be found out.

All of man's real riches, power, and greatness are in his heart and mind, in his own character. His wealth is in his goodness and nobility; his strength in his patience, courage, and thinking powers.

The pauper who would give if he could *is* a philanthropist; and he who could die for man *is* a martyr and savior. By the Eternal Measurements man is exactly what he has made himself, and not what accident has temporarily conferred upon him. The rank of souls is more definite and exact than the rank of any line of earthly nobles.

> "A prince can mak' a belted knight,
> A marquis, duke, and a' that;
> But an honest man 's aboon his might."

The philosophy of Eternalism is good for man. It alone maintains the accountability of man, the freedom of man, the dignity of the soul of man — it is a powerful stimulus to the practice of morality, and to the study of the exact definitions of right and wrong in the affairs of individuals, of society, of the state, and between nations — it explains all things in harmony with our experience and natural feelings, without attributing inconsistency or injustice to the Eternal Order — it puts the responsibility for happiness or unhappiness upon ourselves — it affords the highest possible incentive for right living, and for the pursuit of knowledge — it dignifies and exalts

our conception of the order of Nature — it is in harmony with the oldest truths in Religion, and with the newest facts in science — it unfolds a new heaven and a new earth — it gives us a philosophy to sustain us in our hardest trials ; a hope to illumine our darkest hours ; a faith based on reason and understanding.

And finally, the philosophy of Eternalism — and it alone — enthrones Justice as the Supreme Law, the Fundamental Verity, the Divine Principle, of the Universe.

PART VI

ANSWERS TO CRITICS

UPON the completion of the first draft of my part on "The Actual Meaning of Religion," I sent it to a list of Americans prominent in scientific, philosophical, or theological work, and mailed also to each a letter explaining the scope of my inquiry. The letter closed with this sentence: "I am seeking criticism — sharp, vigorous, sincere fault-finding — for which I would be grateful."

In answer to this request I received more than four hundred letters containing comments and criticisms. To the writers of these I sent later a proof of the first draft of the remainder of the preceding matter and asked for further criticism, to which I received again a generous response. Many of the letters are lengthy and elaborate. Not a few of the writers commented on my proofs paragraph by paragraph, while others expressed their after-thoughts in later letters. My main thought has been attacked, with courtesy and toleration, from almost every point of view lying between and including the extremes of Materialism and orthodoxy.

I am indebted to my critics for many suggestions which have been of value to me in my final revision, and particularly of the part on the meaning of Re-

ligion, which has been rewritten in the main, and altered in material, though not in vital, respects.

Some of the criticisms have been answered in the revision of this volume, while others were met in parts of the original draft which were overlooked by my reviewers. The remaining criticisms of importance I shall attempt to answer in the succeeding pages. When the same point is made by more than one of my correspondents, as is often the case, I have taken for discussion the statement which appears to me to be the clearest and strongest, or a group of the more important comments bearing on the topic in hand.

It is fair to say also that my correspondents have not invariably antagonized my position. I have received many cordial expressions of partial approval from them, while a few have agreed with me wholly, or in the main.

In quoting from my critics I shall not name them, having no permission to do so. While consent could probably be secured in most cases, it seems to me best that the discussion should be impersonal.

I

ALL THEORIES DENYING PRE-EXISTENCE ARE THEORIES OF CREATIONISM AND FATALISM

MUCH to my surprise I find little in the answers in defense of the old-time theories of Creation. Unless I have overlooked something, this is the only point bearing on that subject which I have received :

"Creation does not mean or imply the formation of something out of nothing. God created the Universe from himself."

"To form out of nothing" was the old meaning of Creation, and is still its fundamental definition. It is true that the conception of a time antecedent to Creation, when nothing was and something was not, is unthinkable. The theologians claim that the Creator always existed, even though the Universe did not. As F. W. Newman observes: "A God uncaused and existing from eternity is quite as incomprehensible as a world uncaused and existing from eternity."

The difficulty in building a structure upon no foundation is well illustrated in the story told by Professor James of the woman who described the

world as resting on a rock, and then explained that that rock was supported by another rock, and finally, when pushed with questions, said "it was rocks all the way down."

Here is the theory of Traducianism:

"The theory of Creation that you attack is the old one of original, absolute, immediate Creation. No Christian evolutionist holds to that now. We believe in mediate and derivative Creation, and our theory is not subject to your argument that Creation necessitates Fatalism. Neither does our view of Providence logically lead to Fatalism or to Necessitarianism. What is attacked in your book is 'Creationism' as taught by Aristotle, Jerome, Pelagius, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Reformers. But the view held to-day by those who are not bound by ancient creeds and traditions is Traducianism, both body and soul propagated by natural generation, but the first human soul only immediately created by God."

"The whole doctrine of the direct Creation of souls by God has long been given up. If you will take the trouble to read the recent theologies, such as those by Dr. A. H. Strong, Dr. W. N. Clark, or Dr. E. H. Johnson, you will see that Traducianism is the accepted theory with regard to souls rather than Creationism."

"There has always been in the Christian Church a recognized theory known as Traducianism, which is wholly distinct from Creationism. Moreover, great theologians, like Julius Müller, in his 'History of the Doctrine of Sin,' have strongly advocated theories of preëxistence."

The theory of Traducianism is an effort to relieve

the Maker of the responsibility for the creation of vicious souls, and of the many other forms of injustice which follow upon the theory of Creationism. It is also a step, or a stage, in the direction of Naturalism. It is the advance of a great theological movement from grounds no longer tenable toward a position of security. At present it occupies an intermediate, and in some respects an unfortunate, position between Naturalism and Supernaturalism. It has lost logical connection with the old ground, and has not yet established complete rational harmony with the new.

It is true that Julius Müller, Origen, Scotus Erigena, and other theologians, as well as the Hebrew Kabbalists and the Cathari, have held theories of preëxistence, and that Rothe denied the creation of the Universe. The belief in preëxistence had made such progress among the early Christians that the Council of Constantinople, in the year 553, anathematized it in these words:

"If any one shall teach a fabulous preëxistence of souls and the consequence of this, a monstrous restoration, let him be accursed."

Indeed Christianity acknowledges the fact of preexistence in the reincarnation of Jesus. But the liberal theologians have been and still are limited in their progress by their efforts to harmonize old authority and error with new truth. It is impossible

to build rightly upon wrong foundations — to construct a theory of accountability, freedom, or Justice, upon the dogma of Creationism.

"Can the doctrine of the Materialist, that the human body is a product of gradual evolution, be called a *Creation?* And if it arises through the action of unconscious force upon matter, through natural law, can it be said to have had a Maker?"

Let us not lose our bearings. Neither Traducianism, which seeks to limit the responsibility of the Creator for the nature of the created, nor evolution in the narrow sense in which it is accepted by the scientists who deny the evolution of the soul, throws any light upon the problem of justice for the individual, who remains under either theory an instrument that is made.

If my character was made for me — by the fiat of a personal God, by the unconscious forces of Nature, or in any other way — then I was made, created, by a force or forces apart from me, and I am in no way responsible for what I was when I came into the world. And consequently all theories which deny the eternal preëxistence of the soul are theories of Creationism and Fatalism.

II

RELIGION AND THE SENSE OF JUSTICE — THE PERVERSIONS OF RELIGION

MANY correspondents deny that religious beliefs could have originated in man's sense of Justice:

"Justice to others I take to be a product of growing civilization, and the desire to establish a broad principle of Justice would be ingrafted on to the idea of Religion as a higher concept of the true functions or essence of religious faith."

"Is it true that all, or almost all, men believe in that abstract thing which we call 'Justice' and look for a future life in which it will be administered? I think that the belief implies a degree of moral culture which by far the larger part of the race have not attained."

"The primitive and semi-civilized man has a very imperfect sense of Justice. That nobler ideal only belongs to the highest civilization. I do not think it is demonstrable that the germ of the religious life began with an ideal sense of Justice. That, like all our other moral conceptions (whether innate or acquired), has grown from the beginning. We must not forget the law or method of evolution has operated in all departments of human activity and growth."

"While I fully recognize the element of Justice, retribution, and the operation of a spiritual law of cause and effect in the higher religions, especially in those of India, I do not believe such a thought would occur before a people had arrived at the thought of a world-order and a world-process."

"Faith in Eternal Justice is great support, in many minds, for the doctrine of immortality, now since some sense of Justice has begun to dawn, but I cannot conceive it had anything to do with the early belief, for Justice, eternal or otherwise, is a late conception. Not many people have it now."

I have not claimed that "the germ of the religious life began with an *ideal sense* of Justice," but rather that religious beliefs were "born with the awakening of man's moral senses." The sense of Justice in primitive man was crude, and so were his religious beliefs. And yet in his most grotesque rites we detect a rudimentary sense of Justice. The Papuan Islander prays: "Compassionate father! Here is some food for you to eat; *be kind to us on account of it.*" And this is the prayer of the Delaware Indian: "Have pity on me and protect my life, and I *will bring thee an offering.*"

Offerings, homage, praise, sacrifice, involve a low sense of Justice — the belief that the gods will return service for service.

It is not true that primitive man had no sense of Justice. "The lowest being," says Renan, "prefers

to be just rather than unjust." The dog, even, has gratitude and fidelity, two noble manifestations of Justice.

I have distinctly claimed that primitive man was incapable of reasoning out the deeper meaning of his religious beliefs, which were instinctive, and can be comprehended only in the light of the evolution of all belief.

Nor have the foremost investigators of our own time yet reached an agreement concerning the rational meaning of Religion. They are wide apart in their conclusions. I am forced to believe that religious faith has been and still is instinctive in the minds of men. In no other way can we account for the fundamental harmonies which we find in all of its manifestations, and in spite of its numerous superficial contradictions.

Here are more objections, and from a different point of view, to the identification of Justice with Religion:

"Justice was certainly not the inherent idea of the Greek and Roman Religions, and Justice alone is certainly not the main aim of those Religions which, like the Christian Religion, teach forgiveness and love."

"When you say that the desire for Justice is older than the arts and science, etc., it seems to me that you forget all the monstrous injustice of the past, the bondage and slavery, persecution and bloody wars that have been waged by the strong in exercising their power and wreaking their vengeance upon the weak."

"We are met by the fact in history that, from the savage up to civilized man professing Christianity, Mohammedanism, and other faiths, some of the most religious have practiced the rankest kinds of injustice in the eyes of all except themselves. If their idea of Religion had been Justice, they would not have practiced the inquisition, deprived their fellow men of life, liberty, and personal happiness, and freedom. In fact, I doubt if Religion in its origin had anything to do with morals or the moral sense. Certainly in all its history, even to the present moment, the so-called Religion of men has been in many cases entirely divorced from ethics and morals. The most pious have often been the most immoral, the most worshipful the most unethical."

"In criticism of your position that 'Eternal Justice is the actual meaning of Religion,' I would call attention to the indisputable fact that almost every form of Religion, including certain well known types of Christianity, includes an effort to escape from or to avoid Eternal Justice, ostensibly at least. And as I understand it, the sacrificial system in all Religions is a deliberate effort by the aid of propitiation to secure either something more or something less than absolute Justice."

These writers have fallen into the common error of confusing real Religion with the perversions of Religion. The latter bear the same relation to Religion that license bears to liberty, charlatanism to science, quackery to medicine, pedantry to learning. We would not hold the science of medicine responsible for the ignorance and superstition which

have attended its development — nor astronomy for the vagaries of astrology — nor art, learning, liberty, honor, and truth, for their perversions. We know that all is not learning that pretends to be learning, and all is not truth that claims to be truth; but there are many who seem to be unable to understand that much which claims to be Religion is really Irreligion.

That which is highest and noblest in its essence is that which is the worst perverted. And so it is that every known form of superstition, dishonesty, brutality, and injustice has masqueraded in the form of Religion. For this reason it has been difficult to determine the actual meaning of Religion, to separate the gold from the dross, the diamond from the mud, the true from the false.

III

THE THEORY OF DIVINE LOVE AND MERCY — NATURALISM AGAINST SUPERNATURALISM

SOME of my most earnest critics place love and mercy above Justice:

"While your great affirmation of Justice as the keynote of things kindles me, I feel that the word gives light without heat. That light correlates with heat I don't doubt, but you don't bring that out. The heat word — and most men need it — is love. Your doctrine seems like a New Calvinism — of course of the nineteenth instead of the seventeenth and the fifth century. Calvinism affirmed the Eternal Justice as strongly as we."

"The exaltation of Justice as the supreme law contradicts the loftiest instincts of the soul. From infancy to age love perpetually intervenes to save us from the consequences of Justice. Justice is only fulfilled in love. Drummond has well shown that sacrifice has its place in the evolutionary process.

"If the hope of humanity rests simply upon the unwavering work of strict Justice, it is faint indeed either for this life or the next.

"You have wholly omitted from your survey that immense factor of love which the world over holds the highest place in human thought, and forms the worthiest conception of the Supreme Being."

"Justice, blind Justice, knows no heart, no pity. It does not heap coals of fire on the culprit. It is the harshness of the inexorable law of Justice which the human heart is called upon to smooth over for its fellow hearts. Forgiveness rather than strict accounting is the prescription of Religion."

"To my mind Religion includes mercy as well as Justice, for it regards the frailty of man as well as his strength. The idea of sacrifice inheres in every concept of Religion, and sacrifice rests upon the accepted knowledge of sin, weakness, and need of Divine mercy."

"Religion is the philosophy of our relation to God. The essential principle of that relation on the part of God is mercy and not Justice.

"Under your system where shall the sinner and the ungodly appear? Do you not believe in the forgiveness of sin?

"But you do in matters between human beings. If a child does wrong and goes to his mother and says he is sorry, she takes him to her heart and kisses away his tears and says, 'I forgive you.' She cannot, it may be, prevent the physical pain which follows as a natural result if, for example, the child has eaten green and forbidden fruit, but she knows, and the boy knows, the wide distinction between penalty and punishment, and even a child will bear the natural penalty of transgression with heroism if only mother will smile upon him again and lift upon him the light of a reconciled countenance.

"Now, this mutual disposition of penitence on the one side, and of forgiveness on the other, is natural and universal, but it is not just; it transcends Justice and postulates personality."

Under all of the preceding thoughts lies one fundamental misconception, which might be expressed by each writer as follows: "The divine order is as I would have made it. The attitude of God to man is as that of a parent to a child."

But *is* the divine order as you would have made it? Would you have sent a cyclone to Galveston to destroy, mutilate, and kill? Would you have produced a Napoleon to ravage Europe, and other powerful and ambitious criminals to involve the world in senseless and useless wars? Would you have sent a famine to torture and destroy millions of animals and human beings in India? Would you permit ignorance, poverty, degradation, slavery, and crime to exist?

Would a loving mother cause her child to be born in the slums, to suffer for lack of good air and food? or to grow up under vile influences? or to die of slow torture from disease or famine? or to become in the end an imbecile, a lunatic, or a criminal?

We cannot deny that all that exists belongs to the divine order. We cannot say that a Supernatural Ruler of the Universe is responsible for pleasant showers and not for floods, for favorable winds and not for cyclones, for good and not for evil.

"You deny mercy, but it exists, both in Nature and in man. There are natural antidotes for natural poisons. There is a tree whose leaves are for the healing of the nations. Parents forgive their children. Whence have

they derived this power of forgiveness? It is natural. Over against the law of the survival of the fittest stands the equally certain law of the protection of the most unfit. The babe cannot 'struggle for existence' alone. The mother is Nature's 'friend at court.' The 'law' therefore is not a stranger to love. There is a 'law of love.'"

Mercy exists in man, and so does mercilessness. Love exists also, and so does hate. There are antidotes and there are poisons. There are trees that heal and others that kill. There are things wholesome and things venomous, things uplifting and things degrading. The unfit are protected, and they are also destroyed.

If we say that the Creator is merciful because man is merciful, we must also say that the Creator is merciless because man is merciless. If we say that the Creator loves because man loves, we must say also that the Creator hates because man hates. If we say that the Creator is good because he sends antidotes and protects the unfit, we must say also that the Creator is bad because he sends poisons and destroys the unfit.

If man's mercy and love must be accredited to the Creator, and we must consequently say, "The Creator is merciful and loving," then man's hate, folly, cruelty, and brutality must also be accredited to the Creator, and we must say, "The Creator is hateful, foolish, cruel, and brutal."

We face on all sides the small conception of the cosmic order — the measuring of God's motives and power, by man's motives and power — the assumption that God does as man would do in his place, that God is a greater man.

The reader has doubtless observed the fire of earnestness and conviction in the critical paragraphs which I have quoted in this chapter. And these writers speak not merely as individuals, but as representatives of the fundamental doctrine concerning divine love and mercy in the Christian Religion. It would be folly to say that a doctrine held with great zeal by a religious body so large and important as the Christian Church has no rational significance. What is its deeper meaning?

We of the Western world have been taught, as were our ancestors before us, that we and all things are under the dominion of a human God, who is the cause and source of all that is, and who is personally cognizant of every act and occurrence, small and great, mean and important.

The mind of the individual may be illogical, or weak in its logic, but the thought of mankind, the instinctive wisdom of the years and centuries, is logical. And this is the logic of mankind, of the ages, applied to Supernaturalism: "If the Creator is responsible for the good in the world, he is also responsible for the evil. If we credit him with Buddha and Christ, we must credit him also with

Nero and Napoleon. If he has sent wisdom, he has also sent ignorance. He has created philosophers and saviors, brutes and murderers. He is the source of goodness and love, and also of ingratitude, lust, hate, and crime."

Theology was forced long ago to answer the logic of the ages, and this is its actual answer, stripped of all mystifications: "In the end God will atone, must atone, for all the wrong which he has done in tolerating degradation, cruelty, torture, and other forms of evil. He will do this by extending his mercy and love on easy terms to mankind."

The doctrine of God's mercy and love is an attempt to acquit God of the wrongs and crimes which the dogmas of Creationism and Supernaturalism place logically at his door. It is the theory that he must atone with mercy for his own injustice. In the last analysis it is a rough theory of Justice.

My critics, it will be noted, deny that Justice is the chief attribute of God, and one or two of them belittle the part which Justice plays in the divine order. These views are in harmony with the belief in a personal and supernatural God.

The supernatural conception of a Supreme Personality is always, and doubtless necessarily, a monarchic conception. It depicts God as an earthly autocrat, as one who has created the Universe and the laws and facts of Nature, who alters, improves, and adjusts these laws at will, who is engaged con-

stantly in the vast labor of keeping the Universe in order, in regulating the temperature, the weather, the crops, the minutest affairs of the earth, and more particularly of mankind.

And since, as I have shown, the logic of the ages — when it builds upon the theory of the complete supremacy of a personal and supernatural Deity — holds the Creator accountable for the evil, while accrediting him with the good, in the world, there arises necessarily the conviction that the Creator has failed in the administration of Justice, that he is not a God of Justice. But the religious instinct of man demands Justice, and he falls back on the theory that in the end the Creator will right things, atone for the wrongs which he has tolerated or authorized, by forgiveness, love, and mercy.

And so it is that, in the creeds of Supernaturalism and Anthropomorphism, Justice holds a minor and even an insignificant place, while ceremony, supplication, genuflection, homage, praise, and humiliation are primary and vital. The theory of these creeds as they come down to us is that God is a great monarch who is pleased and influenced by these rites and offerings.

Supernaturalism has dealt largely in the past, and continues to deal, with the difficulties, labors, sorrows, troubles, and mistakes of the Gods. The God of the Hebrew revelation waited in silence and loneliness through an eternity before he created any-

thing; and after he had created a globe with the life thereon, he was so disappointed with his work that he wiped out nearly all life with a flood. And again he became incensed with his creatures, and was reconciled with mankind only through the sacrifice of his only begotten son.

And so go all of the myths in which men have built God in the image of themselves and endowed him with human sentiments, limitations, passions, and weaknesses, and with their own ignorant conceptions of the order of Nature.

It is true that advanced theologians and enlightened churchmen have abandoned the theory that God has human passions, weaknesses, or other imperfections. They would picture him as man-like, though perfect. And yet many of them hold tenaciously to the theory that he is the embodiment of sympathy, mercy, and love. These are human weaknesses when used in judgment. We do not permit a judge to sit in judgment over his own son, or even his friend. He is a poor judge in whom sympathy and mercy are stronger than Justice.

It is a presumption to say that God is a man, or man-like, or even a glorified and perfect man. It involves the assumption that no other living things are higher than man. We do not know this. It is conceivable that man, compared with higher life and intelligence in the Universe, is quite insignificant.

Our later conception of God broadens, and will

doubtless continue to broaden. Science is undermining the foundations of Supernaturalism. Eclipses and comets are correctly predicted, and even the weather is foretold within reasonable limitations. Effect follows cause without interruption. We know of no interruption; doubtless none has been or will be. Every fact which can be brought under observation testifies to an unbroken natural order, and not one to a supernatural government of the Universe.

There are numberless reasons for believing, and none for disbelieving, that the natural order is in itself just and perfect. Science is doing more to elevate our conception of God than is Theology, for science reveals a divine order which is perfect, while Theology holds to a divine system which has been changed, and is imperfect.

We do not know that it is now, or ever will be, possible for man to penetrate the divine mystery at the heart of the world. But this much is plain: that we should be done in this time of enlightenment with the old dull, childish, grotesque conceptions of God, handed down to us from the dim past, which now discredit and scandalize Religion; and that we cannot err widely if, awaiting further light, we conceive of God as the Supreme Power or Principle of Rightness, which is manifest to us only in the order of Nature, and that the order of Nature was as it is now before this globe was, before our solar system —

that it is without beginning or end — that it needs no repairing, no tinkering — that it is not as a clock to be wound, or a road to be improved — that it is just, perfect, and changeless.

IV

ACCOUNTABILITY TO LAW — THE CATERPILLAR AND BUTTERFLY — OTHER CRITICISMS

CONCERNING accountability to law:

"I fail to see how a man can be accountable to any kind of a law. I can see how he may be accountable to the power which made the law. No law is self-enforcing. That eternal or temporal justice may be done an executive is necessary. No law exists without a maker. That eternal justice may be done there must be the eternal law — i. e., a law which is in force through eternity, and the Eternal Executive."

"No law ever can administer itself, law being merely a mode of action and not a being, personal or impersonal. If man believes himself accountable, he must feel himself accountable to some being or beings higher than himself."

"Law cannot administer itself. Law is but an expression of force, or power, or will. Back of all law must be something or somebody, else there is no law, much less any administration of law."

If one should step off a high cliff, or throw himself in front of an advancing engine, or swallow poison, the result would prove that he is accountable to the Law, and that the Law administers itself, promptly and invariably, "in an unbroken series of causes and effects."

If one puts his hand in the fire, he does not assume that God punishes him by burning it. He knows that he has violated a natural law, and taken the penalty.

We have discovered in endless ways that we are accountable to the Law — to the natural order — and that its penalties and rewards are sure and invariable.

In the comparison of human law with natural law, we have again the narrow view of the cosmic order — the assumption that the movements of the stars, the measureless force of gravitation, the influences of evolution, the equilibrium in things infinitely great and infinitely minute, can be comprehended only through our better understanding of the origin and enforcement of man's laws and man's systems of justice on this earth.

While the law of man is imperfect and its execution defective, the law of Nature is perfect and its execution invariable. We find in the natural order no evidence of fear, compassion, reverence, favor, sympathy, or affection. Fire has the same effect upon king and slave, rich and poor — upon the good, the vile, the innocent, the ignorant, the beautiful, the ugly. It will sear the fairest face in the world as readily as the plainest. The insurance rate is the same for the atheist and the Christian.

We have no real reason to doubt, and every reason to believe, that moral penalties and rewards are ad-

ministered exactly as physical penalties and rewards are administered — through the invariable, just, and perfect order of cause and effect.

"Justice! Do we not know that the rich are never convicted, that the guilty often escape, that the innocent have been hanged, that there are liars who are never found out, and that one may think as much evil as he pleases without impairing his moral standing among his neighbors?"

Again we have the limited view, to which the Eternalist answers: "One can do no wrong without immediate and exact punishment, for the evil he does is registered instantly in his own nature and character. If the evil be small, he takes a short step downward; if it be great, he takes a long stride toward hell. The individual may hide his sins from his fellows, but he cannot escape cause and effect, cannot avoid his own degradation."

"Is not Eternalism merely Buddhism in a new dress? Wherein do they differ?"

Whether Buddhism accepts the beginningless existence of the soul is a question I am not prepared to answer. There can be no doubt, however, that the Buddhist doctrine of Nirvana is a denial of the endless existence of the individual. Hence this fundamental distinction exists between Buddhism and Eternalism: Buddhism is a doctrine of the limited existence of the soul; Eternalism is the theory that

the existence of the individual soul is beginningless and endless, unlimited, eternal.

"I admit your chief claim — that Eternalism is apparently a doctrine of Infinite Justice, while Creationism is apparently a doctrine of Infinite Injustice — and yet I cannot accept Eternalism, because it appears to me to be a denial of a personal and loving God, a Great Friend, to whom we can appeal in time of trouble. Deprived of this consolation, life would be hopeless and wretched. So at least it appears to me."

The belief in an Invisible Friend, or in Invisible Friends, is very old and nearly universal. I do not believe that it is wholly groundless, and I can conceive that it may be, in important respects, true.

As intimated elsewhere, I believe in the theory of Superhuman Powers and Intelligences — that in this boundless Universe there must be beings as much superior to us as we are superior to the life below us, and as much above our present comprehension as we are above the comprehension of the insect. It may be that these Great Souls, or some of them, exercise a powerful influence upon affairs here, and that their help can be gained through noble and unselfish prayer, accepting prayer in its higher sense as an expression of fortitude, aspiration, or faith in ultimate Justice.

If we accept the theory of Invisible Great Souls, it does not follow, however, that any one is a Supreme Intelligence. The doctrine of *one* Supreme Intelligence, or Personality, necessarily all-powerful,

must include supreme purpose, design, pre-determination, Fatalism. It robs the individual of merit and demerit, of accountability and freedom, and transfers to the Supreme Personal Intelligence the responsibility for all that is.

"Religion is usually defined as the faith in, or recognition of, God. But as the word God has no clear or definite meaning, it appears to me that Religion, being based on the belief in an indefinable God, also has no definite meaning — that Religion means one thing to one man and in one phase of human development, and quite a different thing to other men and in other stages of social evolution."

Back of all the varying conceptions of God there must be, as I have suggested before, a fundamental harmony. The reaching out toward a mysterious and superhuman power must have a common motive, otherwise the reaching out would not be universal. I believe that God, whether conceived as a ghost, a fetish, an idol, a personality, or a principle, means always *the power that rights things.* The low man has a low comprehension of Justice, and a degraded view of God; the high man has a high comprehension of Justice, and a noble ideal of God.

I would define the word God as the idealization of each soul's conception of Divine Order, Rightness, Justice. The highest and noblest idealization of these principles must be that which is nearest to the truth.

"I do not follow you when you say that 'the principle of Justice . . . is Omnipotence and Omnipresence.'"

Justice is in every manifestation of cause and effect, and is therefore omnipotent and omnipresent.

"If we all are made of the same soul stuff and have like variety of experiences, why should one get any start of another? You do not seem to answer that. Responsibility is all right, but a ball projected by a skillful hand will reach its mark. So would any number. The impelling force of the universe ought to do the same."

I cannot accept the theory that "we are made," that each is as "a ball projected by a skillful hand." These are the terms of Creationism and Fatalism, not of Eternalism. Fatalism is the doctrine that man's destiny is controlled from without, by forces external to him; Eternalism is the doctrine that his destiny is controlled from within, by himself.

"'The fit advance, the unfit decline.' The soul loses its powers through disuse or abuse as the physical organ deteriorates through disease. But if you allow of decline forever and ever, won't you reach a point where decline is no longer possible? Can you argue the persistent decline without stepping on the toes of annihilation? A limb, if disused through a series of generations, shrinks to nothingness. Shall we not predicate the same of the soul?"

"If devolution may go so far that all depths are open to man, must it not come to practical annihilation or to a

point so low that, like the point perfection, we may exclude from our thought all conception of such souls or of their value?"

I can conceive of no point where degradation becomes annihilation, nor where progress becomes perfection. The infinite has no boundary.

Even if a soul should sink so low as to become an unconscious and invisible atom of matter, nearly all scientific minds are agreed that it would remain, or become, an immortal. It is an odd fact, which I have commented on before, that scientific men, including the Agnostics and Materialists, are agreed that the meanest thing of which they have any knowledge, an atom, is preëxistent, after-existent, deathless, eternal. They acknowledge Eternalism on the lowest plane of life.

"If a human soul has become what it is through its antecedent activities as a brute soul, and prior to that as a reptile and amebean soul, was it not necessitated in those activities? If necessitated, how can it be responsible for what it has now become as the result of that former experience? And what justice is there in its present limitations and sufferings if the only defense of Justice is the theory that man's present self is the product of his former actions?"

I do not admit that the soul of the individual has evolved upon the same definite lines as the human race in its physical development on this earth; to do so would be an admission that the destiny of the

individual is controlled from without, which is the theory of Fatalism, not of Eternalism. Nor do I conceive that the soul of the individual is necessarily advancing. That also would be a doctrine of Fatalism. I believe that some souls are advancing, and others receding, in freedom.

Evolution has its narrow interpretations and dogmas as well as Theology. There are scientific men who do not yet admit completely the self-evident fact that the natural order includes devolution as well as evolution — that, on the physical side, all things grow, advance, ripen, decline, deteriorate, and undergo transformation.

The individual, I conceive, must also advance or decline, but having the marvelous powers of consciousness and intelligence, he can choose his way — to degradation or purification, to the depths or heights.

"By Justice I assume that you mean, as I do, the universal adjustment of universal force and substance. It is apparent that the organism of Nature could not exist except for such ceaseless and errorless adjustment. Therefore in the fact of universal self-existence we must encounter a certain phase of Necessitarianism. I wonder if this is included in your reproach of Fatalism, as canceling man's accountability."

I claim that man is free in vital respects, but not in all respects. The Fatalist must assert logically that man is free in no respect. Man is under many

physical limitations here, and he must be forever subject to the order of Nature. But I conceive that the physical limitations are temporary, and that the order of Nature is just, not unjust, and that under this just order man works out his own damnation or salvation in freedom.

"I do not quite see how it follows that if a man must attend so carefully to his own soul there is much place for consideration of other souls. Is it a selfish thing?"

As the Bishop of Ripon says, "All self-affirmation, self-preservation, self-possession, self-mastery, all effort to make the best of self, is not selfishness."

The theory of Eternalism builds upon the assumption that man makes his own character. One can build character only through unselfishness — through love, kindness, generosity, sympathy, good-will, high-mindedness, patience, fortitude, toleration, rectitude, justice. Selfishness, on the other hand, degrades character.

"Nor do I quite see how, if life is a constant succession of births and deaths, and a continual struggle to rise higher, or a constant falling back, death can be said to have no terror, or the grave to be but 'the open door from toil to rest, from war to peace.' I do not see how there can be any rest or peace worthy of the name in a constant round or succession of births and deaths."

We do not know that life includes "a constant round or succession of births and deaths." Nearly

all theories of reincarnation assume that the life in the flesh is an incident, and not the whole, of the life of the individual. It may be that exemption from a return to the physical life can be earned. We do not know, and cannot even imagine, the possibilities of the ascending life. There may be peace and security there passing comprehension, and happiness of which we have no present conception.

We need not appeal to our imagination to find conditions under which peace and happiness can be secured. There are high souls among us who, in spite of difficulty and trial, poverty and privation, pain and sorrow, pursue the even tenor of their way, in courage and hopefulness, without murmur or complaint. We know that courage overcomes trouble, and that faith in the rightness of the Eternal Order is a balm for every sorrow. And this courage and faith are attainable here and now.

"The butterfly and caterpillar may serve as an analogy, but not as a proof. The caterpillar does not die; or, if it does, there 's no butterfly. But for the butterfly death does 'end all,' and so the argument breaks.

"The chrysalis is very different from a dead caterpillar. It preserves the power of sensation and motion."

I do not claim that the caterpillar actually dies, nor do I believe that man really dies. That which is called death is transformation, I hold. The caterpillar, after its transformation, no longer exists, in a

physical sense. To our eye it is not visible. There is no caterpillar. In its place is a very different thing physically, a butterfly. What has become of the caterpillar? My critic and I agree that it is not dead. There has been no death. The caterpillar survives in the butterfly. Is the butterfly, then, a caterpillar? By no means. The body of the caterpillar is unlike the body of the butterfly. One is an ugly, creeping worm; the other is a flying creature of rare brilliancy and beauty. In this change we perceive that there are two physical bodies, with only one animating principle. The life in the body of the caterpillar has passed into the body of the butterfly. While the worm has ceased to exist in a physical sense, in an actual sense it still lives in the butterfly. The worm survives the passing of its body.

Has the worm, then, an after-existence? Yes; it lives again in the body of the butterfly. Is this the very first existence of the butterfly? No; it preëxisted in the body of the worm. This is an actual and tangible case of preëxistence and after-existence. At the least it proves, as I have said before, that preëxistence and after-existence belong to the order of Nature. Its significance may be belittled by those who dwell upon the details only of phenomena, but will not be by those who recognize the essential harmony in all of Nature's ways and facts, and the great part which analogy plays in scientific reasoning.

"If the soul's sins are its own alone and the vicious are attracted to the vicious, why do good people have bad children or the reverse?"

No one is wholly good, or wholly bad. In one mood parents may attract a soul that is in harmony with the evil in their natures, and at another time attract one that is in harmony with their good qualities.

"If this present system of things is so unjust, and there is nothing but this magnificent system of things, this mighty Force, this Nature which brought me here — if this, I say, is so unjust now, what proof have I that it will ever reverse itself and become just? The present injustice — apparent injustice at least — seems almost an argument against the establishment of Justice at any time or anywhere."

It is unnecessary to assume that the order of Nature must be reversed, or that life hereafter will differ materially from life here, to establish Justice. Time is the essential factor in Eternal Justice — life heretofore to explain the inequalities and apparent injustice here, and life hereafter to give further opportunity for adjustment. The life here probably gives some indication of the life hereafter. We should remember, however, that the present life is full of change and transformation — from night to day, from storm to sunshine, from infancy to childhood, to youth, to maturity, to old age; from obscurity to fame, from war to peace — and that the

departure from a wornout physical body may involve equally startling changes.

"Creation, you say in substance, determines constitution and character. These determine choices and actions. Therefore the Creator predestines the entire history of each being that he creates. But if the assumption be true that constitution and character determine conduct, what becomes of your doctrine of freedom? Let it be admitted that man was not created, but got his constitution and character in some other way by his own actions in a former state of existence, let us say. Nevertheless he has them, and they are just what they are. How, then, if they completely determine conduct, can he be free?"

My critic has failed to weigh accurately the broad distinction between the fatalistic theory that the character of the individual is made *for* him, and the eternalistic theory that his character is made *by* him. If man's character is made for him, then we must abandon the theory that he is free or accountable. If, on the other hand, he has made his own character, we must admit that he has made it in freedom, and that he can continue in freedom to undermine and impair it, or to upbuild, improve, and strengthen it.

"I have searched in vain for your definition of the word 'soul' and for your exact meaning when you refer to the relations of 'soul' and body."

The best definition of the word "soul" is found, I believe, in the common and instinctive belief of

mankind, in which the soul is recognized as the real man, the individual, the I, the actual self. The individual does not *have* a soul; he *is* a soul. In this common belief the body is to the soul as the clothing to the body, as the house in which one lives, even as the prison in which one is confined. As clothing and housing limit the freedom of the body, so does the body limit the freedom of the soul.

V

THE QUESTION OF MEMORY — CONSCIOUS IMMORTALITY A THING TO BE EARNED

THE lapse in memory:

"If I preëxisted, the extinction of memory is a practical extinction of being. It is the same as if I were constituted anew of unconscious materials."

There are numerous cases on record of individuals who, through disease or accident, have had all memory of their past obliterated, to be restored again after many years. We do not say that these persons lost their identity with their memory. And we find in these cases, and in many other facts, evidences that memory is often lost and that it may be restored. Because I do not remember what happened last night when I was asleep, I do not deny the individual continuity of my life, or say that my soul failed to pass on from yesterday.

"If throughout these transformations I do not recognize myself, if I cannot always say it is I, do you not see that immortality is no more to me than to the atoms that make up a block of wood?"

"Now I desire to appear again. Death is to me, as to

you, simply a change from one estate to another, but in the change do not let my peculiar make-up be lost. If you do, I have no interest in the proceeding."

I will answer in the language of the poet:

> "Not in my way nor in your way
> Does the cause of truth march on."

The truth is not always as we would have it. The theory of evolution is repugnant in many of its aspects. Many people still deny it because they do not like it.

"Since here we are on the whole unconscious of any previous existence, then the deduction would be natural that in a successive existence to this we shall be quite as unconscious of the present, and therefore wholly insensible of any results either of gains or losses; hence the conclusion would be, 'Live simply for to-day.'"

It is not true that all are unconscious of a previous existence, or that no evidence of such an existence is found in the memory of men. One of my critics writes as follows:

"The only shred of testimony the theory in question has in its favor is the feeling that has come to us all, perhaps, some time in life, 'I have been here before.' This can be explained as well, perhaps, upon some other hypothesis."

The preceding quotation is an admission that the consciousness of a past life is not unusual. Another of my critics says:

"Let me just add one word which will favor your theory. I know a man who told me he could remember his life in a previous existence. He told me he could distinctly remember living two thousand years ago; that in that previous existence he was a Russian, and he felt that he could recall particular incidents of that life. He was a man sane and rational in all ways."

I introduce the foregoing items of evidence because they come from sources adverse to the theory of pre-existence. A formidable mass of similar evidence exists, and while it may not be in itself conclusive, we cannot say that there is no evidence. The fact that I do not remember, and that most of us do not remember, does not refute the evidence of those who do remember.

To those who reject the theory of preëxistence on the ground that they have no recollection of a past life, or that their memory is faint or inconclusive, I commend this thought, which strikes me with great force: *Complete conscious immortality is a thing to be earned.* This is a proposition in harmony with the theory of Eternalism, which considers the individual as an achievement, not a creation, as having earned all that he is, and being in the line of further advancement, of gaining all that he needs, all that he aspires to, and of discovering on still higher planes, now incomprehensible to us, other needs and aspirations yet to bear harvest.

Some of our evolutionists assume that humanity

is the highest product of Nature. This, also, is a narrow conception. The distinction between the highest man and the lowest man, as we now know them, is very great. And the distinction between our highest man and what the individual can be in the limitless future must be measureless.

Evolution shows to us the fruitfulness of aspiration — that the dullest even can get what they need. The eyeless fishes in the Mammoth Cave have no sight because they have never felt the stimulation of light. The beaver made a shovel of his tail because he needed a shovel. Man, on his physical side, is the result of the unconscious and instinctive aspirations of the life below him. And our civilization is the harvest of the up-reaching of some of the individuals who have preceded us.

Who shall say that we have reached the end? that "Finis" is written upon the history of the ascent of the individual? that the law of evolution no longer bears upon us? that we shall respond no more to our own needs and aspirations?

One evolutionist at least, M. Guyau, has perceived clearly that the evolution of the individual is not completed. He utters his thought in these inspiring words:

"Evolution may be conceived of as resulting in beings capable of proposing to themselves a certain aim, and of dragging Nature after them toward it. Natural selection would thus finally be converted into a moral, and, in some

sort, divine selection. It can, in effect, produce species and types superior to humanity as we know it; it is not probable that we embody the highest achievement possible in life, thought, and love. Who knows, indeed, but that evolution may be able to bring forth — nay, has not already brought forth — immortals?"

If evolution teaches us anything clearly it is this: The progress of the individual is not ended, his evolution is not completed. And we may doubt that there ever will be an end to the response of Nature to the aspiration of man.

Man is now under a great need and pressure to establish a rational theory of the moral order of the Universe. The old theologies and the modern materialistic philosophies are repugnant to the higher ethical ideals of the present time. Man demands something better, and his need will produce it. If that higher faith should be found, as I believe it will be found, in the theory of the complete immortality of the soul of the individual, then man's need and aspiration to know something of his past, and in his future life to meet and remember the friends of the present life, will bring forth a harvest, and it will be possible for him to remember, know, and understand.

We get nothing that we do not earn. We have laid small foundation in effort or aspiration for a knowledge of our past lives, for our race has continuously denied the possibility of preëxistence. It is not strange, under the circumstances, that only a

faint glimmer of light comes to us from the blackness of the past. Complete conscious immortality is, I believe, a thing which must be earned. It exists now in a rudimentary sense in many, perhaps in all. It can be developed, as all other things are developed, under the pressure of needs and aspirations.

VI

THE DIFFICULTIES IN ACCEPTING AND EXPRESSING THE LOGIC OF FATALISM

IN defense of Fatalism:

"From my point of view Fatalism is not a doctrine of despair and in nowise need detract from the dignity of mankind, because, while Fatalism takes from man the credit of his being the author of his good conduct, it leaves him the consolation which may be derived from his consciousness of being used as the exponent of righteousness."

But where do we find consolation for him who is created unrighteous — for the hypocrite, liar, thief, murderer? He, it would appear, has the consolation only of being used as an exponent of viciousness.

"'Fatalism kills every aspiration of man.' Perhaps it ought to do so, but does it in fact? I know men who accept Fatalism, yet who are among the most aspiring, energetic, and inspiring men I know."

Fatalism would kill aspiration if any one could actually believe in Fatalism. Fortunately no one accepts Fatalism completely, though many have done so intellectually. The extreme Fatalists are courageous thinkers who see that the theory of Creationism leads to no other conclusion than Fatalism, and who are too sincere to decline that finality, though

it be a hard doctrine to live up to. I have known intimately only two men who accepted the logic of Fatalism; but there was something in each of them that would not be bound by this verdict of the mind. One, a man of great genius and noble character, who is now dead, has left behind him many volumes of striking and original thought, in almost every page of which will be found eulogy and criticism, praise and blame, or some other form of recognition of man as a free moral agent.

The other is a writer of fiction, who told me some time ago of an effort made by him to express the meaning of Fatalism, and of his failure. He has obliged me with this account of his experience:

"It was my intention to write a story which should be projected into that future time when all men shall have penetrated the shallow trickery of the will, and shall have come to see the utter mechanicalism of life. The leading characters were to have been a man and a woman who knew themselves to be the idiots of that gloomily enlightened day, reversions to a previous type, capable of many emotions long outworn in the generality of the species. I wished them to wander away together into the cities of a dead age of splendor, and amid the discarded luxuries of mankind, where their natural reversionary tendencies would be encouraged so that they should come under the sway of hope, love, and many kindred dreams, being led at last to the absurdity of a recognized voluntary attempt to be the first parents of a new and happier race. The idea took strong hold of me — but that idea I shall never

be able to express, because there is no language known to me which could be the vehicle of such a theme. A series of experiments with the introductory chapters of the story convinced me that the error of Free-will is inextricably woven into human speech. I believe it to be strictly impossible to portray such characters as I imagined — people absolutely free from the volitional idea, to whom 'willing' had ceased to be an illusion — unless the writer shall invent a new language or modify that which we now use to such an extent that nobody else will be able to understand it. A mere glance at the auxiliary verbs will show the difficulty of the problem.

"Mark, also, the term, 'absolutely free,' which I inadvertently used above to describe men living open-eyed in the realm of Necessity."

Not only is there no language in which Fatalism can be expressed, but it is also true that no one can regulate his actions, feelings, and thoughts in harmony continuously with that doctrine. No one can sympathize with the cruel, treacherous, and malicious of his own kind, as he should sympathize with them if they were created vicious without their own knowledge or consent — being only the innocent victims of the malice of Nature, or of the wrath of the Creator. Nor can any one look upon an honest man as being entitled to no more approbation than a rascal.

He only who can look constantly upon the mean and depraved with sympathy, and upon the good and noble without respect, can accept fully the doctrine of Fatalism, and the denial of human freedom.

VII

THE DECAY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY — THE TRUE AND IMPERISHABLE PHILOSOPHY

CONCERNING the philosophers:

"Your dealing with the philosophers is, to say the least, one-sided. You say that they have not yet decided what morality is, yet if you will follow the history of moral theory through another line of thinkers you will probably find reason to modify this statement. Beginning with Socrates there is a succession of writers down to the present time who have taught that morality belongs to the nature of man (in opposition to some that you quote) and that it has its foundation in the distinction of right and wrong. Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the early Christian writers, the leading thinkers of mediæval Christianity, Grotius, Berkeley, Reid, Kant, Hegel, Butler, Hutcheson, Price, and a multitude of more recent writers, ending, say, with Martineau, have given a very distinct and consistent utterance on this point."

My critic has misunderstood me. I have said that the inhabitant of a distant planet could not "determine *through any agreement* among our philosophers what the morality of this world really is." I am aware that all philosophers have not been Hedonists.

My issue with the philosophers is with the expo-

nents of Creationism only, and extends so far only as they deal with the great problems of morals and of man's accountability and freedom — all other philosophical questions being relatively unimportant. The philosophers of Creationism build upon the theory that the character of the individual is made for him — not by him — an error which is so bedded in the foundations and interwoven with all of the developments of Western philosophy that the whole structure has finally tumbled of its own rottenness, and is no longer of much interest save to the pedant and the antiquarian.

Socrates and Plato, who are referred to by my critic, were not philosophers of Creationism. They built upon the theory that the soul of the individual is preëxistent and after-existent.

"Your sweeping denunciation of the philosophers is not justified in view of the fact, as you admit, that many of them are not Necessitarians. Nor do I think that the poets, however worthy in their own line, should be exalted at the expense of the great philosophical thinkers."

The philosophers of Creationism are divided into two schools. One school accepts the logic of Creationism completely in the denial of man's freedom and accountability, and in the affirmation of Fatalism. The other school balks at this monstrous determination, abandons its logic, and invents the conclusion that man is free.

Both schools have discredited reasoning — the one

in accepting a conclusion so unreasonable, immoral, and unbelievable that no man, as I have shown, has been able to act or think or live as if it were true; and the other in forcing a conclusion in violation of the simplest and plainest principles of logic.

Reasoning is faulty when the conclusion is unbelievable. Our philosophers were learned men. They knew that their major premise — that the character of the individual is made for him — is only a theory, an assumption, and that it is not the only possible theory or assumption concerning the riddle of human life. They might at least have made this admission: "The difficulties in which we flounder are due to our Western theory that the character of the individual is made for him. There is another theory, held in the other half of the world, and by the greatest of the old philosophers, that man, in his preëxistent life, makes his own character. This other theory, it is true, does not lead to an immoral or fatalistic conclusion, nor would it force us to twist, tangle, and pervert our own logic in order to avoid that conclusion; but we do not consider the other theory as of any consequence. It has no standing in our part of the world; it is contrary to our revealed Religion, and to all of our philosophic thought, which is necessarily in harmony with our Theology. Still, we mention this other theory incidentally, and in fairness, for what it may be worth."

It is true that our philosophy has its roots in our

Theology. Originally they were one. Both are built upon the fundamental error of Creationism. One is dead, and the other is undergoing transformation. Theology survives only because of its association, direct and indirect, with those moral truths of Religion which the logic of our Western philosophy has always denied.

It is true, as my critic says, and as I have just admitted, that many of our philosophers have declined to accept the immoral conclusions from the theory of Creationism. They did this, not as philosophers — for a philosopher cannot repudiate logic — but as men. They declined the conclusions of their fellow philosophers, and accepted instead the instinctive belief of all mankind in man's freedom and accountability. I say "all mankind" advisedly, for all men, including the most extreme philosophical Fatalists, do believe, and cannot avoid believing, instinctively in freedom and accountability. The Fatalists account for this instinctive belief on the ground that it is an "illusion." A strange theory, that our moral instincts are illusions, and that an immoral and unbelievable philosophy is real!

The thought of our poets is clearer and better than the thought of our philosophers, because the poets have drawn usually from the great fountains of truth known instinctively to men, in which are found no contradictions, no entanglements, no lessons of immorality or of Fatalism.

The greatest thoughts of the poets, and all other thoughts drawn from man's instinctive sense of the Rightness of Things, suffer not from age. They come down to us from the dim past, and we treasure them and pass them on to the future. If, through a catastrophe, any be lost of record, then some later thinker, whose soul is kindled by the same sacred fire, produces them anew. They constitute the immortal, the imperishable, philosophy of mankind — not the perverted philosophy of a narrow school, existent for a little time in one part of this world, but the philosophy, we may well believe, of the ages, of all intelligence, of all worlds, of all time. Through it we see clearly the perfection of the Eternal Order, and we draw the strength, the inspiration and hope which assure us that life is a blessing and not a curse.

VIII

AGNOSTICISM—THE EVIDENCES OF THE AFTER-LIFE, OF PRE-EXISTENCE, OF THE MORAL ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE

AGNOSTICISM, doubt, and questionings:

"I am inclined, as are many scientific men, to a belief in Agnosticism on the ground that a future existence is not demonstrable with rigor."

"The Agnosticism of which I have any conception asserts that it is 'not known,' not that it is unknowable or beyond the reach of reason."

"My Agnosticism, while asserting nothing, leaves room for abundant faith in the ultimate goodness of things."

"My form of Agnosticism is hardly a dogma; it is simply a dropping of the subject until data can be acquired upon which to base reasoning."

"All men are more or less Agnostic. All men should be Agnostic to the extent of being able to say when they do not know a certain thing, 'I do not know.'"

"When it comes to the harder task of constructing a working hypothesis to replace those you have so clearly proven untenable, I do not feel that I can follow you so completely and unreservedly. There are still many points

where I am compelled to say with the Agnostic, 'I do not know.' "

"The most thoughtful Agnostics say 'we do not know,' not 'it cannot be known,' which is mere arrogance."

"You ignore the fact that the Agnostic has also 'evolved.' He does not say to-day, 'No one can know,' but 'No one does know up to date.' He does not limit future knowledge. Numbers of things that ten years ago were classed as 'unknowable' are known to-day."

The foregoing quotations are introduced to show that those who call themselves Agnostics usually mean thereby to express doubt, to dispute evidence, or to affirm their individual lack of knowledge. It is an error, however, to use Agnosticism as a word to express doubt, disbelief, or ignorance. If it can be so used correctly, then all men are Agnostics, for all, including the most intelligent, are doubtful, disbelieving, or ignorant in relation to many things.

"Your contention against Agnosticism is, in words, a contention that we can know that man is immortal, while in reality, I should say, it is a contention that there is reasonable ground to believe it."

If it be admitted that "there is reasonable ground to believe it," or the slightest ground to believe it, then the Agnostic position is turned, for the essence of the Agnostic belief is this: No one can know anything about it.

Agnosticism is not the attitude of an individual;

it is not even a school of thought. It is a dogma defining the limits of thought. Logically it derides all discussion and investigation of a future life, for he who discusses or investigates admits that the theory of survival has some rational standing. This a real Agnostic cannot admit.

Let us now consider the actual Agnostic position:

"I do not affirm or deny the possibility of future recompenses or the reverse, yet it appears to me that there can be no proof or knowledge here. The subject permits of no investigation."

"The subject permits of no investigation" is the creed of real Agnosticism.

"You raise a number of deep questions, many of which transcend the natural world and consequently are outside the pale of science."

Again we have the limited conception of the cosmic order — the assumption that questions can be so deep or subtle or remote that they "transcend the natural world, and consequently are outside the pale of science." Here is a theory that there is a natural world, with something beyond which is not of Nature, that the cosmos does not include all, that there are phenomena which science cannot consider. It is akin to the error into which Buckle falls when he assumes that "man modifies Nature, and Nature modifies man," as though man were not a part of Nature.

The thought of man cannot reach beyond the

natural, because man is of Nature, and his thought is also of Nature. He may, and usually does, misunderstand Nature, hold limited and imperfect views; but these also are natural, not unnatural or supernatural. No man has unlimited intelligence or reasoning powers; hence he is subject to error, which is as natural in his case as accuracy. The supernatural theory is not a thing apart from Nature; it is a misconception of the order of Nature. It is not a theory to be ignored on the ground that it is outside of Nature, and consequently beyond the domain of science. It can be answered only by showing that it is untrue, that it is an incorrect interpretation of Nature.

It is true that we use the word "unnatural," meaning thereby the exceptional, the abnormal, or the untrue; but the exceptional, the abnormal, and the untrue do not "transcend the natural world." Progressive science is engaged wholly in exploring the unknown and in answering the untrue.

The religious beliefs of man are as legitimate matters for scientific investigation as his stomach, muscles, or brain. Some of the most eminent of modern thinkers have devoted much time and thought to the study and comparison of these beliefs, seeking for their common meaning and rational interpretation. No one can deny that Religion is natural, for, as the Bishop of Ripon says, "man has been incorrigibly religious."

"We are limited in all our discussions so soon as we forsake Theology to 'pure' experience — that is, to the evidence of history and civilization as we are able to understand the facts — and we only evade our problems when we bring in references to other spheres. Every question that is capable of clear statement must be solved from within human experience or else it is incapable of solution."

"Psychical research claims to have rendered some evidence as to an hereafter, conscious, personal, communicative. Its evidence is not, however, conclusive upon that matter; but, so far as I am aware, there is not a single whit of evidence, even of this character, as to 'preëxistence.'

"The case seems somewhat similar in one respect to the biological problem as to the origin of life — namely, that it may have come to our earth from some other planet or some preëxistent life. Such is not an impossibility, but wholly beyond possibility at present of demonstration. It may have originated de novo, from some fortunate clash of atoms in the processes of a cooling globe, but this again is wholly beyond demonstration.

"It seems to me that while speculations upon these points are not without interest and some measure of profit as showing possibilities of a reconciliation of existing conditions, they are at best merely suggestive, and in nowise conclusive."

"If Justice is to be vindicated for man, it must be so vindicated without an appeal to the unknown possibilities of an inscrutable past or future."

"Your theory of man's relations to the Universe is correct in so far as it maintains, mainly in opposition to the theory of Theology, that man is unreservedly part of a

larger whole, but it explains the problems of Heredity, Necessity, Free-will, etc., only by evading them for this world and debiting the solution to another sphere.

"The main fallacy of Eternalism is precisely that it takes us to such another world and makes the whole problem, if not center there, then be solved there, and of this no man can say anything. The theory, it is true, cannot be refuted, but equally it carries conviction to none."

I am unable to believe that any problem which man can comprehend even vaguely is beyond the reach of reason. The fact that man can comprehend the issue indicates that some light exists. Many problems are beyond my reason, but they cannot be beyond all reason.

Of the problem of "another sphere," "another world," of life after death, my critics say, we know nothing, "no man can say anything."

We know that the physical body of the individual dies and decomposes. So far, at least, we have knowledge. If this be all that we know, then we know that the individual does not survive death, that there is no life hereafter; and this we should state as our conclusion. The admission that the individual may live after death is an evidence that there must be some reason to justify such an assumption. We do not say of a house consumed by fire that it may still exist.

If we know nothing, and can know nothing, of a life hereafter, then there has been and can be no

evidence of such existence. Is it true that there is no such evidence?

Every form and manifestation of Religion, as Tylor has shown, is based upon what he calls Animism — the belief in disembodied spirits, and that man has held, or can hold, communication with them. The witnesses of these communications have been numerous in all times, and among nearly all tribes and races of which we have accurate knowledge, including the peoples now in existence. Some of these witnesses are well known — Socrates and Swedenborg, and in our own time Hyslop and James, Wallace and Crookes, and many others. It is impossible to impeach all of these witnesses; they are too numerous, and many thousands, perhaps millions, are dead.

My Agnostic critics will doubtless say that they disbelieve this evidence. In saying this they shift their ground. They abandon the claim that there is no evidence, and admit instead that there is a great deal of evidence, all of which they dispute. But their denial, and all other denial of the evidence, does not answer it or remove it. It is difficult to conceive of a rational ground on which such a mass of evidence can be disputed, save on the assumption that the survival of the soul is a doctrine which is unbelievable — a lame conclusion in view of the fact that nearly all of mankind have believed it, and continue to believe it.

Nor can the instinctive belief of mankind in the survival of the soul be passed by as a fact of no importance.

I have shown in a former place that the belief in the survival of the soul is the instinctive faith of man. That this belief in an after-life was not in the beginning a product of man's reason is an evidence of its truth, for it belongs in the category of vital truth and wisdom which is not taught, but which is instinctive, and does not mislead or deceive.

He who denies the evidence of "another sphere," of life hereafter, must show either that man's belief in the survival of the soul is not instinctive, or that instinct is misleading and untrue. And he will have much difficulty in establishing either proposition.

The evidence which is absolutely conclusive to my mind, however, of the after-existence, and also of the preëxistence, of the soul is found in the fact that on no theory other than the complete immortality of the soul can we establish the freedom and the accountability of man, and the moral order of the Universe. Some of my Agnostic critics have dismissed this consideration as a matter beyond the reach of science. I am sure that they have passed judgment too hastily. Whether the Eternal Order be upon the whole right or wrong, just or unjust, is an issue of much importance, and possibly of more importance than all other questions pertaining to human life. To say that science cannot consider

this supreme question is an unwarranted impeachment of the capability of science.

In answer to the critics who assume that no evidence of preëxistence has been presented, or is obtainable, I will present a simple proposition. There are only two possible theories of the origin of the individual — one that his character has been made for him; the other that his character is made by him. The former is the theory of Creationism; the latter of Eternalism. Each of these theories includes certain inevitable consequences. The corollary of Creationism, as I have proved, is Fatalism.

He who appeals to reason must not deny reason. He who accepts Creationism as true must accept Fatalism as true. He who says, "I deny preëxistence," says at the same time, in fact, "I accept Fatalism." If he says, "I accept Creationism and deny Fatalism," he takes a position which is irrational and illogical.

"And suppose that I do accept Fatalism. What then?" Then you accept a position so irrational, unjust, and unbelievable, as I have shown, that it cannot be expressed in our language, or entertained without doing violence to the normal feelings and moral sentiments of mankind.

It would be unreasonable to say that, of two possible theories of the origin of the individual, there is no ground for rational preference between the one which leads to conclusions that are immoral and

unbelievable, and the other which leads to conclusions that are moral and believable.

As for the dogma of Agnosticism, upon what does it really rest? Has it ever been demonstrated, or has any serious attempt been made to demonstrate it? I know of none. It is a mere assertion, a denial. Science has nothing to do with assertions and denials. It weighs, considers, strikes a balance, proves or disproves.

The assertion that "No one can know" — made as it is by a very few, in antagonism to the almost universal faith of mankind, and in the denial logically of any rational ground for the belief in the moral order of the Universe — is apparently the most pretentious, imperious, and arrogant assertion of intellectual infallibility ever made by a school of men on this earth. Certainly we have no record of any others who, in contradiction to the mature judgment and moral instincts of the human race, have said this practically: "We know the limits of human knowledge. We set up our barrier here, and no thought shall ever penetrate beyond it!"

IX

AN EXAMINATION OF THE ONE THEORY OF INFINITE JUSTICE OFFERED BY CREATIONISM

WHEN I invited criticism upon the original draft of the matter in this volume, I urged each of my reviewers to send to me his own theory of Infinite Justice, if it should differ from the theory of Eternalism. I conceived, correctly I think, that the theory of Eternalism could be answered more completely by a better theory than in any other way. The answers to this request are of much importance, for they point to the fact — which is evident indeed in the very nature of the issue, though it would doubtless otherwise have escaped my observation — that there are apparently only two theories of adjustment which can be built upon the assumption of Creationism, and that these two theories resolve themselves promptly upon analysis into one. This one theory is old and well known. Indeed it is doubtful that there are any theories entirely new bearing on the relations of the individual to the Eternal Order. So much thought has been expended on the subject that one can only hope at the best to find some new

harmony or overlooked inconsistency in the reasoning that has come down to us, or to discover in the later facts of science some new light upon the old philosophies and beliefs.

The minor theory, which, as I shall show, is really included in the main theory, is as follows:

"*Man is justly responsible for all he is, because God has given him Free-will.*"

"When you say that 'the theological theory that man has been created by God is also the doctrine of Fatalism,' I must dissent, for whatever the Scriptures may say in regard to 'the final disposal of man,' they must always be interpreted in the light of the doctrine or fact or consciousness — call it what you will — that men possess Free-will in spiritual things. Consequently the responsibility rests not with the Creator, as you claim, but with the one who has Free-will."

"There are difficulties, indeed, but, after all, there are less, it seems to me, in the Biblical statement that God made all men upright, but that men have sought many inventions. The responsibility of the present state of things does not rest upon God, but upon man as a free agent."

"If human souls are created, the responsibility for their congenital defects may be charged up to their Creator. But are they not responsible for willfully doing what they know to be wrong? If not, then I do not see that we can have an ethic at all in the ordinary sense."

"With free volition as his indisputable attribute, man's

moral responsibility, unless rendered unaccountable by conditions over which he has no control, is inseparable from his ruling position in this creation and far beyond. If, like the tiger, man is carnivorous or ferocious, it is his heritage from a degraded stock to be redeemed by a nobler humanity to come. Man is what the impressions of education and environment make of him. The angel and the devil, hell and heaven, happiness and misery, are all rooted in the human heart, provided it has been allowed to throb freely in accord with its natural inclinations. With the loss of freedom responsibility ceases. Bad parents have not infrequently a good child, and vice versa. It all depends on influences. All other things being equal, self-elevation from a lower to a higher state is the test well worthy of a general theory. The moment it is proved that it lies in my power to be better than I am, that moment my Creator ceases to be amenable for my being bad. The cat is felonious by instinct; man by his free-will. Herein your theory of human accountability must remain unchallenged."

"Sin in the sight of God is the knowing violation of Divine Law. A man sins when he knows the law, and in liberty rejects the right and chooses the evil. 'Then ye did not know, and ye were without sin.'"

"Nor do I think that 'Creationism' necessarily involves quite such a severe indictment of the Creator. Might not he conceivably turn a soul loose in the world, and that soul's subsequent downfall be due to the evil choice it makes, it possessing Free-will? Wherein is God then so fearfully responsible?"

Assuming that freedom is given to men by the

Creator, has the allotment been equal, fair, and just?

There are no scores to be settled between the uncreated souls and the Creator. The uncreated have done no evil, no good, nothing to earn condemnation or favor. It would be unfair for him to give to one more of Free-will than to another, knowing that the salvation or damnation of each soul would follow upon this endowment.

Freedom is dependent largely upon intelligence. We cannot say that the Australian savages, who can count no more than the fingers of one hand, are as free as the individuals of the higher races, nor that the dull of any race are as free as the enlightened. Nor is it true that one created a Turk is as free to embrace Christianity as one who is created an American.

Can Free-will be so bestowed that the individual who is endowed with evil passions is as free to lead a good life as the one who is endowed with virtues? This question must be answered in the negative. The soul created vicious is not as free to be good as is the soul that is created virtuous; and the soul created ignorant is not as free to be wise as is the soul that is created intelligent.

It is plain that Free-will, if it be the gift of the Creator, is unfairly and unjustly distributed — that there are discriminations in favor of some souls and against others. And it appears to be quite impossi-

ble to build a theory of Justice upon an original injustice in the order of Creation. Since, however, this theory treats freedom as an endowment of souls, it should be included in the main theory of Eternal Justice, offered by the believers in Creationism, which is as follows:

"*God judges men according to their endowments, their original natures and characters, their opportunities and difficulties — he 'asks not the same of one as of another,' but judges each soul separately.*"

"You ask 'how can men be held to equal moral accountability if they have not been endowed in the beginning with equal goodness, equal strength,' etc.

"Who supposes they will be held to equal moral accountability? Human tribunals may so hold, but then all human tribunals are imperfect. Perhaps it may be necessary for those who are imperfect judges, who cannot know of the original endowment, its strength or its weakness, to judge by one standard for all rather than attempt the impossible, — *i. e.*, of judging by a standard different for each individual when, confessedly, ignorant of all the circumstances in the case of any. It seems to me you attempt to apply the provisional and imperfect methods of men as if they were the ways of the omniscient God."

"The same obligation is not exacted of all. The divine being who can see the heart judges justly and asks not the same of one as of the other."

"Again, the adverse conditions under which so many are born do not to me argue 'the curse of the Creator' when the Creator is interpreted to be not a mere wheel of

'Justice,' but the 'everlasting love' which will forever deal in mercy and judge according to one's light."

"My faith is that the Creator does assume responsibility for all who are born unfit and unfortunate. In other words, no human being enters this Universe who will not here or in some after life have the fairest chance that even the Eternal Heart can give him."

"No man is condemned for his heredity. This whole question, which seems to trouble many, in regard to heredity, being born in the slums, having no chance, etc., is simple, so simple that there ought not to be any confusion. A child that is born in evil surroundings and never knew the right is, in the Lord's sight, always a child. A man is not judged by his parents, nor his birth, nor his chances. The question is not how much do you know, but how faithfully have you lived up to what you do know. The question is not how great were your chances, but how well have you used what you have. The question is not how great things have you done, but with what motive have you worked. A man can shovel dirt with as godly a motive as a clergyman will preach a sermon."

"No man that has had no chance is condemned. 'Herein is the condemnation that light has come into the world and men love darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil.' That is, a man is condemned only when light has come into his mind and he has deliberately turned from the light and chosen evil because he loved evil rather than good. Such a one can but receive the penalty inherent in violated order."

"It is an unwarranted assumption that all men are equally accountable. The man with two talents was

required to gain simply the spiritual duplicates. Sinners differ in degrees of vice as well as saints in degrees of virtue. 'One star differs from another in glory.' Man is accountable for his possibilities, not another's."

The assumption that the Creator will set things right in the end includes necessarily the other assumption that they were wrong in the beginning. If things had been right in the beginning, there would be nothing for God to make right in the end. And who, or what, is responsible for the beginning of all souls, under the theory which we are considering? The Creator. Here we meet again the unanswerable logic of the ages, which holds the Maker responsible for the thing made, the Creator for the soul created.

How will the Creator, who has made things wrong, set them right? Will he reward the good? Why should the good be rewarded? They did not make themselves good; they were made good by their Creator. Will he punish the evil? They were made evil by himself. Will he, then, forgive the vicious? But why should he forgive those whom he has made vicious? It is a strange doctrine that the souls created vicious should ask forgiveness of their Creator. Rather should the Creator pray for forgiveness from his victims upon whom he has inflicted a wrong and outrage greater than all the wrongs that men can put on one another.

The Kamschatkans hold that the rich and the poor

will change places in the other world — that the Creator will be generous hereafter to those to whom he has been ungenerous here, that he will adjust the inequalities of this life through contrary inequalities in the next — a theory creditable to the Kamschatkans, since it shows a good comprehension of Justice. The same theory of adjustment is expressed by the Wolofs in this proverb: "The more powerful one is in this world, the more servile he will be in the next."

Will the Creator, then, give the higher place in heaven to the evil, to whom he has been unkind in this life, and the lower place to the good, to whom he has been generous here? Strict Justice would require that the handicaps in the race of this life — in which, if the Creative theory be true, some individuals have been degraded and others glorified by the Creator — should be reversed in the next. And yet this theory has its difficulties — for the most debased among us would be surest of salvation, and the noblest in danger of hell.

If the Creator should finally judge each soul in proportion to its endowment of Free-will, then the dullest, who receive the smallest allotment of freedom, would be the safest, having little accountability, while the wisest, having the larger allotment, would be the most insecure.

Fortunate, if this line of adjustment be followed, is he who has been created dull and vicious, for the

Creator is his debtor; and unfortunate is he who is created wise and good, for he is heavily in debt to his Maker.

Man, at the most, under the one theory of Divine Justice offered by the Creationists, is accountable for the use of his endowments. If his endowments are vicious, he cannot be expected to make a good use of them. One cannot reap with a hammer, or plow with a broom, and neither can one endowed with an evil character be good. As we would expect the one endowed with goodness to be good, so we should expect the one endowed with viciousness to be bad. And if we expect the creature in whom good preponderates to grow in goodness, so we should expect the creature in whom evil preponderates to grow in evil.

The theory destroys the distinctions between good and evil, by making God responsible for evil. We cannot assume that God creates a murderer without knowing that the murderer will kill. If the Creator dislikes murder, why does he create murderers? If he detests wrong, why does he make liars, thieves, wantons, sots, ingrates? If I should hypnotize some one, and put a murderous spirit in him, and he should consequently commit murder, who would be the real murderer, he or I? There is no doubt that I would be the actual criminal. How, then, can we acquit the Creator of the crimes committed by those whom he has made criminals? The theory which

we are considering is immoral. It enables men to acquit themselves, and to assume that God is the author of, or at least a partner in, their sins.

The theory is a terrible arraignment of God. It assumes that he will excuse men for their evil endowments because he is the author of their endowments — that he will pardon the dull because he made them dull, the weak because he made them weak, the bad because he made them bad, the tempted because he put temptation in their way. That God tempts man is recognized in the Lord's Prayer — "Lead us not into temptation." The theory represents God also as an incapable who, with all power, all knowledge, all light, is yet unable to devise a divine order which is right and just fundamentally.

The theory that God must set things right is a noble conception, but when it is interwoven logically and inextricably — as it must be whenever it is based upon the dogma of Creationism — with the companion theory that God is responsible for all that is wrong, it cannot be designated as a theory of Divine Justice. It is really a theory of Divine Injustice.

And is this all? Does Creationism offer no other theory of Infinite Justice? It is all; Creationism offers no other theory. In the nature of things it can offer no other. The one theory is offered by Theology. On the other hand, Materialism, being

based also on Creationism, can offer no theory of Infinite Justice, and for this reason: Creationism is grounded upon the assumption that the character of the individual is made for him, either by the act of God, or by the processes of Nature, and that some individuals are created good without their knowledge, and that others are created bad without their consent. Upon this fundamental injustice no genuine theory of Justice, finite or infinite, natural or supernatural, can be constructed.

APPENDIX

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POETS, PHILOSOPHERS, AND OTHER THINKERS ON ETERNALISM

MANY poets, philosophers, and other thinkers, ancient and modern, have expressed views more or less in harmony with the principles of Eternalism. Some of these thoughts are here reproduced in classified form, each of the fundamental propositions of Eternalism being followed by the views which are in accord with it:

FIRST PROPOSITION

The Universe has in space no boundary; in time no beginning and no end.

From the Chhandogya-upanishad, in Sanscrit (600 B. C.):

The existent alone, my son, was here in the beginning, one only without a second. Others say, there was the non-existent alone here in the beginning, one only, without a second — and from the non-existent the existent was born. But how could this be, my son? How could the existent be born from the non-existent? No, my son, only the existent was here in the beginning, one only, without a second.

Francis Bacon:

So great a difficulty hath it been thought to conceive matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated of ancient philosophers, even those who maintain the being of a God, have thought matter to be uncreated and coeternal with Him.

Robert G. Ingersoll:

There was no beginning, and there can be no end.

Huxley:

But science knows nothing of any stage in which the Universe could be said, in other than a metaphorical and popular sense, to be formless or empty, or in any respect less the seat of law and order than it is now.

Herbert Spencer:

That which persists unchanging in quantity, but ever changing in form, under these sensible appearances which the Universe presents to us, transcends human knowledge and conception — is an unknown and unknowable power, which we are obliged to recognize as without limit in space and without beginning or end in time.

Haeckel:

The Universe, or the cosmos, is eternal, infinite, and illimitable.

Sir William Hamilton:

Either existence is created by an existent God, on which alternative the definition is stultified by self-contradiction; or existence is created by a non-existent God, an alternative, if deliberately held, at once absurd and impious.

Voltaire:

Aristotle expressly maintains, in his book on Heaven, chapter xi., that the world is eternal; this was the opinion of all antiquity, excepting the Epicureans.

Heraklitus of Ephesus:

The Universe, that is the All, is made neither of gods nor of men, but ever has been and ever will be an eternal living Fire, kindling and extinguishing in destined measure, a game which Zeus plays with himself.

Buchner:

The Universe or matter with its properties, conditions, or movements, which we name forces, must have existed from and will exist to all eternity, or — in other words — the Universe cannot have been created.

Du Prel:

The Universe as a totality is without cause, without origin, without end.

Grove:

All our experiments yield us not the slightest trace of a limit; each increased power of the telescope only opens to our gaze new realms of stars and nebulæ, which, if not consisting of galaxies of stars, are self-illumining matter.

To suppose the stellar Universe to be bounded by infinite space or by infinite chaos, that is to say, to suppose a spot — for it would then become so — of matter in definite forms, with definite forces, and probably teeming with definite organic beings, plunged in a Universe of nothing, is, to my mind at least, far more unphilosophical than to suppose a boundless Universe of matter existing in forms and actions more or less analogous to those which, as far as our examination goes, pervade space.

W. Meyer:

With each sharpening of our tools which bear our gaze into the waves of light of the furthest starry realms, new waves of suns break forth from the limitless ocean of the stars.

G. J. Klein:

Even with the most powerful telescopes we see so many faintly shining stars that we are unable to doubt that on the further side of these there are yet others which will become visible by larger instruments.

Secchi:

From all these experiments, we conclude that the depth of celestial space cannot be sounded, and that we shall never succeed in reaching its bounds. We should vainly strive by a cumulation of resemblances to give even an approximate idea of the immeasurableness of the starry Universe.

Pascal:

The Universe is a circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere.

Ruckert:

The world has neither beginning nor end, in space nor in time. Everywhere is center, and turning-point, and in a moment is eternity.

D'Holbach:

Almost all the ancient philosophers are agreed in regarding the Universe as eternal. Ocellus Lukanus says expressly, in speaking of the Universe, that "it has always been and ever will be." All unprejudiced persons will feel the force of the axiom "out of nothing nothing comes."

Creation, in the acceptation in which the word is used by the moderns, is a theological subtlety.

Empedocles:

None of the gods has formed the world, nor has any man; it has always been.

SECOND PROPOSITION

There is no creation and no annihilation — the essential properties of all things being uncreatable and indestructible. Birth and death, growth and decay, are transformations.

Francis Bacon:

It is impossible for any body to be utterly annihilated.

Herbert Spencer:

Hence it is impossible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming something — the reason, namely, that nothing cannot become an object of consciousness. The annihilation of matter is unthinkable for the same reason that the creation of matter is unthinkable.

Carl Vogt:

Matter is uncreatable as it is indestructible.

Spiller:

If matter is indestructible, then it is also uncreated.

F. Mohr:

It is an indubitable fact, proved by a thousand chemical experiments, that no ponderable bodies or elements can perish or disappear, and equally that no new ones can originate. The property that cannot perish in time can-

not be evolved in time. That which cannot be destroyed cannot be originated. It follows that matter has existed from eternity, that it was neither created nor evolved, that its totality which is infinitely great can be neither increased nor diminished, and this also on the ground that the infinitely great cannot be increased by the addition of the finite, and that its characteristic of indestructibility includes that of non-creation.

Haeckel:

No particle of living energy is ever extinguished; no particle is ever created anew.

C. Maxwell:

Although in the course of ages catastrophes have taken place in the heavens, and still take place, although ancient systems dissolve and new systems are built up out of their ruins, yet the molecules of which these systems consist, the foundations of the material universe, remain unbroken and uninjured.

Robert G. Ingersoll:

Nature is but an endless chain of efficient causes. She cannot create, but she eternally transforms.

Buchner:

The same atom which to-day helps to form the haughty mien of a sovereign or a hero, may perchance lie to-morrow as the street-dust beneath his feet. The same atom which to-day drones in the brain of a sheep, may perchance to-morrow aid the thinking of a philosopher or of a poet. The same atom which to-day forms part of dirt or manure, may perchance to-morrow sleep with its fellows on the flower-bud as fragrant bloom.

Ecclesiastes i. 9:

The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun.

B. Stewart:

A simple elemental atom is really an immortal being, and rejoices in the power of remaining unchanged and unmoved in its being under the mightiest attacks which may be leveled against it; it is probably in a condition of ceaseless movement and change of form, but remains none the less evermore the same.

Rossmaessler:

Matter is eternal; it changes only its forms.

Sebastian Frank:

Substance abides eternally. A thing falls into dust, but out of the dust is developed another. The earth, as Pliny says, is a phœnix and remains once for all. When it becomes old it burns itself to ashes that out of them a young phœnix may arise, the former but rejuvenated.

Bernard Telesius:

Bodily matter is alike in all things and remains ever the same; dark sluggish matter can neither be increased nor diminished.

Giordano Bruno:

That which was seed at first, becomes grass, hence the ear, then bread, nutritive juice, blood, animal seed, embryo, man, corpse, then again earth, stone, or other mineral, and so forth. Herein we recognize therefore a thing which changes into all these things and essentially remains ever one and the same. . . . Where we say there is death,

there is only the outgoing towards new life, a loosing of one union which is the binding into a new.

Empedocles:

They are children or persons of narrow views who imagine that anything originates which before was non-existent, or that anything can wholly die or perish.

Anaxagoras:

Existence in space neither increases nor diminishes.

Democritus:

Out of nothing arises nothing; nothing that is can be annihilated. All change is only the union and separation of particles. The varieties of all things depend on the varieties of the atoms in number, size, form, and arrangement.

P. A. Secchi:

In Nature nothing is lost, nor matter, nor force, nor mechanical work.

Liebig:

Out of nothing no energy can arise.

Du Prel:

Motion, heat, light, magnetism, electricity, chemical affinity pass one into the other; they are only different modes of one and the same original energy, and each if not directly can yet indirectly be converted back again into the old form out of which it has been evoked.

Tyndall:

Everywhere is change, nowhere is annihilation. In the organic as well as in the physical world, in living as well as in dead bodies, there is everlasting motion. Absolute

repose is found nowhere. All is changing, and from the mould of the dust new life arises unceasingly.

Buchner:

The eternity of motion and its necessary existence were laid down as axioms long ago by the most ancient Greek philosophers who lived prior to the Socratic age. Especially did the atomists, Leukippus and Democritus and their famous disciples Epicurus and Lucretius, regard it as self-evident that the atoms, out of which proceed all existence, should be considered as having been in motion from all eternity.

THIRD PROPOSITION

The soul of the individual, which is the essence of the individual, is uncreatable and indestructible, preëxistent and after-existent, immortal and eternal.

Emerson:

We cannot describe the natural history of the soul, but we know that it is divine. I cannot tell if these wonderful qualities which house to-day in this mortal frame shall ever reassemble in equal activity in a similar frame, or whether they have before had a natural history like that of this body you see before you; but this one thing I know, that these qualities did not now begin to exist, cannot be sick with my sickness, nor buried in any grave; but that they circulate through the Universe; before the world was, they were. Nothing can bar them out, or shut them in, they penetrate the ocean and land, space and time, form and essence, and hold the key to universal Nature. I draw from this faith courage and hope. All things are known

to the soul. It is not to be surprised by any communication. Nothing can be greater than it. Let those fear and those fawn who will. The soul is in her native realm, and it is wider than space, older than time, wide as hope, rich as love.

Socrates:

Our souls therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a human form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence.

Bulwer:

Eternity may be but an endless series of those migrations which men call deaths, abandonments of home after home, even to fairer scenes and loftier heights. Age after age the spirit may shift its tent, fated not to rest in the dull Elysium of the heathen, but carrying with it evermore its two elements, activity and desire.

J. E. Von Schubert:

I seem often clearly to remember in my soul a presentment which I have not seen with my present, but with some other eye.

William Law:

The essences of our souls can never cease to be because they never began to be, and nothing can live eternally but that which hath lived from eternity.

Sir Thomas Browne:

There is surely a piece of divinity in us — something that was before the elements and owes no homage unto the sun.

Whatever hath no beginning may be confident of no end.

Hume:

The soul, if immortal, existed before our birth.

What is incorruptible, must be ungenerable.

Metempsychosis is the only system of immortality that philosophy can hearken to.

Schlegel:

Nature is nothing less than the ladder of resurrection which, step by step, leads upward — or rather is carried from the abyss of eternal death up to the apex of life.

Michelet:

That which has saved India and Egypt through so many misfortunes and preserved their fertility is neither the Nile nor the Ganges; it is the respect for animal life by the mild and gentle heart of man.

Pythagoras:

The soul was not then imprisoned in a gross mortal body, as it is now: it was united to a luminous, heavenly, ethereal body, which served it as a vehicle to fly through the air, rise to the stars, and wander over all the regions of immensity.

We are our own children.

Soame Jenyns:

The ancient doctrine of transmigration seems the most rational and most consistent with God's wisdom and goodness; as by it all the unequal dispensations of things so necessary in one life may be set right in another, and all creatures serve the highest and lowest, the most eligible and most burdensome offices of life by an equitable rotation; by which means their rewards and punishments may not only be proportioned to their behavior, but also carry

on the business of the Universe, and thus at the same time answer the purposes both of justice and utility.

Herder:

Do you not know great and rare men who cannot have become what they are at once, in a single human existence? who must have often existed before in order to have attained that purity of feeling, that instinctive impulse for all that is true, beautiful, and good, in short, that elevation and natural supremacy over all around them?

I am not ashamed of my half-brothers the brutes; on the contrary, as far as they are concerned, I am a great advocate of metempsychosis. I believe, for a certainty, that they will ascend to a higher grade of being, and am unable to understand how any one can object to this hypothesis, which seems to have the analogy of the whole creation in its favor.

Dr. Henry More:

And as this hypothesis [preëxistence] is rational in itself, so has it also gained the suffrage of all philosophers of all ages, of any note, that have held the soul of man incorporeal and immortal.

Southey:

The system of progressive existence seems, of all others, the most benevolent; and all that we do understand is so wise and so good, and all we do or do not, so perfectly and overwhelmingly wonderful, that the most benevolent system is the most probable.

William Blake:

In my brain are studies and chambers filled with books and pictures of old which I wrote and painted in ages of eternity before my mortal life.

Rev. William R. Alger:

In every event, it must be confessed that of all the thoughtful and refined forms of the belief in a future life none has had so extensive and prolonged a prevalence as this [preëxistence]. It has the vote of the majority, having for ages on ages been held by half the human race with an intensity of conviction almost without a parallel. Indeed, the most striking fact about the doctrine of the repeated incarnations of the soul, its form and experience in each successive embodiment being determined by its merits and demerits in the preceding ones, is the constant reappearance of that faith in all parts of the world, and its permanent hold on certain great nations.

It takes us out of the littleness of petty themes and selfish affairs, and makes it easier for us to believe in the vastest hopes mankind have ever kuown. It causes the most magnificent conceptions of human destiny to seem simply proportional to the native magnitude and beauty of the powers of the mind which can conceive such things.

Francis Bowen:

The doctrine of metempsychosis may almost claim to be a natural or innate belief in the human mind, if we may judge from its wide diffusion among the nations of the earth and its prevalence throughout the historical ages.

George MacDonald:

We cannot yet have learned all that we are meant to learn through the body. How much of the teaching even of this world can the most diligent and most favored man have exhausted before he is called to leave it? Is all that remains lost?

Bhagavad Gita:

You cannot say of the soul, it shall be, or is about to be, or is to be hereafter. It is a thing without birth.

William Knight:

As the inheritance of an illustrious name and pedigree quickens the sense of duty in every noble nature, a belief in preëxistence may enhance the glory of the present life and intensify the reverence with which the deathless principle is regarded.

The ethical leverage of the doctrine is immense, its motive power is great. It reveals as magnificent a background to the present life, with its contradictions and disasters, as the prospect of immortality opens up an illimitable foreground lengthening out the horizon of hope.

Isaac D'Israeli:

If we except the belief of a future remuneration beyond this life for suffering virtue and retribution for successful crimes, there is no system so simple, and so little repugnant to our understanding, as that of metempsychosis. The pains and pleasures of this life are by this system considered as the recompense or the punishment of our actions in another state.

Hartmann:

The experiences gained in one life may not be remembered in their details in the next, but the impressions which they produce will remain. Again and again man passes through the wheel of transformation, changing his lower energies into higher ones, until matter attracts him no longer, and he becomes — what he is destined to be — a god.

James Freeman Clarke:

It would be curious if we should find science and philosophy taking up again the old theory of metempsychosis, remodeling it to suit our present modes of religious and scientific thought, and launching it again on the wide ocean of human belief. But stranger things have happened in the history of human opinion.

Lichtenberg:

I cannot get rid of the thought that I died before I was born.

Voltaire:

Pherecides was the first among the Greeks who believed that souls existed from all eternity, and not the first, as has been supposed, who said that the soul survived the body. Ulysses, long before Pherecides, had seen the souls of heroes in the infernal regions; but that souls were as old as the world was a system which had sprung up in the East, and was brought into the West by Pherecides.

Schopenhauer:

The deep conviction of the indestructibleness of our nature through death, which every one carries at the bottom of his heart, depends altogether upon the consciousness of the original and eternal nature of our being.

We find the doctrine of Metempsychosis, springing from the earliest and noblest ages of the human race, always spread abroad in the earth as the belief of the great majority of mankind — nay, really as the teaching of all religions, with the exception of that of the Jews and the two which have proceeded from it: in the most subtle form, however, and coming nearest to the truth in Buddhism.

With reference to the universality of the belief in Metempsychosis, Obry says rightly in his excellent book, "Du Nirvana Indien," p. 13, "This old belief has been held all round the world, and was spread in the remote antiquity to such an extent that a learned English churchman has declared it to be fatherless, motherless, and without genealogy." Taught already in the "Vedas," as in all the sacred books of India, Metempsychosis is well known to be the kernel of Brahmanism and Buddhism. It accordingly prevails at the present day in the whole of non-Mohammedan Asia, thus among more than half the whole human race, as the firmest conviction, and with an incredibly strong practical influence. It was also the belief of the Egyptians, from whom it was received with enthusiasm by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato. The Pythagoreans, however, specially retained it. That it was also taught in the mysteries of the Greeks undeniably follows from the ninth book of Plato's Laws. The "Edda" also, especially in the "Voluspa," teaches Metempsychosis. Not less was it the foundation of the religion of the Druids. Even a Mohammedan sect in Hindustan, the Bohrahs, of which Colebrooke gives a full account in the "Asiatic Researches," believes in Metempsychosis, and accordingly refrains from all animal food. Also among American Indians and negro tribes — nay, even among the natives of Australia, traces of this belief are found.

Lessing:

The very same way by which the race reaches its perfection must every individual man — one sooner, another later — have traveled over. Have traveled over in one and the same life? Can he have been in one and the selfsame

life a sensual Jew and a spiritual Christian? Can he in the selfsame life have overtaken both?

Surely not that: but why should not every individual man have existed more than once upon this world?

Is this hypothesis so laughable merely because it is the oldest? Because the human understanding, before the sophistries of the schools had dissipated and debilitated it, lighted upon it at once?

Why may not even I have already performed those steps of my perfecting which bring to men only temporal punishments and rewards?

Why should I not come back as often as I am capable of acquiring fresh knowledge, fresh expertness? Do I bring away so much from one life that there is nothing to repay the trouble of coming back?

Is this a reason against it? Or because I forget that I have been here already? Happy is it for me that I do forget. The recollection of my former condition would permit me to make only a bad use of the present. And that which even I must forget *now*, is that necessarily forgotten forever?

Wordsworth, in "Intimations of Immortality:"

> Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
> The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
> Hath had elsewhere its setting
> And cometh from afar.

Tennyson, in "De Profundis:"

> Out of the deep, my child, out of the deep,
> Where all that was to be, in all that was,
> Whirled for a million eons through the vast
> Waste dawn of multitudinous eddying light —
> Out of the deep, my child, out of the deep,
> Through all this changing world of changeless law,

And every phase of ever heightening life,
And nine long months of antenatal gloom,
Thou comest.

Goethe, in "Faust:"

The soul of man
Is like the water —
From heaven it cometh,
To heaven it mounteth,
And thence at once
It must back to earth,
Forever changing.

Shelley, in "The Cloud:"

I am the daughter of earth and water
And the nursling of the sky;
I pass through the pores of the ocean and shores;
I change, but I cannot die.

Whittier, in "A Mystery:"

A presence strange at once and known
Walked with me as my guide;
The skirts of some forgotten life
Trailed noiseless at my side.

Bayard Taylor, in "The Metempsychosis of the Pine:"

All outward vision yields to that within
Whereof nor creed nor canon holds the key;
We only feel that we have ever been
And evermore shall be.

Longfellow, in "Rain in Summer:"

Thus the seer, with vision clear,
Sees forms appear and disappear
In the perpetual round of strange
Mysterious change
From birth to death, from death to birth,
From earth to heaven, from heaven to earth,
Till glimpses more sublime

Of things unseen before
Unto his wondering eyes reveal
The Universe as an immeasurable wheel
Turning for evermore
In the rapid rushing river of time.

Walt Whitman, in "Leaves of Grass:"

I know I am deathless;
I know that this orbit of mine cannot be swept by a carpenter's compass,
And, whether I come to my own to-day or in ten thousand or ten million years,
I can cheerfully take it now, or with equal cheerfulness I can wait.

. . . . . .

As to you, Life, I reckon you are the leavings of many deaths.
No doubt I have died myself ten thousand times before.

Victor Hugo, in "To the Invisible One:"

Before I came upon this earth
I know I lived in gladness
For ages as an angel; birth
Has caused my present sadness.

Dryden, in the translation of Ovid's "Metamorphoses:"

Souls cannot die. They leave a former home,
And in new bodies dwell and from them roam.
Nothing can perish, all things change below,
For spirits through all forms may come and go.

T. B. Aldrich, in "The Metempsychosis:"

I was a spirit on the mountain tops,
A perfume in the valleys, a simoom
On arid deserts, a nomadic wind
Roaming the Universe, a tireless Voice.
I was ere Romulus and Remus were;
I was ere Nineveh and Babylon;
I was, and am, and evermore shall be,
Progressing, never reaching to the end.

Robert Browning, in "Evelyn Hope:"

Delayed it may be for more lives yet
Through worlds I must traverse, not a few —
Much is to learn and much to forget
Ere the time be come for taking you.

Coleridge, in "On a Homeward Journey:"

Oft in the brain does that strange fancy roll
Which makes the present (while the flash does last)
Seem a mere semblance of some unknown past,
Mixed with such feelings as perplex the soul
Self-questioned in her sleep: and some have said
We lived, ere yet this robe of flesh we wore.

Rudyard Kipling, in "The Neolithic Age:"

In the neolithic age, savage warfare did I wage
For food and fame and two-toed horses' pelt;
I was singer to my clan in that dim, red dawn of man,
And I sang of all we fought and feared and felt.

. . . . . .

Then the silence closed upon me till they put new clothing on me —
Of whiter, weaker flesh and bone more frail;
And I stepped beneath Time's finger, once again a tribal singer.

Lowell, in "The Twilight:"

Sometimes a breath floats by me,
An odor from Dreamland sent,
Which makes the ghost seem nigh me
Of a something that came and went,
Of a life lived somewhere, I know not
In what diviner sphere:
Of mem'ries that come not and go not;
Like music once heard by an ear
That cannot forget or reclaim it;
A something so shy, it would shame it
To make it a show;
A something too vague, could I name it,
For others to know:

As though I had lived it and dreamed it,
As though I had acted and schemed it
Long ago.

Ella Wheeler Wilcox, in "To an Astrologer:"

Before the solar systems were conceived,
When nothing was but the Unnamable,
My spirit lived, an atom of the Cause.
Through countless ages and in many forms
It has existed ere it entered in
This human frame to serve its little day
Upon this earth.

W. W. Story, in "Cleopatra:"

That was a life to live for!
Not this weak human life,
With its frivolous, bloodless passions,
Its poor and petty strife!
Come to my arms, my hero!
The shadows of twilight grow,
And the tiger's ancient fierceness
In my veins begins to flow.
Come not cringing to sue me!
Take me with triumph and power,
As a warrior storms a fortress!
I will not shrink or cower.
Come as you came in the desert,
Ere we were women and men,
When the tiger passions were in us,
And love as you loved me then!

Paul H. Hayne, in "Preëxistence:"

One sails toward me on the bay,
And what he comes to do and say
I can foretell. A prescient lore
Springs from some life outlived of yore.

Edwin Arnold, in "Light of Asia:"

Lo! as hid seed shoots after rainless years,
So good and evil, pains and pleasures, hates

And loves, and all dead deeds come forth again
Bearing bright leaves or dark, sweet fruit or sour.
Thus was I he and she Yasodhara;
And while the wheel of birth and death turns round
That which hath been must be between us two.

Young:

Look nature through; 't is revolution all,
All change; no death. Day follows night, and night
The dying day; stars rise and set, and set and rise.
Earth takes the example. All to reflourish fades
As in a wheel; all sinks to reascend;
Emblems of man, who passes, not expires.

Milman's translation of "Mahabharata:"

Ne'er was the time when I was not, nor thou, nor yonder kings of earth;
Hereafter, ne'er shall be the time, when one of us shall cease to be.
The soul within its mortal frame glides on through childhood, youth, and age;
Then in another form renewed, renews its course again.
All indestructible is He that spread the living universe;
And who is he that shall destroy the work of the Indestructible?
Corruptible, these bodies are the wrap of the everlasting soul —
The eternal unimaginable soul. Whence on to battle, Bharata!
For he that thinks to slay the soul, or he that thinks the soul is slain,
Are fondly both alike deceived: it is not slain — it slayeth not;
It is not born — it doth not die; past, present, future, knows it not;
Ancient, eternal and unchanged, it dies not with the dying of the frame.
Who knows it incorruptible, and everlasting and unborn,
What heeds he whether he may slay, or fall himself in battle slain?
As their old garments men cast off, anon, new raiment to assume,
So casts the soul its worn-out frame, and takes at once another form.
The weapon cannot pierce it through, nor waste it the consuming fire;

The liquid waters melt it not, nor dries it up the parching wind.
Impenetrable and unburned ; impermeable and undried ;
Perpetual, ever wandering, firm, indissoluble, permanent,
Invisible, unspeakable.

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